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I first visited the Lower Papaloapan Basin, the gateway to the 
tropical Southeast of Mexico, in 1954. It was then an isolated, little 
developed region dominated by rain forest, empty savannah, and great
rivers.which periodically overtopped their banks. The newly created ...
Papaloapan River Basin Commission had begun an ambitious program of 
development, but the early results, which I later documented in a small 
hook,!./ were not promising.
When Sara Scherr, a student with long personal experience in Mexico, 
sought a research topic in 1975? I suggested that she evaluate what had 
happened subsequently. To my surprise and gratification, a great deal 
had occurred. The Lower Papaloapan had been transformed, with a booming 
commercial agriculture, busy highways, and modern towns newly evident.
The first half of the 1970s had been a particularly buoyant time for 
both the Papaloapan Commission and the region's economy.
Over five years have passed since Ms. Scherr's study was completed 
and with them a turbulent period for Mexico. The sexenio of President 
Jose Lopez Portillo saw the oil boom in the Southeast reach its zenith.
The country's economy began a dizzying acceleration, and great hopes for 
a more equitable course of development were entertained. These dreams 
were dashed in 1982. Following repeated devaluations of the peso, aus­
terity has become the watchword.
It was originally planned that Ms. Scherr's study would be published 
by the Papaloapan Commission. However, completion of the Spanish text in 
1978 coincided almost to the day with a helicopter crash which took the 
lives of the Commission's dynamic leaders, Ing. Jorge L. Tamayo and Ing. 
Guillermo Hernandez Castro. Plans for publication were abandoned— as, 
indeed, were most of the activities in which the Commission was engaged. 
Although the Lower Papaloapan now finds itself closely linked to both 
the national economy and the new centers of gas and oil production, little 
was done to exploit the new opportunities.
With the advent last month of the administration of President Miguel 
de la Madrid, the Mexican government will once again reassess its approach 
to the tropical Southeast and it is appropriate that we issue a shortened 
version of Ms. Scherr’s study. Some of the changes in the Papaloapan 
took place as a direct;consequence of governmental Initiatives, some
1/ The~Papaloapan Project: Agricultural Development in the Mexican
Tropics (Stanford University Press, 1964).
despite them, and some irrespective of them, from Ms. Scherr's evalua­
tion of local "success stories" many guidelines emerge as to the most 
effective role a government strapped for funds can play.
We are greatly indebted to those who made the study possible. '.'Sara'' 
Scherr’s first year of research in the Basin was underwritten by a Ful- 
bright Fellowship. Her final two months of field work and subsequent 
visits by her and myself to Mexico were made possible by a generous grant 
to Cornell University from the Tinker Foundation. While at Cornell,
Ms. Scherr's work was funded by a Liberty Hyde Bailey Fellowship, adminis 
tered by the New York State College of Agriculture and Life Sciences, and 
by the Department of Agricultural Economics.
Help from the Papaloapan Commission was^unfailing. Xngs. Tamayo and 
Hernandez offered more assistance than we might legitimately have sought. 
Friends in the Departamento de Fomento Agropecuario, in particular Ing. 
Jose Rodriguez Vallejo and Lies. Hector Duarte Penalosa, Victor Valle 
Aroche and Benjamin Pineda M. , deserve special thanks. Srita. Sarita 
Flores R. was helpfulness personified.
Lillian Thomas, my secretary, typed the original manuscript and 
made our travel and business arrangements. She also edited this version 
and, with Joseph Baldwin, drew the many graphs and charts. The maps 
were drafted in Cuidad Aleman by Gilberto Carrasco Sanchez, Beda Olmedo 
F., Nestor Olmedo Luna and Pablo Virgen Pelayo. The present typescript 
was prepared by Wendy Barrett and Diana Atkinson. Thank you all.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CHAPTER 1. THE ECONOMIC GROWTH "MIRACLE" AND THE EQUITY PROBLEM 1 
Agricultural Structure in the 1970s 1
The Equity Problem
Employment ■ ■
Agricultural Employment q
Urban Migration in
Industrial Employment 10
Agricultural Policies of the Echeverria Administration 10
CHAPTER 2. THE PAPALOAPAN BASIN 17
Settlement and History 17
The Coming of the Spaniards 
Mexican Independence
Conditions in the Papaloapan Basin in the 1940s
Regional Differences 25
Industrial Region 
Lowlands Region 
The Flood Problem 
Tuxtlas Region 
Colonization Region 
Highlands Region
28
29
30
30
31
32
Highlands Economy 33
CHAPTER 3. THE PAPALOAPAN. COMMISSION 35
History 
The Mandate
Presidential Policies, 1947-1970
35
35
37
1947-1952
1953-1958
Summary of Works through 1970 
Programs of the 1970s
37
41
42
43
-iii-
CHAPTER 4. CHANGES IN THE PAPALOAPAN BASIN 
Absorption into the National Mainstream 
Trade and Services
45
45
49
Page
Expansion of Land Farmed and Production 49
The Industrial Region 51
The Lowlands Region 51
The Tuxtlas Region 55
The Colonization Region 58
The Highlands Region 61
Assistance to Agriculture in the Basin 63
Economic Diversification and Employment 64
The Industrial Region 
The Lowlands Region 
The Tuxtlas Region 
The Colonization Region 
The Highlands Region
66
66
70
70:
70
Demographic Changes 71
Urbanization and New Zones of Influence ’ 75
Welfare Improvements 75 
Income Changes 79 
Educational Improvements gl
Summary gi
CHAPTER 5. ECONOMIC DYNAMISM IN THE BASIN— FOUR CASE STUDIES 85
The Zones of Study 35
Data Collection ; 87
CHAPTER 6 . TUXTEPEC: THE NEW CENTER OF THE PAPALOAPAN BASIN 89
The Nature of the Changes, 1945-1975 92
Communications 92
Population 92
Agriculture 96
Incomes and Employment 96
Living Standards 101
Cultural Change 101
Traditional Tuxtepec 103
Railroad and Revolution: 1900-1920 103
Era of Green Gold: 1920s 103
Stagnation: 1930s and 1940s 104
-iv-
Flood Control 1^5
Road Communications for the City 105
Opening the Hinterland 105
Agricultural Change 107
Economic Diversity -LUO
A Summary of Progress Through 1970 108
The "Boom" of the 1970s H O
Sources of Urban Change 112
Beginnings: The Adolfo Lopez Mateos Sugar Mill 112
Government Investments 112
Industrial Expansion H 4
The Influence of Roads 115
Urban.Employment.............."....... ........................ H O
Sources of Rural Change 118
The Importance of Sugar Cane 118
Private Cattle Expansion 119
Public Policies for Poorer Farmers 121
Production Credit for Improving Incomes and Technology 121
Ejidal Livestock Credit 122
Commodity Credit 12^
Agricultural Labor Demand 12^
Summary: The Value of Integrated Rural Development 130
Basic Requirements 121*
Employment Stimulation 120
Urban Investments 121
A Network of Regional Centers 132
Appendix 6-A. Agricultural Production in Tuxtepec Zone,
1960-1970 134
CHAPTER 7. ISLA AND LOCAL INITIATIVE 135
The Nature of the Changes 135
Population 135
Communications 138
Agriculture 138
Economic Diversification l44
Living Standards i4^
Sources of Isla's Development: The Early Years, 1900-1945 146
Isla's Founding l4^
Introduction of Pineapple 1^8
Immigration l43
Page
The Papaloapan Commission and Two Decades of Development 105
-v-
Pa%e
Settlement, 1945-1965 148
New People 149
Communications 149
Progress in Ranching 150
Progress in Pineapple Production 150
Isla as a Free Municipio 151
Municipal Activity 151
New Roads 152
Pineapple 152
Ranching 155
Other Agricultural Credit Programs 158
Changing Labor Demand in Isla 158
New Lands 159
Seasonality 159
Labor by Class 161
Summary: The Potential of Local Initiative 162
Importance of. Local Sources of Capital 162
Technology and Education : 164
Success of Credit cum Processing 164
Repeating the Isla Experience 164
Appendix 7-A. Income Changes in Isla 167
CHAPTER 8 . ABASOLO AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN AGRICULTURE 168
The Nature of the Changes 169
Population 169
Communications 169
Agriculture 173
Economic Diversification 173
Living Standards 176
The Sources of Abasolo's Changes: Political Unification 178
The Establishment of Abasolo 178
Unification in the 1970s 177
Sources of Abasolo's Changes: The Public Credit Project 180
The Plan Benito Juarez 180 ■
The Coordinated Development Project 180
Agricultural Credit 182
Ranching Credit 183
Present Status of the Program 184
Improved Marketing 184
-vi-
187Employment Patterns in Abasolo 
Land Clearing
Changes in Intensification and Seasonal Distribution of 
Labor
Type of Holding 
Labor Patterns by Class
Summary: Rural Prosperity and Change
Transfer of Resources 
Success in Cattle Enterprises 
Program Flexibility and Politics 
The Problems
Application of the Abasolo Model
187
187
187
188
190
190
190
191
191
192
CHAPTER 9. IXTLAN AND THE TUXTEPEC PAPER MILL 194
The Nature of the Changes 194
Population
Communications
Agriculture
Economic Diversification 
Living Standards
Sources of Changes: Personalism in
............................ 194
197
197
203
208
Politics 211
The Early History of Ixtlan
Economic Changes After the War
Their Present Political Outlook
The Personal Link in the 1970s Program
211
212
212
213
Sources of Change: Projects to Stimulate Employment 214
History of the Forest 
Solution of the Paper 
Agricultural Programs
Complex
Mill Supply Problem 
and other Government
214
216
Aid 220
Changing Labor Patterns in Ixtlan 222
In Logging Communities 
Other Communities
The Effects of Small-Scale Industry
The Effect of Agricultural Intensification
222
222
225
225
Summary:EconomicDiversificationforthe Highlands
The Future of Agriculture 
Opportunities Outside Agriculture
225
225
226
226Labor-Intensive Inputs with Capital-Intensive Processing 
Applicability of the Ixtlan Model 227
-Page
CHAPTER 10. DEVELOPMENT, EMPLOYMENT AND EQUITY IN MEXICO:
THE CASE OF THE PAPALOAPAN BASIN 229
The Potential of the Humid Tropics in Mexico 229
Agricultural Development and Employment 230
Prices, Products and Intensification 230
Land Expansion 231
Capitalization of Agriculture 232
New Migration Patterns 233
Industrial Development and Employment 234
Urbanization of the Countryside 236
The Future of the Tropical Development Commissions 236
-viii-
List of Acronyms
BANAMEX
BANCOMER
BANRURAL
CAPFCE
CFE
Comision Nacional de Irrigacion
.......>*........................Comision Nacional de la Industria Azucarera
Complejo Fruticola Industrial, S.A.
Comite Nacional Coordinadora del Sector Agropecuario
Financiera Nacional Azucarera, S.A.
Fideicomiso para Obras Sociales para Caneros de 
Escasos Recursos
Fideicomiso Instituido en Relation con la Agricultura 
Fondo Nacional de Fomento Agropecuario
Instituto para el Mejoramiento de la Produccion de Azucar 
Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo de la Comunidad 
Instituto Nacional de Investigation Forestal 
Instituto Nacional Indigenista 
Instituto Mexicana de Cafe 
Plan Integral de Desarrollo Rural 
FLAMEFA Plan para Mejoramiento Parcelario
PLANP Plan Papaloapan
PNH Plan Nacional Hidraulico
CNIA
COFRINSA
CONACOSA
FINASA
FIOSCER
FIRA
FONAFE
IMPA
INDECO
INIF
INI
INMECAFE
PIDER
Banco Nacional de Mexico, S.A.
Banco de Comercio, S.A.
Banco de Credito Rural, S.A.
Comite Administradora del Programa Federal de 
Construccion de Escuelas
Comision Federal de Electricidad
-ix-
FRONAFOR
FRONDAAT
SAG
SARH
SOP
SRH
Programa NacionaX de Aprovechamiento Forrajero 
Programa NacionaX de AgricuXtura en Areas de TemporaX 
Secretaria de AgricuXtura y Ganaderia 
Secretaria de AgricuXtura y Recursos HidrauXicos 
Secretaria de Obras PubXicas 
Secretaria de Recursos HidrauXicos
-x-
CHAPTER 1. THE ECONOMIC GROWTH "MIRACLE" AND THE EQUITY PROBLEM
For years, economists spoke excitedly about the "Mexican growth 
miracle." National product (shown in Graph 1-1) rose roughly six times 
between 1940 and 1970, at a rate of about five percent per year, with 
manufacturing at the fore. Urbanization proceeded at a very rapid rate, 
until well over half the population lived in towns. Professional, 
technical and white-collar workers comprise over ten percent of the 
economically active population (EAP). Workers in manufacturing, sales 
and other nonhighly skilled, but nevertheless "modern" work now comprise 
nearly 40 percent (32, p. 63). The country has been woven together as a 
nation for the first time in its history through a vast system of new 
roads and other communications infrastructure. Improved health standards 
led to a precipitous drop in the mortality rate.
..But today the.talk is more sober.  The rate.of growth has dropped.-..
markedly; agriculture is stagnating; Mexico has been forced to devalue 
the peso; unemploymentand underemployment are rising. It is becoming 
obvious— if it ever was not— that Mexico's "miracle" completely bypassed 
at least half of the population. Studies are beginning to show that 
large groups experienced actual dec 1ines in real income.
These phenomena, however, have not been universal. There are some 
pockets that have achieved both rapid growth, and a relatively broad 
distribution of the benefits from growth. The Papaloapan Basin in the 
tropical Southeast contains several such zones. Its experience suggests 
that there are viable options open to the Mexicans on two fronts. First 
of all, conditions today are ripe for a major thrust forward m  tropical 
development. Sufficient technology is available; the infrastructure is 
there. It is a frontier that should hold the same potential for growth 
that the arid north held thirty years ago. Secondly, if properly 
supported, rural Mexico can indeed be a dynamic source of employment 
generation, both through intensification of production, and through 
urbanization of the countryside.
This chapter provides a national setting in which to consider the 
Papaloapan experiences. Chapters 2 and 3 describe the Papaloapan River 
Basin and the Papaloapan Commission which was set up to develop the 
region. Chapter 4 analyzes the general growth patterns of the Basin, and 
is followed by four case studies of particularly dynamic areas. The con­
cluding chapter discusses a range of policy options open to the govern­
ment to duplicate the production, income and employment achievements of 
these zones elsewhere.
Agricultural Structure in the 1970s
The goals of national agricultural policy until the 1970s were quite 
clearly the achievement of self-sufficiency of effective domestic
-1-
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GRAPH 1-1 GROWTH OF MEXICAN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT*
Source* Banco cle Mexico, S.A.
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food demand with cheap urban food prices, and an export
finance capital imports for industry. Production between!940 and 197U 
more than tripled, with the overwhelming proportion of this increase in 
export crops.
The irrigation districts in the north are the major producers; the 
20 percent of land under irrigation produced 43 percent of the value of 
production in 1970. Technology in this sector is quite advanced. In the 
tropics, only Veracruz is a major producer, particularly for livestock.
But whereas only 20 percent of the GDP in 1976 came from agricul­
ture, nearly 45 percent of the EAP was employed primarily in that sector. 
There are three significantly different groups of rural producers. In 
1968, 52 percent of holdings were classified as "subsistence ^another 41 
percent were considered "traditional"; and only seven percent "modern 
those which use advanced technology and marketing systems. Graph 1-2 and 
Chart 1-1 describe the sectors.
With such a structure, stagnation came quickly to agriculture in 
Mexico,oncethemostproductiveinvestmentsinirrigation werecom- 
Dieted Agricultural product per economically active person in agricul- 
ture had risen 2.0 percent annually 1940-1950; 1.9 percent 1950-1960, and 
only 1.2 percent 1960-1970. Between 1970 and 1974, it actually declined 
.7 percent per year (30). Between 1940 and 1960, agricultural exports 
rose ten percent yearly, but in the 1960's, only 1.2 percent yearly. 
Imports were required in several years. The value of ramfed agricul 
rural production has actually been declining.
And beyond the now-critical production problems are even more 
intransigent problems of equity and employment.
The Equity Problem
Graphs 1-3 and 1-4 show the characteristics of income distribution 
in Mexico according to the 1970 Census. While 62 percent of the work 
force as a whole earn less than $100 monthly (US $960 per year in 1970 
prices, or about $1800 in 1976 prices), 94 percent of the agricultural 
labor force made as little. Less than three percent of the work force^ 
made over US $10,000 per year (by 1976 prices) compared to 50 percent in 
the United States. Even if it is assumed that the^Mexican income figures 
are grossly deflated and that farm incomes do not include on farm con 
sumption, the rural-urban dichotomy is still notable, as is the large 
segment of Mexican society with extremely low living levels.
Becauseofloweredinfantandtotal.mortality rates,a verysub­
stantial portion of the population is in the "dependent" age group. The 
potential EAP of Mexico (those older than fourteen and younger than 
sixty) dropped from 58 percent in 1930 to about 50 percent m  19 . ^
Because of the extremely low participation of women, the actual EAP by 
the 1970 census was 27 percent. In the United States, the corresponding 
figure was around 50 percent.
GRAPH 1-2. MODERN, TRADITIONAL, SUBSISTENCE SECTORS BY STRUCTURE*
m0
01 xt fi nJCQPOs:
Eh
1967/68— INCOME BY SECTOR AND REGION, PRIVATE AND EJIDAL*
□  PrivateHI EJidal
NP - N. Pacific 
NC 1 „NE L North + Aguas- 
CN I oalients
B Center +
C Colima, Guerrero 
S - S. Pacific 
+ Gulf (exc, 
Colima, Guerrero)
—  Except where noted, 
order from top to 
bottom; modern, trad., 
subsist.
* Manuel Rodriguez Cisneros, et al., Caracteristicas de la AeriVnlfn^ 
Mexicana, 1970, pp. 156, 262. ~ _ _  ■ ------—
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CHART 1.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF MEXICAN AGRICULTURE*
Percentage farms 
Percent land irrigated 
Percent improved seeds 
Percent fertilized 
Percent consumed by producer
Income per plot (pesos) 
Cultivated hectares per plot 
Productivity per plot (pesos)
Capital per hectare 
Tractor hoursperhectare 
Oxen hours per hectare 
Man hours per hectare
Cost of fertilizer per hectare 
Cost of insecticide per hectare
Modern Traditional Subsistence
7.1 40.5 52.4
33.1 13.1 : 7.9
85.6 33.6 14.0
83.1 41.9 16.8
7.2 15.5 38.8
62,840 9282 3472
33.1 13.1 7.9
2093 721 522
3675 1787 959
1 0 .8 4.7 . . 8
4 23 54
260 209 251
348 195 39
47 18 6
* Manuel Rodriguez Cisnerosj et.al., Caracterist icas— de—La—Agricultur5L 
Mexicana, 1970, pp. 255, 264.
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GRAPH 1-3. INCOMES IN MEXICO IN 1970*-^
4799 9595
Income Classes
GRAPH 1-4. INCOME DISTRIBUTION BY SECTOR IN MEXICO, 1970*
a/ Of 12,955,057 workers, 11,620,469 reported their income. 
^Source: Mexico, SIC, Noveno Censo de Poblacion, 1970 (1972)
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The lack of integration into "modern life" is 
literacy figures. Even by 1970, forty percent 
earthen floors. Nearly 50 percent had palm or
reflected in housing 
of all Mexican homes 
insulated tile roofs.
Literacy in 1970 averaged only 62 percent, with a range among^states 
from 51 to 83 percent, the latter figure for Mexico City. Sixty-five 
percent of children ages six to nine had had no primary schooling; 
roughly 20 percent of children 10 to 19 had had none. Only five percent 
of children 10 to 14 had attended junior high school and 10 percent of 
those 15 to 19. Yet schooling has a crucial effect on employability.
There are geographical differences in living standards. The general 
welfare (as measured by a variety of indices) is highest m  the northern 
border states, a little better than average in Veracruz and some of tne^ 
western states, below average in most of the central states, and worst in 
the South Pacific (2, p. 6 8 ). Meanwhile, national health indicators on
mortalityandmorbidity,afterreachingalow.i n 1965,appeartohave
cl imbed since then.
Xn 1977 , 9 1/2 million people— or one-seventh of the total popula­
tion— resided in the capital city, not to mention another two to three 
million in the surrounding metropolitan area. The Central Plateau is 
extremely overcrowded, while the provinces are too underpopulated to 
provide either important markets or a qualified labor force.
Despite these glaring distributional problems, Mexico has funnelled 
an unusually small amount of public expenditure into welfare programs tor 
the bottom quarter of the population— in fact, the lowest m  Latin _ 
America, as of 1970. Relative rural peace has been bought by periodic 
distribution of land and the pull of the cities. Meanwhile, peace in the 
cities has been achieved through subsidies of food, health care, an 
transportation.
Employment
Employment is emerging as the single most crucial issue in develop­
ment, from the standpoint of both production and distribution. In a poor 
society, few people are really "unemployed": they find a way>to make a
few cents here and there to live. Therefore "underemployment is the 
more common term used: work of marginal productivity, marginal rewards
or marginal value to society. Estimates of underemployment range from 
to 45 percent of the EAP (4.8 to 5.8 million persons) (35). This figure 
does not include the millions of Mexicans working in the United States^
noC supported by.the Mexican economy...According to the Census, 60 per
cent of those in agriculture are underemployed, 14 percent m  services,
10 percent in the transformation industry sector and 6 percent in com 
merce. Only 81 percent of the EAP worked 10 to 12 months per year; in 
the agricultural sector, only 77 percent.
-8-
Agricultural Employment
The seasonal and multisectoral aspect of employment is important. 
For example, Chart 1-2 shows the distribution of workers in agriculture. 
The number of workers fluctuates between 6 million in the winter cycle 
harvest, and 9,6 million for the spring-summer cycle harvest.
The absorption of agricultural labor is dependent upon a number of 
variables such as land expansion, yields, mechanization, irrigation, and 
choice of crop. Ranching, while it generates 34 percent of agricultural 
product, absorbs only about 4 percent of the EAP.
Different sections of the country have different characteristics of 
labor absorption. Traditionally, it was greatest in the north, espe­
cially the northwest irrigation zones which have multiple harvests. Yet 
the substitution of wheat, and especially cotton, by sorghum, soy and 
safflower, and also high mechanization have reduced employment growth in 
recent years. The differential employment per hectare between rainfed 
and irrigated land was halved between 1960 and 1973 (20). After 1973 
cotton dropped even more drastically, which eliminate~thousands of jobs. 
What used to be a three-month long migration from all parts of the 
country, is now satisfied by local labor.
In the Center Gulf and South Pacific, increase in production and 
opening lands led to increasing absorption of free workers; but they also 
receive the lowest wages of any working group. There is a low level of 
capitalization, and few alternatives for workers who will not work for 
the wages offered. There is frequent migration to the sugar, coffee and 
copra fields for harvests. In Yucatan, the only real absorption of 
workers has been through opening of new lands. On the Gulf coast in 
general there were high levels of unemployment and underemployment until 
recent years, when increasing land-clearing and greater government 
investment created many new jobs.
In the Southern region (which includes Oaxaca, Guerrero and Chiapas) 
the problems are severe. Whereas 211,000 workers left agriculture in 
1960-69, only 70,000 new jobs were offered in that region in industry and 
services.
The Central region has shown the greatest relative increase in use 
of the labor force, due to greater increases in land, large yield 
increases and^a low mechanization rate, while change in crop composition 
was not negative. However, because there was already such strong pres­
sure on the land, with widespread minifundism, the net result was pretty 
insignificant to the labor force. In 1972, the majority of farmers in 
the State of Mexico worked in Mexico City in the off-season and/or 
received income from a family member living in the capital (2 0, 25, 30).
Urban Migration
Because of the comparatively higher rate of underemployment in 
the countryside, there has been a major rural-urban migration since about 
1966. Prior to this, most internal migration was between productive 
rural zones. The immigrants are mostly young, single, and the
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better-educated groups from the provinces. Half of all migration between 
1960 and 1970 was to cities greater than 50,000 population. Two-thirds 
of these migrants went to Mexico City, Monterrey, Guadalajara, Puebla or 
Ciudad Juarez in Chihuahua. The city of Netzahualcoyotl on the outskirts 
of Mexico City, was born and grew to a million people in about ten 
years.
Industrial Employment
A decline in agricultural employment would not be a problem, if the 
other sectors were absorbing new workers quickly. But from 1960 to 1969, 
the manufacturing sector absorbed only about 90,000 workers per year. 
Since it has been estimated that Mexico will need to create 600,000 jobs 
per year to absorb the net increase in EAP, this is not a very promising 
record (30). Food products and textile production, traditionally the 
most important sources of employment, are now losing workers. Absorption 
rates from 1960 to 1969 were greatest in machinery, electric and 
electronics equipment, chemicals and basic metals— i.e., the most 
modernized industries, which tend to hire skilled labor. Capital goods 
and consumer durable industries gave the best overall record in 
production, productivity and employment increases (30).
With urban migration , and the constraints of industrial employment 
possibilities, the greatest number of migrants have been absorbed by the 
service sector, which is larger in Mexico than in any European or 
American country with the exception of Guatemala (30). Unfortunately, a 
large portion of this is of a very marginal nature. Graph 1-5 shows the 
changes over time in the EAP.
Agricultural Policies of the Echeverria Administration
The government of Echeverria initiated many new projects to deal 
with the problem of rural stagnation. New irrigation projects were 
begun, through the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources (SRH) and the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Livestock's (SAG) Plan Benito Juarez. Rainfed land 
was cleared through the Ejidal Bank Clearing program and other SRH 
programs. A Water Law was passed in 1971 to reorganize Irrigation and 
Drainage Districts and a new Agrarian Reform law was passed.
Road-building was at an unprecedented high, including many built with 
manual labor.
Guaranteed product prices increased, as shown in Graph 1-6. The 
participation of C0NASUP0 (National Company for Basic Staples) grew 
enormously. Both private and public credit have been provided on a large 
scale to agriculture, as illustrated in Graph 1-7. The Bank of Mexico's 
FIRA program— "Fideicomiso Instituido en Relacion con la Agricultura"—  
has funneled money from Lhe Interamerican Bank for Development and the 
World Bank, through private banks, to poorer farmers at low interest 
rates. In 1974 the three public banks which used to lend to the rural 
sector (Banco Ejidal, Banco Agropecuario, Banco Agricola) were merged, to 
become the National Bank for Rural Credit (BANRURAL).
11
GRAPH 1-5. ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION (EAR)*
* Secretaria de Recursos Hidraulieos, Prontuario Estadlstlco de la SRH, 
■ 1974, p. 121.
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GRAPH 1-6. AVERAGE NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL PRICES*
Input prices rose: 1.7 percent annually, 1960-1965
1.3 percent annually, 1965-1970
9.9 percent annually, 1970-1974
Prices declined for: electricity
fertilizer
Prices rose for: seed
fuels (49%) 
petroleum (50%) 
irrigation (50%) 
tin plate 
packaging
* Mexico, Comercio Exterior, Vol. 25 #5 (Special issue on agriculture), 
mayo 1975.
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GRAPH 1-7. TOTAL FINANCING OF AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK 
PRODUCTION BY THE MEXICAN BANKING SYSTEM*— /
Rate of real increase:
Period
1951-1960
1961-1970
1971-1975
Percent in the period 
206.2 
97.0 
28.4
Annual percent 
11 .8
7.0
5.1
— / Besides national and private institutions, we also consider 
"almacenes de deposito,” Federal Government trust funds given as credit, 
and funds of fiduciary departments.
k/ Index of prices implicit in the Gross Domestic Product.
* 1942-1568: Banco de Mexico, S.A. Informe Anual 1972. 1969-1975:
Re1aci6n de Responsibilidades de usuarios de credito bancario.
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There was some collectivization of ejidos, and the National Fund for 
Ejidal Development (FONAFE) was set up to diversify ejidal activities.
The tropical river basin commissions were generously refinanced in the 
first part of the sexenio. The first semblance of agricultural planning 
appeared, in the form of CONACOSA (National Coordinating Committee for 
Agriculture) and SRH's National Hydraulic Plan (PNH).
Direct efforts to help farms on rainfed lands were made through the 
Puebla Plan, the Maize Plan and the Tlaxcala Plan. Outside groups helped 
to finance PIDER (Integral Plan of Rural Development) and PRONDAAT 
(National Plan for Rainfed Agriculture), Rainfed Agriculture Districts 
are being set up. After the new President Jose Lopez Portillo took 
office in 1976, tbe SRH and SAG were combined to form one ministry for 
the rural areas the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources 
(SARH). An attempt has also been made to decentralize industry somewhat.
Presently this multitude of programs is without direction, or a 
common policy, and resources are probably spread too thinly among them.
But their successful interaction in parts of the Fapaloapan Basin is an 
optimistic sign. The following study attempts to analyze the specific 
factors behind such success, and suggest a general policy for rural 
"growth with equity."
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CHAPTER 2. THE PAPALGAPAN BASIN
The Papaloapan Basin on Mexico's Gulf Coast is the closest tropical 
river basin to the Central Plateau. It includes parts of the states of 
Veracruz, Oaxaca and Puebla, and has over two million inhabitants.
The Papaloapan is primarily a rural area, with nearly a third of its 
land in agricultural production. Most of this is on the flat plains of 
the Lower Basin, and in a few fertile valleys in the mountains of the 
Sierra Madre Oriental that make up the Upper Basin.
The region is extremely diverse, as can be noted in the photographs 
on the following page. The hot dry coastal plain is covered with savan­
nahs..Moving to.the.foothills of.the.Sierra.,.rainfall increases.and.the..
land is covered by luxuriant tropical vegetation. In the high, cold 
mountains, pine trees predominate; in the rain shadow to the east, the 
land is nearly barren.
The alluvial soils along the rivers are rich as are the volcanic 
soils around Orizaba and the Tuxtlas, but most of the lowland soils are 
more suitable to pasture than crops, due to the high prevalence of later- 
ites, severe weathering, low organic matter and difficult drainage
problems.
Maps 2-1 through 2-6 illustrate the major geographic variables.
Settlement and History
The Basin has a long history of settlement and resettlement. There 
has been much speculation on the role of the various indigenous groups in 
the Papaloapan Basin in the prehistoric development of Mexico. Excava 
tions in the Tehuacan Valley and other arid zones showed that man was 
living there before 7200 B.C. and began cultivating maize between 3500 
and 2300 B.C. Squashes, chiles, avocados, "quelite," fava beans, sapota 
and string beans were all part of the diet during this period. The first 
maize with tripsicum was found there, dating between 1500 and 900 B.C.
(8 , pp. 14-15).
There was a possible Mayan influence in the Basin from 5000 to 
2700 B.C., but it appears that the Mayans were thrown out eventually by
the.Huastecos(the directdescendantsoftheOlmecs), the Totonacs...and
the Popolucas, groups native to the area. It was the Mayans who first 
introduced pineapple to the region (8_, p. 16).
From 1500 to 600 B.C., the Totonacs inhabited the left bank of the 
Papaloapan River and the right bank near Angel R. Cabada and the Tres 
Zapotes. The rest of the right and the left banks near Cosamaloapan was 
inhabited by the Popolocas . It has been suggested that first populations
-17-
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MAP 2-2. PAFALOAPAN BASIN: CLIMATIC ZONES (THORNTHWAITE CLASSIFICATION)*
*Adapted from: Sec. Rec. Hidr., Comm. Pap.> 
Hidrologico de la Cuenca del Papaloapan (Mexico,
Atlas Climatologico e 
1975), Lamina XVIII,
XIX-B
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MAP 2-4. TOPOGRAPHY OF THE PAPALOAPAN BASIN*
MAP 2-5. RIVER SYSTEMS OF THE PAPALOAPAN BASIN+
*Fec. Rec. Hidr.
fSec. Rec. Hidr. 
1958, p. 6 8,
Comm. Pap., Basic Map of the Papaloapan Basin.
Comm. Pap., Economia del Papaloapan, Primera Parte,
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of the Central Plateau came from the Gulf Coast, particularly from the 
Mixtequilla within the Basin C8 , p. 16).
The Empire of Mexico had a major effect in the 1400s on the Lower 
Basin and the Upper Mixteca, as considerable tribute was extracted from 
these areas. The Olmecs had learned to use rubber, and this product was 
included in the tribute given by Tuxtepec to the Mexican Empire, along 
with cotton. Major cotton production before the 16th century centered 
around Tlalixcoyan, Soyaltepec, Xxcatlan, Tuxtepec and Teotitlan in the 
Canada (8, p. 18).
The Coming of the Spaniards
At the time the Spaniards came, there were no roads anywhere in the 
Basin, only a vast system of foot paths. As they had for centuries, 
settlements located mostly along the navigable rivers, where the soils 
were more fertile and where communication was possible to outside areas 
via launches. The most important towns were Tlacotalpan, Chacaltianguis, 
Cosamaloapan, Otatitlan, Tuxtepec and Playa Vicente.
Since nearby Veracruz was the principal port for the Spaniards, the 
Basin was one of the first places to be settled by them. The river 
towns— Tlalixcoyan, Tlacotalpan, Cosamaloapan and Amatitlan were the main 
towns chosen. These, along with Orizaba, the Tuxtlas, Zongolica and 
Playa Vicente, would be the zones of development in the Basin for the 
next few centuries.
It was the Spaniards who first opened up the area. By the 17th 
century, a road had been built to Veracruz through Cotaxtle, Cordoba, 
Orizaba, Maltrata and Puebla, and in the 18th century, a route from 
Tlalixcoyan to Cotaxtle was added. These opened up commerce to the 
interior.
Their effect on agriculture was significant. They introduced wheat, 
barley, rice, sugar cane, apples, grapes, olives, pears, quince, oranges 
and a number of vegetables (8_, p. 19). Wheat grew to be an important 
crop in Esperanza and the Valley of Tehuacan in Puebla.
Tobacco became important in Cordoba, Orizaba and Zongolica in the 
18th century, until 1764, when the Spanish Crown banned future produc­
tion. It was not important again until the end of the century (8, 
p. 27). 1860-1870 marked the first real pioneer colonization in the
Basin, when Cuban and Spanish planters came (after the 1868 revolt) to 
Valle Nacional.
Native production of cotton grew; by the late 1700s, the Basin was a 
major producer in the country. A few small mills were opened in the 
early 1800s, then in 1845 a credit program was set up which expanded the 
cotton industry in Orizaba to take third place nationally, after Mexico 
City and Puebla (8, p. 26)
-23-
Livestock was introduced and, by 1600, occupied most of the open 
land in the Lower Basin. Sugar cane was introduced by Cortes himself in 
1524 in Santiago Tuxtla, where the first "trepiche" in Mexico was built 
to produce raw sugar. The 16th century saw the rapid spread of cane, 
even into the Canada. Competition from the Caribbean caused a decline in 
production at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries,
But after the Negro Rebellion in Haiti and Santo Domingo, the export 
market opened up and there was a big increase in production. It was at 
this time that many blacks came to work in the cane fields. They mixed 
with the indigenous peoples to form the "jarocho" typical of Veracruz 
(8_, P.26) .
The "sombrero11 hat was introduced by the Spanish in 1580 and was 
quickly accepted by the natives. The famous Mixtec weaving dates from 
about that time. Coffee (coffea arabica) was brought to the Huasteco
.—  still an..important.coffee-growing.area— in.1812...Mango was brought....
from Manila to Cordoba in 1826 (8_).
; Brought also by.the Spaniards were a number.of illnesses, especially
viruela and yellow fever, that rapidly decimated the coastal population. 
As a result of this, and the retreating of many coastal tribes into the 
'Sierra during the Spanish conquest, the coastal plain was left relatively 
depopulated.
Mexican Independence
Independence after 1821 brought few important changes to the Basin. 
Prime among these was the building of the railroad in 1873, which pro­
vided the first opportunity for many inland areas to begin commercial 
agricultural production. Yet because of the development of the steam­
ship, until the 20th century most produce was still moved to Port 
Alvarado by river, then by lighter to Veracruz. Cotton and tobacco were 
the principal commercial crops at this time.
Cotton became more and more important, especially with the United 
States crisis occasioned by the Civil War. Playa Vicente and Tuxtepec 
were major productive areas. New factories were put up in Nogales, 
Orizaba, Necontala, Rio Blanco, San Andres Tuxtla and Alvarado. By the 
late 1870's, the Basin produced almost half the cotton in the country. 
This continued until the turn of the century, when there was a drastic 
decline in production as much lower cost producers in the north began to 
expand on a large scale (8_, p. 24).
During this era, the new laws of "terrenos baldios"^ encouraged 
Veracruz hac end ados to settle peons on their lands, The 1and was
}JUnder this law, state land was distributed for sale to private 
individuals, with the intention of populating unoccupied lands. In 
practice, much of the land was acquired by private land companies who 
sold off little for settlement.
-24-
repopulated, primarily under a latifundio/plantation structure based on 
extensive ranching and cash plantation crops, including rubber. These 
holdings dominated the riverbanks and land along the railways. Scarcity 
of labor remained their biggest problem.
After 1875, coffee and tobacco leaped to importance. In 1896, the 
giant San Cristobal sugar mill was erected in Cosamaloapan— the beginning 
of the pervasive importance of cane in the Fapaloapan. Its private 
owners, along with other large-scale business interests, markedly 
influenced local politics through the first half of the 20th century.
In order to attract outside labor to the underpopulated zone, they 
began to offer wages which, while still low, were for many peons the 
first opportunity to earn outside income. Migrants came from all over 
the Sierra. The Chinantec, Mixe and Mixtec Indians began to descend 
regularly from the hills for harvest of sugar cane, tobacco and coffee.
Coffee remained important near the urban northwest and the windward 
slopes of the Sierra. The banana was cultivated in the Basin in the 
mid-'20s, and the'30s was a time of the banana export ’’boom." Along with 
the Grijalva area further south of the Basin, the Lower Fapaloapan 
produced most of Mexico1s bananas. The boom collapsed in the latter half 
of the decade, though, when the Panama disease set in and could not be 
economically controlled. Most of the foreign planters left Mexico.
Zebu cattle were introduced in the 1920s, along with new pastures—  
Guinea grass for the hills and Para for the flooded areas. The livestock 
coefficient increased three to four times with the new grasses; 2.5 head 
per hectare could be supported by Para (10, p. 126)
In general, the ejios received the marginal lands of the Haciendas. 
Their most important production was for subsistence, the major exception 
being cane production from the mills. In the Cosamaloapan and San 
Cristobal areas, 74 ejidos were born between 1921 and 1950 and their 
population grew from 45,000 to 80,000. Cane production grew from 1500 
hectares at the turn of the century to 27,000 hectares in 1953, of which
18,000 hectares were on ejidos (10).
By 1950, one-third of the land in the Lower Papaloapan was owned by 
ejidos and up to two-thirds of the cultivable land. Some 700 ejidos had 
been set up and distributed to about 50,000 ejidatarios. This had a 
major negative effect on livestock production, as most of the land was 
turned to subsistence farming (1, p.  76).
There was much less effect on the Upper Basin, where there had been 
few large landholdings before the war and in which the traditional 
landholding village form predominated through the present time.
Conditions in the Papaloapan Basin in the 1940s
In 1947, when the Papaloapan Commission was created, the Basin was 
still one of the most backward areas in Mexico, with the exception of
-25-
the Cordoba-Orizaba-Tehuacan zone which was well-communicated with 
Veracruz and the Central Plateau, and had begun to industrialize. The 
first labor movements in Mexico took place in Orizaba.
The rest of the Basin had no first-class roads at all. Scattered 
sugar mills were the only industry in the region. Rivers provided the 
only major form of transportation with most important settlements near 
them, but declining navigability was becoming a problem. The burden was 
shifting to the railroad, which had very inadequate equipment and 
management. See Map 2-7 for a view of communications and settlement in
the Basin around this time.
There were no warehouses for production inputs or harvest storage, 
which also greatly limited commercial agricultural exploitation. In 
1945, only 5 percent of the land was being cultivated (8^ Chart 3).
There were very few services, and the lack of sanitary and medical 
facilities was critical. Because of isolation, the tropical climate and 
poornutrition,inhabitantsoftheregionfellpreytonumerousdiseases 
and infections. Malaria was endemic; nearly everyone had gastro­
intestinal parasites. Tuberculosis, onchocercosis (a filarial worm^ . 
infestation) infected large segments of the population, especially m  the 
Papaloapan Valley and to the east of the Santo Domingo River.
Illiteracy in 1950 was around 58 percent. Fifty percent of the 
school-age population had no educational facilities at all. Secondary 
schooling was available in only a few urban centers^and no schools for 
technical or higher education were available at all in the Basin.
One third of the population spoke no Spanish. The nine major 
Indian languages had 180 subdialects among them which were mutually 
incomprehensible,2J
Regional Differences
The Basin was not then— and is not now— homogeneous. For purposes 
of more careful analysis, we can divide it into the five subregions which 
were marked on the above maps and in Map 2-8, which have more or less 
distinct physical and socioeconomic characteristics.
The "Industrial Region" is in the northwestern corner of the Basin 
and includes the major cities of Cordoba, Orizaba, Ciudad Mendoza, and 
Tehuacan in Puebla. This area has followed a pattern of development 
distinct fromthe restof the B a s i n . I t h a s l o n g  been part ofthe 
national economy and is presently quite urbanized and industrialize .
Z/Major Xnd ian languages included: Mixtec, Zapotec, Nahuat1,
Chinantec, Popoluca, Popoloca, Ixcatec, Cuicatec, Mazatec.
-26-
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The "Lowlands Region" comprises the major floodplain area of the 
Basin, This is the region that the Papaloapan Commission has emphasized 
in its programs, and that has experienced most economic growth in the 
last few decades (outside the Industrial Zone).
The "Tuxtlas Region" in the eastern Basin is dominated by a small 
volcanic mountain range called the Tuxtlas. It is a long-settled area 
which has nevertheless been fairly isolated and less affected by major 
government investment.
The "Colonization Region" is the sparsely populated region at the 
eastern foothills of the Sierra. This area is just beginning to be 
integrated with the rest of the country..
The "Highlands Region" comprises most of the Oaxaca highlands. This 
is a zone of centuries-old settlement by numerous indigenous populations 
who have generally lived in extreme isolation and poverty.
The general characteristics of these five regions are described 
below, to familiarize the reader with the potential and the constraints 
of each of the zones for long-term development.
Industrial Region
This has long been the center for economic activity in the Basin, as 
the major market, service center and source of inputs. Long on the 
overland route from the Central Plateau to Veracruz, the first railroad 
in Mexico also passed through here.
The region is highly urbanized: Cordoba and Orizaba have more than
75,000 inhabitants; Tehuacan has more than 40,000, There are four towns 
with over 15,000 people.
Tehuacan was first a tourist center due to its famous mineral baths. 
Recently it has become a center for soft drinks, livestock feed (mostly" 
alfalfa) and poultry production. It lies in a very low rainfall area 
(less than 600 millimeters per year), located at 1000 to 2000 meters 
altitude in the fertile region of the Valley of Tehuacan in Puebla. The 
valley is fed by the Salado River, which has been used for irrigation 
since the earliest settlements in the very arid region.
Soils there are primarily Regosols— sandy and heavy and there is a 
lot of flat agricultural land in the valley. Clay for construction, fine 
white pottery clay for porcelain and onyx for artistry are mined in the 
area.
Orizaba first began as a textile center due to its water power and 
climate, and proximity to early cotton production. Beer is also 
important today and other industries have moved into the area. The town 
of Orizaba sits at the foot of the mountain of Mount Orizaba— or the 
Indian-named Citlaltepetl— 5750 meters high. The northwest region has a 
very humid climate with 1000-1500 millimeters rainfall per year, with
-29-
Xittle or no deficiency any time during the year, 
parts have a temperate climate. The eastern slope 
meters and has a definitely tropical climate.
The more mountainous 
drops abruptly to 100
Right near Orizaba are some very fertile volcanic soils, but the 
area is dominated by fine textured vertic luvisols with their consider 
able erosion problems, and orthic acrisols with low fertility and e«ess 
water problems in the rainy season. Pasture is the best use fo 
land, particularly where it is sloping, but on flat land with good 
management, a wide range of row and tree crops can be grown. Today its 
major commercial crops are cane, coffee and fruit trees. e 
mining locally for stone, limestone and clay for cement, and artesanry.
Lowlands Region
The Lowlands area has received the most attention from the
PapaloapanCommission,particularlyasregardsfloodcontrol and........
communication works. After the Industrial region, this is the richest 
zone of the Basin. The northern part is mainly used for extensive c 
production, but the central part is one of the most densely populated
zones in the Basin.
As of 1976, there were three towns with over 30,000 inhabitants and 
four others with over 10,000. There is a growing percentage of the 
population in nonagricultural activities.
In the Cosamaloapan and Tierra Blanca areas, there is important oil 
drilling. There are nine wells in operation and several more being 
explored. In 1970, 467,000 barrels of crude were pumped, 12,000 barrels 
of condensed oil and 393 million cubic meters of natural gas (5_) .
The Papaloapan Commission planners intended to create a commercial 
center for the Basin in the Lowlands— and the emergence of Tuxtepec as a 
vital town is fulfilling this goal.
The Lowlands all lie below 50 meters, 
open savannah with scattered trees. There 
foothills of the Sierra and around Tuxtepec 
Sayula. The littoral has numerous mangrove
The plains are covered with 
are gallery forests near the 
, Playa Vicente, Acayucan and 
forests.
It is very humid along the coast and in the Oaxacan part, and semi- 
humid between. The weather is tropical with a m a r k e d l y  season from 
December to May, but a very small seasonal variation m  te^pe^
Rainfall is 1500 to 2000 millimeters per year, increasing to JUUU mill 
meters toward Tuxtepec and the Sierra foothills.
The soils present many constraints for agricultural production. For 
much of the land, optimum use is in pasture. Under good management, 
crops can be grown profitably on some parts. Rice production m  the 
Irrigation District and around Tuxtepec today is an example. Loma Bonita 
specializes in pineapple, and there is a considerable amount of fruit 
tree production. A major problem with trees is damage from high wind 
velocities which are often experienced throughout the coastal plain.
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Dominating the Lowlands are the nine rivers which run through it, 
draining into the Lake of Alvarado. The flow of the Tonto is presently 
regulated by the President Miguel Aleman Dam and its reservoir.
The Flood Problem
The Lowlands of the Papaloapan Basin have been subject to flooding 
at least since the 16th century, when first written records are avail­
able. Evidence suggests, however, that their intensity has been increas- 
ing over time and hence the disasters they bring. According to regis— 
tered information, floods occurred in 1787, 1888, 1921, 1922, 1935 1941
and 1944, to a level of at least two meters above the streets. 1^1931,* 
1935 and 1941, water was on the ground for two to three months (2).
Flooding in earlier years was often beneficial for its deposits of 
fertile alluvium. But when the water covered the land for excessive 
periods of time, or occurred during the period before harvest, crops were 
often destroyed. In the 1941 flood, all the cane and one third of the 
banana crop were lost (2).
Apparently, the Papaloapan River has been changing its course during 
this century due to both geologic processes— the situation caused by 
rapidly falling water over steep slopes, and that caused by man-made 
erosion. Erosion in the Canada was estimated in the 1940s to be around
1,900,000 hectares with the cultivable land there declining and 
desertification of a significant amount of land occurring.
The Basin is also within one of the three principal hurricane tracks 
crossing Mexico. When hurricanes occur, winds of over 140 kilometers per 
hour have been recorded (average wind velocities are 22 kilometers per 
hour). Hurricanes, because of the huge amount of rain they pour over an 
historically been a major cause of the flooding prob1em in the
Basin.
Noriega concluded that "preventive medicine" required that an inte­
grated program of soil conservation, overflow reservoirs in the lowlands 
and defense works along the rivers be initiated to stem both the natural 
and man-made losses,
Tuxtlas Region
The Sierra de los Tuxtlas, an isolated mountain range in the northeast 
corner of the Basin, is also considered to be in the Lower Papaloapan, 
despite peaks averaging 1000, and reaching 3000 meters in the north. *The 
area has long been populated— Cortes himself owned much of the land 
during his epoch— and is very European in nature, rather than indigenous. 
But its overall state of development is not high. San Andres Tuxtla and 
Is la have shown marked progress, but Santiago Tuxtla and Hueyapan del 
Ocampo are particularly poor. There is some minimal soft drink, tobacco 
and barbasco processing, and Catemaco Lake is a growing tourist area, but 
only the Acayucan area has a high percentage of nonagricultural workers.
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San Andres Tuxtla and Acayucan are center for the region, '
about 30,000 inhabitants and there are five additional towns w _
15,000 inhabitants. Furthermore, there has been a rapid popu ,
increase in the last few years in these areas, similar to the Lowland .
Climate in the Tuxtlas ranges from humid near the coast to semi- 
humid “ the southern part. Rainfall declines to m  - -  m  «
San Andres area and to 1500 millimeters in the south. There_is a winter
rainfall deficiency except in the northern peaks which
4000 millimeters per year of rain. The major bodies of water are 
Catemaco Lake and the rivers San Juan and Tesechoacan._
There are some very fertile soils in the northeast part, due to its 
volcanic nature, but in the south the soil quality is poor.
Cane, maize and tobacco are the predominant crops around San Andres,
and Isla has some pineapple, but most of the land area is use^ mr ■ 
cattle. The area around Rodriguez Clara has flood problems in the ramy
season, as does.much.of.the.land.around <*e.Tesechoacan and San Juan
Rivers, but "tonalmil" (winter) maize production is so good that t 
has become the maize belt of the Basin. The railroad_track essentially 
demarcates the zone of the iron-bearing nonflooded soils of the regio .
Colonization Region
The fourth region covers the municipios of Plays Vicente, Choapan 
and the southern part of the Greater District of Tuxtepec. Until very
recently, this zone was extremely isolated. There were no town ^  ™  
with more than 5000 inhabitants. Little attention was paid to l b y  the 
Papaloapan Commission except for their resettlement programs there for 
the Aleman Dam.
Now however, two new roads are nearly finished— to Sayula and to 
Palomares, from Tuxtepec, which are opening up millions of hectares to 
commercial production. In Choapan, along the Palomares road, a very 
important network of small ranches has opened up, with growing importance
to the livestock industry of the Basin.
This region is populated by indigenous groups, and colonists from 
other parts of the country. In Playa Vicente the Zapotecs reside; in 
part of Choapan and Tuxtepec, the Chinantecs, and in the northern tip,
the Mazatecs.
Most of t h e r e g i o n i s a t 1 0 0 t o 1000metersaltitude,risingtoward 
the South. This is the highest rainfall area in the Basin. Moving up
3/There is some flooding around the Tesechoacan area, and for its 
physical characteristics, this municipio might well belong in the ow 
lands region, but its traditional historical and economic ties were
mostly to the east.
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the Piedmont and eastern slope of the Sierra Madre, rainfall increases 
from 2500 to 5000 millimeters as the wet season expands to more than ten 
months of the year. The high rainfall centers are southwest of the 
Aleman Reservoir, southern Tuxtepec and northwest Choapan. Average temp­
eratures are 15 to 25 C., with monthly fluctuations increasing with
increasing altitude. As rainfall, altitude and wet season length 
increase, the vegetation turns from gallery forest to tropical rain 
forest. Toward the crest, at about 1800 meters, this abruptly switches 
to stands of deciduous hardwoods and conifers.
All over the Basin, rainfall patterns are the result of both convec- 
tional activity in the northern movement of the intertropical convergence 
zone, and of orographic lifting. The latter is the most important: as
moisture-laden winds from the Gulf are slowed moving up the eastern slope 
of the Sierra Madre, high rainfall occurs. The Valle Nacional and 
Tesechoacan Rivers, originating on the eastern slope of the Sierra de 
Juarez, pass through the Colonization Region.
There are two major soil types here— the orthic acrisols in Playa 
Vicente and the eutric cambisols in southern Tuxtepec and western 
Choapan. The first are acid, infertile soils with excess water in the 
rainy season and easily erodible. They are best for livestock produc­
tion, and that is, indeed, the major product of the region, along with
The second soil type is found in the more mountainous areas. There 
soils are heavy, rocky, erodible, and suggested mainly for forest and 
pasture use. The major commercial crop here is coffee, with some tobacco 
in the flatlands of Valle Nacional. Rubber production in Valle Nacional, 
Tuxtepec and Choapan is increasing.
Highlands Region
The Highlands Region, despite centuries-long habitation, is one of 
the most backward areas in Mexico today. We consider it here as a homo­
geneous region, only for reasons of topography, and because we will be 
doing a less detailed study of it than of the other regions.
The Highlands can be divided into three maior subregions.
^  Sierra Madre Oriental separates the Gulf Lowlands all along the 
coast from the interior plateau. Its average elevation is greater than 
2000 meters. The south is dominated by 3400-meter Mt. Zempoaltepec and 
the north by 5750-meter Mt. Orizaba. The eastern range is split by the 
canyon of the Santo Domingo River into a northern zone with the Sierras 
Zongolica and Huautla, and a southern zone with the Sierras Juarez,
Ixtlan and Mixe. Rainfall here is between 800 and 2000 millimeters, with 
the higher figure corresponding to the lower slopes. The soils in gen­
eral are very poor for agriculture, except in the Esperanza-Palmar de 
Bravo area and scattered fertile valleys.
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The Canada Oaxaquena-Poblana lies between the western and east 
ranges to a length of about lb(T kilometers ■ The Canada was formed by the 
Sal ado and Grande Rivers. As the rivers merge into the Santo Doming , 
the Valley falls from a height of 1500 meters to the coastal plain In 
thesl sheltered valleys, temperatures average 24° C., with wide monthly 
variations. Rainfall averages only 400 to_600 millimeters per J ® *
After extremely high rainfall in the Colonization zone, an . _■
H ghla's theymoi!ture-free clouds move over the western m o u n t . i o n e  
leaving this in a classical rain shadow. The dry r e g i o n s  of the Salado 
basin are the source of 60 percent of the silt flowing into the
Papaloapan.
The soils to the north are sandy and alkaline regosols, to the 
southfacid phosphate-fixing andosols. The Rio Salado has provided 
irrigation for centuries, and with modern improvements, is one of the 
most productive areas of the Highlands.
The western range consists of a series of heavily eroded ^ a r p - ^
range of southern Mexico. Annual average temperatures are about 16 C
with wide seasonal and diurnal fluctuations. _ Frosts are ^  a^ Ut
four to five months per year. This is a semiarid region, also lying in 
the rain shadow of the eastern range. The wet season ”
months long with irregular rainfall averaging only 600 millimeters per 
year. As moisture declines with declining altitude ver
covering becomes sparse and xerophytic. The cambisol soils here are very 
poor for agriculture. Furthermore, overgrazing and poor agricultural
practices have led to severe erosion.
Highlands Economy
As can be surmised from the above, very little of the la^ in the ■
Highlands is really adequate for agriculture, despite the f
majority of the people there are engaged in subsistence maize and beans
farming Coffee is the leading commercial crop, grown primarily
Sierras'of^Zongolica, Huautla and southeastern Juarez. Wheat was once a
bis crop in the Mixteca and the Sierra de Juarez, but production is _ 
declining now that there are so many lower-cost producers elsewhere in 
the country. Wood is the principal product of most of the area cut for 
paper! and sawlogs-and the collection of barbasco found in the woods is 
economically important. Some livestock is kept-primanly goats 
sheep in poor condition and overstocked.
Fiber weaving is the most important manufacture of the area with 
the Mixteca specializing in palm hats, the Canada in basketry and Villa
ifca i„ hard fibers. There are considerable mineral resources, though 
few precious metals remain.
The population is still overwhelmingly indigenous, alt^ug h  the 
Spanish-speaking population has increased a lot in recent decade.. Thls 
region has greater cultural diversity than anywhere else m  Mexico, 
ITeTt possibly the Yucatan Peninsula. The Mixe are found -  the south
the Zapotecs in Etla and Ixtlan, the Mixtecs m  Nochixtlan and Etla, the 
Mazatecs in Teotitlan, the Cuicatecs in Cuicatlan, the Popolocas in
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eastern Puebla and the Mexica-Nahuas in central Puebla.
The land use system is still the communal landholding village.
Despite major road building there in the last decade, the Highlands 
remain pretty isolated. During the rainy eason, many of these roads are
impassable. The only railway connection is a narrow rail line through the Canada. 6
In 1973, Huautla was the only town with a population greater than 
5000 in all the Oaxaca portion. The Veracruz/Puebla portion had four 
small towns with 5000 to 15,000. The area as a whole is losing popula­
tion due to the lack of economic opportunities and social facilities.
Changes of different types have taken place in all these regions 
since 1947, when the Papaloapan Commission began its work. The following 
chapter describes the operations of the Commission and the different 
strategies it has chosen to deal with the multiple problems of poverty, 
underproduction and isolation in the Basin as a whole.
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CHAPTER 3. THE PAPALOAPAN COMMISSION
History
The first appeal to the federal government from the Papaloapan Basin
i„ m i ,  „ v „ .  nood *■ *««■
CO seekoutside a8sista"‘e-fr^  "h^Dep^tments of Communications,
Commission made of mem , Bas^n They recommended
£  r P- e^  d  -
federal and ministerial interest, these recommendations were igno .
In 1944, a hurricane hit the region, and the  resultant floods caused
goa millionpesosworthofdamage(worth$135million1 9 Pes° some $30 million pesos worm u b Novillero, Cosamaloapan andover 470,000 hectares m  Tuxtepec, Otatitian, i N o v u t e ’ .
.Tlacotalpan municipios   One hundred iives were  os : — * * _  
Forced to react by the size of the c a t a s t r o p h e.President Avila
, a r-aa in October of that year to authorize the National 
Camacho issued «[ Ministry of Maritime Works and River-
^ ^ ^ o ' s L d v T h e  hydropic^problems of the" Basin. Miguel Aleman, who 
became President of Mexico in 1947, had made as one of In
oledves the promotion of development in Veracruz, his native raS*° 
spring of 1947 he created by Presidential Accord the Papaloapan Commis 
lion (henceforth called the Commission)~the first regional and first
J » P i c «  development scheme in Mexico^' The L ^ V ^ a r a t e
ministry;*0 that'of1 Hydraulic Resources (SRH) in December of 1946 (2, 
pp.  92-96).
particularly for the tropics. There was no body of knowledge at the time
:Ua f ; o i r f o U r e d £hy regicmal^development In the
tropics. See Map 31.
The Mandate
A1thoueh directly under Presidential authority, the Commission is in 
Che Mtnis^y of Hydraulic Resources, one of the most powerful  ministries
in the Mexican government. Its mission, however, ^ T g e n t r a l  devel- 
hvHraulic control. The Commission was to act as a gener 
opment authority, modeled after the Tennessee Valley Authority project in
-35-
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MAP 3-1. RIVER BASIN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS*
*?lchard T* K±n§» River Basin Projects and Regional Development 
(Dept, of Agricultural Economics at Cornell Univ.: Ithaca, N.Y., 1964),
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the United States. Its general goals, expressed by Adolfo Orive Alba, 
then Secretary of the SRH were: flood control, sanitary improvement,
agricultural promotion via drainage and irrigation, electric power for ^ 
industry, improvement of urban centers, improvement of the rivers navi 
gability and provision of adequate communications (2_, pp. 100 IU1J.
Presidential Policies 1947-1970
Jose Noriega was the first engineer to study the Basin, and to make 
specific guidelines for Papaloapan development goals. Considering the 
short time he spent analyzing the area, he came up with a very g°°d 
treatise, which put together most of the known facts, particularly for 
the Lower Basin. He recommended that ultimately storage dams be built on 
the Santo Domingo River to avoid floods through the Papaloapan Valley to 
Cosamaloapan,andthatreliefbasinscarryexcesswatertotheAyutla 
Tonto Rivers. Two storage dams on the Papaloapan, Tonto, Tesechoacan 
SanJuanRiverswerealsorecommended. Theoriginalplancalledfor 
expansion of land under cultivation through drainage of 570,000 hectares 
and irrigation of 220 ,000 hectares (1_) .
or
or
Noriega emphasized the need for communications improvements and 
particularly sanitary engineering, pointing to the Panama Canal as a 
tropical project whose success historically had depended upon creation of 
healthy living conditions.
1947-1952
Map 3-2 shows the major projects completed by the Commission through 
1976 During the Presidency of Miguel Aleman, the Commission enjoyed a 
hefty budget and strong support. As the region was of little interest to 
most ministries, the Commission enjoyed almost unrestricted freedom to 
take on any type of program it wished.
The program followed Noriega's recommendations rather closely.
Graphs 3-1 and 3-2 show the trends of Commission budget and expenditures. 
In the budget of the first few years, half the money went to flood 
control, one fourth to roads, the rest mainly to health programs and 
construction of the Commission headquarters in Ciudad Aleman, Veracruz. 
These activities had a large impact primarily on the Lowlands Region.
The firstinvestments wereall veryLarge-scale, visibleprojects. 
Despite the lack of sufficient information for thorough project planning, 
construction of the Miguel Aleman Dam at Temascal, Oaxaca on the Tonto 
River was immediately initiated, with its accompanying hydroelectric 
power station. The first road built from La Tinaja to Ciudad Aleman was 
three lanes and paved, despite the virtual absence of any connecting_ 
roads along its length. The Commission headquarters itself is relative y 
lavish, with wide, paved streets originally designed for a city of 
150,000 people. Today it is always deserted on weekends, as it is sti 
inhabited mostly by Papaloapan Commission employees (2_, p. 103;.
ill
Ma
jo
r 
pr
oj
ec
ts
 o
f 
Th
f 
pa
pa
lo
ap
an
 C
om
mi
ss
io
n
-38-
A
dg
pf
cd
 
f/
on
i 
Cu
an
ca
 d
tl 
Po
pa
io
op
or
i P
lan
a 
Ca
nj
un
TQ
, D
v
m
bv
 
0
7
2
Gr
ap
h 
3-
1:
 
Bu
dg
et
 o
f 
th
e 
Pa
pa
lo
ap
an
 C
om
mi
ss
io
n 
19
47
-1
97
* 
(i
n 
cu
rr
en
tj
 a
nd
 r
ea
l 
pr
ic
es^
.'
39-
■u
U ) Cfl pi0J a u aP4 u f-i d -aD c a etj *H■U 0) u w cn■rH U ■H Ul aj aXJ u W X) e U1 a u(=1 a pi o 0 ) > * Pu0) u u a a o& *H a •HX pi U ><; p:w •H P u W a.
S O S 3  (£ J O  S H O T  X1. T H
—
■' 
De
ri
ve
d 
fr
om
 p
ri
ce
 i
nd
ic
es
 o
f 
th
e 
Ba
nc
o 
de
 M
ex
ic
o,
 
S.
A.
, 
wi
th
 b
as
e 
19
54
 =
 1
00
 f
or
 1
95
0-
19
74
 
da
ta
 a
nd
 w
it
h 
ba
se
 1
95
7 
= 
10
0 
fo
r 
19
29
-1
95
7 
da
ta
.
G
ra
ph
 
3 
2:
 
D
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 o
f 
E
xp
en
d
it
u
re
s 
o
f 
th
e 
P
ap
al
oa
p
an
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 
19
47
-1
97
3*
-40-
Ot
he
rs
" 
in
cl
ud
es
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
co
st
s,
 p
ay
me
nt
s 
fo
r 
la
nd
, 
fi
na
nc
ia
l 
ch
ar
ge
s,
 v
eh
ic
le
s 
n 
19
74
 a
nd
 1
97
5,
 8
 a
nd
 1
9 
pe
rc
en
t 
of
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
we
re
 u
se
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
In
te
gr
al
 P
la
n.
-41-
The health programs were directed mostly against malaria 
onchocercosis. Plans were made for the massive resettlement of 22,000 
Mazatec Indians from the Temascal area. Smaller projects ™ = lu^®d ® 
irrigation system for 600 hectares in Michapan, Veracruz, defense works 
along the rivers and the dragging of Lake Alvarado. There-was ,a big 
campaign to supply drinking water and sewage systems, mostly ln ’
Most of the Basin's small airfields were bui It in this epoch. In 1950 
two agricultural experiment stations were established. La Granja on clay 
soils, and La Isleta on alluvial soils by the Papaloapan River, both 
the Lowlands.
1953-1958
Money was also abundant during the Presidency of Ruiz Cortines. 
Experimentationinprogramexecutionwasencouraged,andemphasisbegan 
to move away from large infrastructure projects.
In late 1955, a plan was preented for a coordinated approach to 
development, which was scheduled to be completed by 1970 Its goal was 
to inte^sif; use of virgin or extensively utilized lands into the tropi­
cal areas through colonization and credit programs, and to spread more 
widely the benefits of education and sanitary engineering. But until 
1957, when the dam was finished, only the resettlement program had any 
budget with which to incorporate the,new ideas.
Irrigation works in Rio Blanco, Los Naranjos, Rio Salado and
Tepelmeme were constructed and the biggest expenditures ever were made 
on schools and drinking water facilities.
A good program might have been put together, but in 1957 the 
Executive Director of the Commission who had been responsible for muc 
of the dynamism of that era, was killed in an airplane _ crash. T h «  
coincided with a growing antagonism toward the Commission from ^tsi 
ministries who were worried that their "territories were^bemg invaded. 
The change of leadership offered a good opportunity for them to make 
their feelings known and an important cutback in the powers of the 
Commission came about (^) .
In 1957 the agricultural research stations were turned over to the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (SAG); in 1958, the health campaign 
"a. moved ovef to the Ministry of Health (SSA). Credit and colonization 
programs were soon drastically curtailed-with very sad resultfor the 
participating campeainos. During the last two years of the Ruiz Cortines 
administration,overhalfthebudgetwasdevotedexclusivelytoroad 
construction (2_, p. 109).
By contrast with the two prior presidents, Adolfo Lopez Mateos 
showed little interest in the Papaloapan Commission, m  keeping with his 
general shift to investment in the North and North Pacific. There was a 
sharp decline in the budget, with very little new investment, •“ > « 
cut in staff took place. Much emphasis was put into studies for the time 
when money would come (6 ). In 1959, the reearch stations were returned
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to the Commission, but little important work was done. In 1962, road 
construction responsibility shifted to the Ministry of Public Works (SOP) 
and after 1963, the only roads built by the Commission were those 
directly related to other projects.
. Commission did some work in promoting rubber production, and 
irrigation works in Rio Blanco and other small areas were completed.
The administration of Diaz Ordaz brought few new programs. In 1966 
the Commission was reorganized, and in 1967, the branch of Rural Develop­
ment was added to complete the present administrative structure. There 
was some more work on irrigation and sanitary facilities. A program for 
the Upper Basin was begun, through a series of small-scale projects (8 ).
Summary of Works through 1970
The work done by the Papaloapan Commission emphasized development of 
the Lower Basin, particularly the "Lowlands/' Infrastructure works- 
hydraulic and communication— make up roughly two thirds of total expendi­
tures. Most sanitary facilities, urban works, and most of the irriga­
tion sites were in the Lowlands. The agronomic reearch that was done 
mainly reflected conditions there.
Other than minimal road-building, little was done in the area of the 
Tuxtlas. The same was true for the Industrial Region.
The Colonization Region was opened up only by a very poor road 
system; most of the investments there had to do with colonization. In 
general, the directed colonization schemes were never completed as 
planned. Even for the Mazatec resettlement, only half of the families 
were settled under government programs, and then with many problems.
The Highlands regions were connected by some all-weather roads. The 
Rio Salado District irrigation was vastly improved, and some small-scale 
irrigation developed elsewhere. The agronomic research stations managed 
tree nurseries for the Upper Papaloapan. There were a few reforestation 
efforts including plantings of nopal and ornamental and fruit trees.
Under the soil conservation program, 9000 hectares were affected in* 
Coixtlahuaca, Tepelmeme, Suchiztlahuca and Nochixtlan Oaxaca. In gen­
eral, floodplain control has been emphasized over siltation control in 
the highlands.
At no time were direct agricultural programs important except for 
the very short period during the Ruiz Cortines sexenio, and these were 
excessively paternalistic and based on no great store of agronomic 
information. Indeed, probably the greatest lack in the Commission's 
program over the years was that, while there was a wealth of hydrologic 
climatologic and engineering studies, there was very little of the basic 
reearch on natural resources, soils, etc., that is necessary for adequate 
long-term economic planning.
-43-
One of the most important constraints on Commission activities, how 
ever, was the noncontinuity occasioned by the changing administrations, 
changing budgets and objectives.
Programs of the 1970s
New life came to the Papaloapan Commission with the Presidency of 
Luis Echeverria Alvarez, who strongly emphasized rural development. The 
budget during this past sexenio reached the highest ever.
Partly, this was the result of the big flood in 1969: in the
Lowlands which illustrated graphically the fact that the Papaloapan^ 
Project had not been completed. The flood devastated the left margin of 
the Papaloapan River. Thus, as the Commission got back to work, their
first priority was, again,.to build a dam.' However, after.almost ten
years of studies and planning, the program expanded in other directions 
as welltowardintegratedruraldevelopmentandeconomicdiversification
The Cerro de Oro dam over the Santo Domingo river is expected to be 
finished in the early 1980s. Its reservoir will join that of the Aleman 
Dam, to form the largest man-made lake in Latin America, with a 13.38 
billion cubic meter capacity. The resettlement program for the 2500 
Chinantec families who now live in the Ojitlan reservoir area is quite 
extensive. 10,000 hectares which were formerly virgin jungle, have been 
prepared for collective agriculture in Uxpanapa, Veracruz; an equivalent 
area is being prepared near Los Naranjos, which is to be irrigated.
The Integral Development Plan for the Papaloapan was begun in 1974, 
with funding from the World Bank. The program is divided into two parts 
The rainfed agriculture project has the goal of reaching some 22,000 
farmers in the Upper Papaloapan and 78,000 in the Lower Basin, to tech- 
nify staple food production. In 1975, 4000 farmers participated. The 
irrigated agriculture program includes work in the Salado and Blanco 
systems, and wells in Esperanza and Palmar de Bravo. Technical assis­
tance, basic research, access roads and storage warehouses are also 
included in the project. Social infrastructure— with electricity, drink 
ing water, sewage, schools, medical and community centers is aimed at 
improving general welfare in the rural areas. Both the Plan and the 
Uxpanapa project exhibit an unprecedented degree of interest on the part 
of the Commission in direct agricultural activities.
The Commission has also begun to focus more on the nonagricultural 
potential of the Basin, with programs for increasing tourism, fishing, 
andindustry.Amongthe latter type,the mostimportant has beendirect 
involvement in pineapple and other fruit canning, and coordination with 
new state- and federally-sponsored manufacturing plants.
Do the present plans reflect an understanding of the forces that 
have fostered development in the past, and the changes of the present?
In the following chapter, we try to describe what kinds of changes have
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taRen place, what was accomplished— and what was not— by the various 
policies of the government. A series of case studies follow which 
examine more closely the instruments, policies and circumstances which 
were most responsible for local dynamism, as well as patterns of 
employment and distribution of the benefits from change.
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CHAPTER 4. CHANGES IN THE PAPALOAPAN BASIN
Our focus in this study is on four of the most dynamic localities in 
the Papaloapan Basin, and the details of their development. To provide a 
background against which their growth could be compared a more general 
analysis of change in the Basin is necessary.
To quantify the transformation that has taken place is somewhat 
difficult. Even the Papaloapan Commission has neglected the importance 
of keeping accurate, meaningful indicators of change. Hence, some of the 
standard indices are not available. What data has been collected has 
most often been lumped into categories by state or the Basin as a whole, 
rather than by smaller more homogeneous regions. Attempts have been made 
by several Commission economists (Atto1 ini, Duarte, PLANPA designers) to 
make such a regionalization, but none has come into standard use. Here 
we use the divisions introduced in Chapter 2. The Tuxtepec case study 
zonelies intheLowlands; Islain theTuxtlas; A b a s o l o d e l V a l l e m  the 
Colonization zone; and Ixtlan in the Highlands.
The national Population Census has been the primary source of data 
for this chapter on all social indicators, particularly the Compendia 
printed by the Commission summarizing data for the Basin (1950, 1960). 
Historical data for agricultural and livestock production was provided by 
the Commission's Department of Economics. Further, there was a wealth of 
disparate sources covering many topics to be found in the Commission 
archives, if one dug hard enough to find them.
The Bank of Mexico did an Input-Output Matrix for the Basin in 1963 
and 1970 which was somewhat useful, but like too many of the economic 
studies done on the Basin, spent too much effort spewing forth numbers 
and too little analyzing what happened and why.
Absorption into the National Mainstream
Possibly the single greatest change for the Basin dwellers in the 
past few decades has been in communications. Every region is now served 
by at least one major highway and a widening net of telecommunications. 
Compare Map 4-1 of the Basin 1976 with Map 2-7 on page 26.
Before 1947, there were no first-class roads at all, only rather 
inefficienttrainservice, By 1973, o v e r  4 0 0 0  kilometers of roadshad 
been built, and nearly half had been paved. It^is difficult to 
overemphasize the role that improved communications have made. Where 
there are roads, there is progress; where there are not, signs of 
progress are hard to find. Roads have opened markets, allowed farmers to 
deliver their harvests, permitted extensive inexpensive travel 
opportunities. The opening of huge tracts of land to commercial 
production followed the building of roads. For most industrial concerns,
they were vital.
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chart 4-1* CHANGES IN LAND USE IN THE PAPALOAPAN BASIN*
1 9  5 0 19 7 0
Cultivated land
* Mexico, SIC, Censo Agricola y Ganaderax 1950 and i 970 (oubUr.bed in 1955 and 1975).
CHART 4-2* CHANGES IN CROP COMPOSITION IN THE PAPALOAPAN HAS 1N
194H-1970t
19  7 0
+ Data from SRH, Comision del Papaloapan, Departaraeiito d. 
Superficie, Cantidad y Valor de la Produccion Agricula
DesarroLIo Rural, "Cuenca del Rio Papaloapan 
L94S-1970" (Chart No. 3), 197b.
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Trade and Services. In 1947, the level of Basin trade with the rest 
of the country and world was pretty well defined by figures on rail move 
ment and some fo re ig n  export by r iv e r  and sea of tobacco . By 1970, how 
ever, the vast majority of exchanges of goods and services involved 
trade.!./ About two thirds of all trade outside is with the rest of _ 
the Republic; the remainder is split between exports and sales to neig 
boring parts of Veracruz, Puebla and Oaxaca.
Trucking, in particular, has increased with the opening of the 
roads, and has almost entirely replaced rail, and river transport. Two 
thirds of all transportation value for 1970 came from the trucking 
industry; only 13 percent from the railroad.
................. Expansion of Land Farmed and Production............ .
The Basin's major role in the nation's economy has traditionally
been as an.agricultural producer...The.primary aim of the Papaloapan..
Commission was to develop its agricultural potential, particularly^ 
through flood control works, and indirectly through making the Basin a 
more attractive place for farmers to live, by inspiring marketing 
improvements, e.g., roads.
Some statistics of change are fairly impressive. In 1948, only 
300 451 hectares were being cultivated (only a third of censused crop _ 
land), primarily along river valleys. By 1970, 626,378 were under culti­
vation— more than double. Charts 4-1 and 4-2 show the general changes 
in land use and crop composition. About 37 percent of the land area was 
being exploited in some way in 1950; 50 percent in 1970— an increase of 
nearly 70,000 hectares, not to mention the fact that production has 
intensified significantly. There have essentially been no major changes 
in the type of produce coming out of the Basin. As roads were built 
particularly to areas already having significant production— permanent 
agriculture with more modern technology became feasible and remunerative, 
replacing subsistence slash-and-burn cultivation. The value of produc­
tion rose about 4 1/2 times between 1948 and 1970._/
Meanwhile, livestock production has become even more important than 
it was historically, with the herd size tripling over this time period. 
Since there was little intensification of livestock production far more 
cattle land than cropland was opened for exploitation. Maps 4 2 and 4 j 
show the distribution of production in 1950 and 1970.
}_/By the Input-Output Matrix, sales 
amounted to only $388.5 million in 1970; 
million and purchases outside the Basin 
surplus of $2354.3 million.
and purchases inside the Basin 
sales outside were $6882.3 
$4568 million— leaving a trade
2/Using 1974 pesos, the 1948 value ($161,491,000) is worth 
$65,403,855,000; the 1970 value ($1,922,533,000) is worth $290,302, 
483*000!
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The Industrial Region
In the 1940s, the Industrial region was still highly dependent upon 
agriculture, and about half of the commercial agricultural production of 
the Basin— particularly in coffee and sugar cane in the Cordoba/Orizaba 
zone— was from there. Wheat production was beginning to increase in the 
drier Tehuacan area. Two thirds of the population there lived m  rural 
areas, deriving subsistence from farming.
There were few changes in the 1950s, but in the 1960s, there was a 
big increase in population and some important changes did occur. There 
was a drastic decline in maize production, mostly because of price 
declines and the marked increase of sugar cane. There was a dramatic 
increase in coffee production, as the crop was found to be particularly 
suited to the area. Barley production for the local beer factories 
remained.pretty.stable. .......................... .............
Because of the comparative abundance of work opportunities in indus 
try and services, subsistence production in general has declined here. 
Nevertheless, technology is not particularly advanced. Chart 4-3 shows 
the major characteristics of the zone.
The Lowlands Region
In the 1940s, that portion of the Lowlands right along the 
Papaloapan and Valle Nacional rivers was the most important locus of 
commercial agriculture. Crop production was primarily sugar cane north 
of Tuxtepec, bananas south of Tuxtepec and pineapple to the east. ihe 
northern reaches and the nonalluvial land was in extensive cattle 
holdings. Most of the commercial crops were grown on large private 
plantations.
The alluvial area is still the most commercialized zone. It con­
tains over half of total rice and cane area in the Lower Basin, and the 
major part of the mango and plantain crops.
The Lowlands has experienced the most dramatic changes in agricul 
ture. In 1970, half the land was being cultivated, compared with a 
quarter in 1950, as shown in Chart 4-4. Although maize production 
increased during the 1950s (mostly on the newly-formed ejidos), 
conmercial maize was significantly replaced by supplies from the Tuxtlas. 
Production remained stable in the 1960s. Most is tonalmil production; a 
third of theland isin hybrids.
Rice production has steadily been growing. Highest yields are in 
the spring/sumraer cycle, although double cropping and winter cropping are 
very common.
The most important crop of the Lowlands is sugar cane. The first 
growth spurt was in the 1950s, as roads opened up Tierra Blanca and Los 
Naranjos. Lerdo experienced its surge in the 1960s. The peak coincided 
with increased demand from the United States market after relations were
-52-
L A N D  U S E
CHART 4.3. CHARACTERISTICS OF AGRICULTURE IN THE INDUSTRIAL REGION*
1950
Forestfcan be logged)
Forest(cannot 
be logged) 
Productive, 
but unculti­
vated
Can be opened
Pastures
Crops and -k°8Sec0
^implantations Produ
but u^culti
1970
Forest(cannot^JE^rest(can be
ogged)
Can be opene 
Natural pastures
Hectares 
Censused: 170,143
lantations
ivated 
pastures
168,790
* Agr3;CO:la V Ganader°. J-950 and 1970. (published im
C R O P  C O M P O S I T I O N -
i960 197Qa/
Others
Coffee
Alfalfa
Hectares
Cropped:
8589.
121,806
a/— Of annual crops harvested in;
* Mexico SRH, Comisidn del Fapaloapan, Preliminary Data from the Censo 
Agricola y Ganadero, 1970; and "Cultivos, 1961." ~ — ”
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CHART 4.4. CHARACTERISTICS OF AGRICULTURE IN THE LOWLANDS REGION*
L A N D  U S E
1950^
Can be opened 
Inadequate 
Uncultivated jbuty 
productive
Forest(cannot 
be logged)
Forest(can be 
logged) *
Planta­
tions
Pastures
Natural 
pastures
(plains)/
1970
Crops
Natural 
pastures 
(hilly)
Can be 
opened
Uncultivated, but
productive and forests
Planta­
tions 
Planted 
pastures 
Inadequate
Hectares
Censused: 626,359 791,000
a/ r—  Does not include the municipios of Tuxtepec.
* Mexico, SIC, Censo Agricola y Ganadero, 1950 and 1970, (published in 
1955 and 1975).
C R O P  C O M P O S  
1960
Hectares
Cropped: 158,593
a/— Of annual crops harvested in: 
30,410 hectares
I T I 0 N
1970^
Winter- 3 8 , 0 9 3 ; Spring/Summer- 
Preliminary data from the Censo* Mexico, SRH, Comision del Papaloapan,
Agricola y Ganadero 1970: "Cultivos 1961."
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cut off with Cuba. As the economy started to diversify around the Tierra 
Blanca/Cosamaloapan zone, and cane prices stagnated, many farmers moved 
land out of cane in the 1960s, to rice, fruit trees or cattle.
Cane is popular for several reasons. It is adaptable to short-term 
flooding. It is a high security crop because of the close contacts with 
the mill which provide most management decisions, inputs and credit, and 
sometimes the producers are eligible for social security benefits. The 
giant San Cristobal mill was nationalized in 1970.2/ Less than a 
third of the Basin's mills are now in private hands.
Bananas are produced on nonflooding alluvial soils. Production 
rebuilt slowly after the disaster of the 1930s, and is now based on vari­
eties. Pineapple in the 1940s was on a very small scale. In the 1950s, 
the reconstruction of the railroad and use of refrigerated cars to trans­
port the fresh fruit, plus association with American canneries brought a 
successful epoch. Most production is on ejidos, although during the 
1970s, more private ranchers entered into production.
Cattle production was always important to the Lowlands, although it 
had stagnated with the land reform in the 1930s and 1940s. Herds grew 
slowly until the 1960s, when total cattle numbers doubled. Production is 
characterized by problems with a very long dry season on the one hand 
(Tlalixcoyan, Loma Bonita) and with flooding on the other (Lerdo, 
Cosamaloapan, Tlacotalpan, Tuxtepec). Many of the larger ranchers have 
properties in both areas, and move their cattle accordingly. They often 
rent land not used by ejidatarios, who are at a disadvantage with a 
single parcel of land. Rearing operations predominate, but milk and beef 
production has gained in importance recently.
Fishing activities have expanded in the last decade. Eight thousand 
tons of seafood were produced in 1973. There are four fishing co-ops in 
Alvarado_7 with 400 members, plus three around the Aleman Reservoir, 
and one in Tlacotalpan for the Papaloapan River. There are several 
thousand free fishermen as well. Aquaculture stations are found in 
Temascal and Tlacotalpan.
Water Control. Flooding has been a problem in the region, particu­
larly on the right margin of the Papaloapan river. Taking two annual 
seasons together, there is a one-in-five chance of a zero crop because of 
flooding. The Commission's flood control program did much to stabilize 
river bank agriculture and replace part-time grazing land with crops.
The Miguel Aleman Dam prevented major flooding in the high rainfall years 
of 1954 and 1955.
3/_/The mill had financial difficulties. But with $750 million 
pesos in capital, 1000 employees, 8000 farmers, and 20,000 canecutters 
involved, the government could not allow it to fold.
— ^In 1976 there were over 1000 private fishing boats in Alvarado. 
Productos Pesqueros Mexicano had 135 small modem fishing vessels.
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Despite these works, the total damages from the 1958 and 1 9 6 9 ^flood 
were far more serious than before the flood control works. In 1969, 
340.000 square kilometers were flooded, with damages (in real terms; 
reaching M$443 million, compared to $123 million on 470,000 hectares o 
the 1944 flood.5/ Without the dam it is estimated that there would 
have been severe floods every six to ten years. However, increased 
production has not yet brought high returns to the investment.
Irrigation works were undertaken in the Rio Blanco area of the Low­
lands on 13,000 hectares in 1954. Seven thousand hectares of the 
district are now operating; in 1970 it was hardly in use at all. 
ently, the district, with its double-cropping of rice is adding signiri 
cantly to production, although much_of its resources are being wasted on 
pasture for extensive cattle operations.
Irrigation has been planned for years for 1000 hectares in the Los 
Naranjos area, but so far there have been no results. The initial plan 
was dropped in 1957 after experimentation with 350 hectares. An attempt 
was made in 1957 to carry outa drainage project o f 3000hectares near 
Tlacotalpan, but it was abandoned as noneconomical. There are present y 
some pilot projects for drainage going on in anticipation of the Cerro de
Oro project.
Colonization. As mentioned before, most of the population growth in 
the Lowlands came about through substantial spontaneous colonization in 
the earlier years. There was only one important directed colonization 
scheme, in Los Naranjos, for resettlement of Mazatecs from the Aleman 
Reservoir area (shown in Map 3-2, on p. 38). A practically uninhabited 
and uncultivated area of 22,000 hectares was expropriated. The first 
colonists arrived in 1952 (417 families on 3300 hectares), and by 1954 
five colonies were set up— Zapata, Oaxaca, Los Naranjos,^Resumidero and 
Independencia. The program involved complete land clearing and prepara­
tion, housebuilding, a directed credit program and mechanization, except 
in Resumidero, a religious-based colony which was provided only with 
land.
By 1956, however, almost half the families had left or been 
expelled, and the majority of loans were left unpaid. In mid-1957, the 
Commission’s credit program was drastically curtailed. Unable to pay off 
their accumulated indebtedness, most colonists were forced to leave. e 
land was resold to Veracruz cattlemen. A second colonization attempt was 
made soon after with 35 families from Durango, of which 20 left the first 
year. Today, only Resumidero and small parts of the others are oper 
ating. The land is intended now for resettlement of the Chmantecs from 
Cerro de Oro..........................................
5/xhe current value of damages was $30 million. The real value is 
in 1969 pesos, according to Commission conversion tables. Of the 1969 
losses, 40 percent were in agriculture, 20 percent in cattle. Over 8000 
ejidatarios and 2000 small property owners were affected.
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Land Tenure. Land tenure is still a big problem in the Lowlands, 
icularly much land around Cosamaloapan, and Tlalixcoyan is still in 
-j-ar8a cattle holdings. In the Tuxtepec area, holdings are 
individually smaller, but many ranchers own a number of them. In order 
for cattlemen to go into farming, they must divide their land into two 
plots and get separate inaffectability certificates for each. There 
were, however, a number of ejidos created during the 1960s, and today 
the area around Loma Bonita and Lerdo particularly.have a preponderance 
of ejidos.
, Technology. Crop technology in the Basin is probably most advanced 
xn the Lowlands, where there is highest use of outside inputs. While in 
1949/50, there were fewer than 250 tractors in the lowlands— used mostly 
to haul cane during harvest, by 1970, there were nearer 2000. Technology 
xn livestock production is still fairly limited to changes in pasture 
varieties, simple health care and some improved breeding.
The Tuxtlas Region
Chart 4-5 describes Tuxtlas agriculture. Back in the late 1940s 
this region had only a few spots of commercial cane production around 
Hueyapan, with pineapple in Isla and Rodriguez Clara. By 1970, the area 
had become the Basin's maize granary and center for beans and chile pro­
duction, and as important as Loma Bonita in pineapple. Almost all the 
beans are intercropped with maize. The tonalmil season production of 
maize is most important. Crop composition in the area has diversified 
over the years with rice, coffee, sesame and tobacco.
Over half of the land is now worked, compared to a third in 1950. 
Slightly more land is in crops than in cultivated pastures. Of all the 
regions except the Colonization region, the Tuxtlas is the most agricul­
tural, with about half of its gross product and personal income from this 
sector.
Cattle production in the Tuxtlas is growing steadily, and where 
there xs water, the land is particularly opt for it. From 1960 to 1970, 
cattle land increased about 60 percent. The zone has neither flood nor’ 
drought problems for the most part. Milk production is more common here 
than in the other regions.
Until recently, there were very few government programs involving 
the Tuxtlas. Perhaps because of this, recent agricultural programs have 
met with more success here than in most other parts of the Basin.
Apart from traditional agricultural production, there is a growing 
fishing center at Lake Catemaco, and barbasco collection plays an 
important role in local incomes.
Almost all new settlement of the Tuxtlas area since the 1930s has 
been spontaneous and, as will be mentioned in the section on demography, 
amazingly rapid. The only direct colonization program here was in 
Michapan, an area of about 1400 hectares north of Acayucan. It was
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L A N D  U S E
CHART 4-5- CHARACTERISTICS OF
a g r i c u l t u r e in th e tux t l a s r e g i o n*
H e c ta r e s
Censused: 747,359
* Mexico, SIC, Censo^grxcola 
1955 and 1975).
Onnadero, 1950_
608,684
1970, (published in
C R O P C O M P O S I T I O N
Beans 
Pineapp le 
Tobacco 
Coffee 
Others 
Sugar 
cane 
Rice
1960
1970^
Hectares 106,618
Cropped: 93,658
. THnter cycle - 33,592 hectares; Spring/ a/ Of annual crops: Winter cjci
Summer - 57,320 hectares.
ontq comision dal Papaloapan, Preliminary Data of the Censo
* „ Ganadero 1970; and "Cultivos, 19ol.
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dest  ined for  f iv e  percent o f  Hio
r U , r ^ l B O  o r i « in « l l y  had an i r " « t 1f o ' In d ia “  ° f  the Aleman He.e r-  By 1956,  80 f a m i l ie s  in a s i n g l e  " V 8  a  pr° S ram which was droooed 
h e c t a r e s .  Roughi y the 3aine p®0g raC° l ° ny. weTre c u l t i v a t i n g  almost 900 ’
s e t t i n g  up urban c e n t e r s ,  c r e d i f  and u  ° S NaranJ ° 8 fo r  c l e a r i n g  
Che c r e d i t  s i t u a t i o n  h e r i  s L  . Was  in e f f e c t .  But 
considered decent c r e d i t  r i s k s  for° « f t y  f a m i l i e s
me c h a n i s a t i o n ^  m n e r s  ^  StUl quite low- t h o u g h
This is one of the major foci of the PLANW raoment™> in the 1970s.
t e c h n ic ia n s  are quite  e x c i te d  about i t s  n t i c u l ! ^  ° °  ^  C ° ™ ^ i o n
8 aSriculturaI potential.
jjie Colonization RpPion
served by no^pemanent "type^of c o ^ u " ' Sparsely Populated and was
r o ^ T ^ " 1 aB - ‘=ulturey‘Serf. “T ^ *  ^  * «  aW
fence and c’ there haS been a stable rise L  n L  V ° l0nized and some and commercial crops, shown in Chart ™ 6production of both subsis-
Two thirdTof this" w a f ^ p l L ^ i n ^ y o ^ t r  CUltivatad in
the a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r  and M, \  personal income s t i l l  c o m e s f *
percentage since 1960. ’ ^  38 been only a minor decline in this
t i c u l a r l y ^ r i c e  Sesame -nd tobacco Par-
Meire andf  b e l a t i ^ ly  important d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  ^ P 0 r t a n c e - T h e '60s was a 
production. Rice is t o n a l m i l ^ ’
been don^^^Tpe'opre^Le^verrpoorhhhe6^ ^ 6 U “ le experimentation has poor communications increase ^ th ^reat in the Lower Basin) and
i" thisy-regioenOTly r8mainin8 alaah-and-bu™' V ^ c u l L r ^ t h T B ^ n  is
ered ^  CenSUS as a zone of gath-a^e r c i a l  PurPoses-as in
private foldings oftand" c ^ n ^ - f o r e ™  Re?i0" W"  °nCe ia 1-rye 
unexploited except for extraction of ffineSt i T 8* - a"d individuals- 
this century. The main forms of land, tlmber ln the early Part of 
Colonies were at one time particularly anUre are now ejidos and colonies 
midway between ejido and private ^  ^  th8 35 a
land. Due to problems of excessive i! a h controlled selling of
colonies were approved. Those fully tit.C°ncenCfation. no further 
Vere chanSed to the status of ejido ra™ e d ;  those without title
-59-
CHART 4-6. CHARACTERISTICS OE AGRICULTURE IN THE COLONIZATION REGION*
L A N D  U S E
1950.2/ 1970
Hectares
Censused: 406,014 ; 347,814
_§/ This does not include the municipios of Tuxtepec.
* Mexico, SIC, Censo Agricola y Ganadero, 1950 and 1970, (published in 1955 
ctnd 1975) .
■Hectares... ... ................................. ........ ................
57,787 148,192
~^0f annual crops: harvested in Winter — 34,673, in Spring/Suironer
31,745.
* Mexico, SRH, Papaloapan Commission, Preliminary data of the Censo AgrrcoLa 
y Ganadero 1970; "Cultivos 1961.”
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r„ n Most ^ of the few collective ejidos in the Basin are here. None has 
P^5tlJ:ularly successful, although they have only been operating 
7  % Ver  ^ few y e a r s ' In g e n e r a l * chey use s a la r ie d  workers 
a d m in i s t r a t i  o f , e^ df t a r l o 8 >. ^ i l e  the Bank giving c r e d i t  makes the 
p r i v a t e  p t o tI? S1° nS- Most e t l U  keeP a ^ g e  P«rt of  the land in
r directed Colonization. During the years of Miguel Aleman, the
o H e o ^ r i n t n  fbo^  the prospect of moving large numbersof people into the tropical lowlands. It was generally held thlt
c e s ^ r T  Sh°Uld be glVSn t0 such Pioneering colonists to ensure suc­cessful farming on a commercial scale. It seemed likely— and indeed the 
xperience of spontaneous settlements bears this out— that new settlers 
would fall into traditional subsistence patterns in the face of the 
numerous technical and social difficulties of moving into the "jungle". 
Thus when the need arose to resettle 3000 Mazatec Indians and some 500 
other colonists, the Commission tried out its philosophy.
r» = „1!,nf0rtUnateiy’ the pro?rfms were fraught with difficulties, and the
at a ver^hi h° °ater tradltlonal subsistence fanning units after all,ac a very nigh cost. . ’
A number of problems were common to all the programs. Choice of 
site was made hastily, with insufficient research. There were no pre-
p ^ c t i c e s i r a n v ^ f  1^ esLifatfons °* test croPs> varieties, or management practices in any of the colonies. Hence timetables devised for the
colonists were completely experimental in nature, and yet gave the 
colonist no flexibility for devising his own. All the fast-profit crop 
programs for tobacco, rice, and peanuts failed. P
prrc Me^banization introduced yet another known variable into the proj­
ects. ^ The excessive paternalism required by such high-risk programs left 
colonists unprepared for the brusque suspension of services that fre­
quently occurred. The infrastructure built was excessive, and was poorly 
maintained, while crucial matters like land titling were never completed!
Spontaneous Colonization. In contrast to these poor results is 
he comparative ease of the spontaneous colonization here, which pre- 
dominated Many of the colonies of Playa Vicente were settled this way
wasWo L n e f  °L ^  Lan3~la Trinidad Basin’ of economic sizewas opened with no expense at all to the government other than normal
road maintenance and land titling costs.
Whereas the new colonists who settled in the Lowlands tended to come 
rom out of the Basin, those who came to this zone with its extremely
condltlons tended to come primarily from within the Basin. In 
1949/50, average holding size in the Lower Basin was less than ten
Wl^  "ncreasing P ^ l ^ i o n  pressure, small groups broke off 
from ejidos and formed the growing numbers of landless workers in the search for new lands.
. In Nuevo Cosoltepec, a group of Indians from the impoverished Alta 
Mixteca petitioned for about 500 hectares in Soyaltepec, because the 
Temascal-La Granja road cut through it. Some colonies spontaneously
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set tied by Mazatecs had notably more successful results than the directed 
projects. These included the ejido El Carmen in the Soyaltepec 
resettlement zone, and the colonies of Arroyo Leon and Vegas de Jobal in 
Nuevo Ixcatlan. Spontaneous settlement is a major force along the 
newly-built road to Palomares, as a series of small, but prosperous 
ranchers are already a force in regional cattle production.
The key features in the success of the spontaneous colonies are: 
automatic choice of the most appropriate agricultural lands, strong indi­
vidual initiative, support of a cohesive social group, and full awareness 
by the settlers of the facts of living in isolated areas. The existence 
of a road seems to be the single biggest attraction for settlers, as it 
assures escape from isolation and adequate marketing opportunities.
The Highlands Region
In the Highlands,onlyafourthofthelandiscultivated, andthis 
almost entirely with crops. Typical of the really mountainous areas, in 
the Sierra de Juarez as little as five percent of the land is cropped. 
Agriculture is restricted in most parts of the region to the rainy 
season. While most production is for subsistence, there are several 
zones of important commercial production.
In the late 1940s, only coffee grown around Huautla was important 
commercially. By 1970, the Canada was much more developed, particularly 
with cane, maize, beans and fruit tree production. The Fio Salado 
irrigation district in the Canada has been there since people first moved 
to the area, since the land is so arid that agriculture is impossible 
without it. Since the 1800s there have been individual systems and 
associations. The system is made with infiltration wells or springs and 
small dams. Between 1960-1969, the Commission made it into a district 
and built a more sophisticated water control system.
There are small 
Juarez, where almost 
crop is still maize,
There are important new coffee centers around Villa Alta, and com­
mercial production of basic foodstuffs in Esperanza and Palmarde Bravo. 
Maize production over the entire Highlands rose greatly, while bean pro­
duction was replaced in great part by dry peas.
The 1960s was a very difficult time for much of the Highlands. The 
north of Mexico eas ily outcompeted them for wheat, and there was a period 
of bad weather. Although the land area exploited changed little, there 
was a 40 percent decline in actual production from 1960 to 1970. Chart 
4-7 provides data on production and land use.
There was an increase overall of only three quarters between 1950 
and 1970 in livestock. This is primarily due to a marked reduction in 
herds during the hoof—and—mouth epidemic, which were slow to build up 
again.
irrigation systems elsewhere,' such as the Sierra de 
1500 hectares in five areas are covered. The major 
however, and technology is extremely primitive.
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L A N D  U S E
CHART 4-7. CHARACTERISTICS OF AGRICULTURE IN THE HIGHLANDS*
1950 1970
Forest (can 
be logged)
Forest 
(cannot 
be log­
ged)
lantations
Pastures
.Can be 
opened
Forest(can be 
logged)
Uncultivat 
but prod/c
Hectares 
Censused:
inadequate
Uncultivated, 
but productive
2,147,117
Crops
Plantations
X  Natural 
Pastures
1,466,804
* Mexico SIC, Censo Agricola, y Ganadero, 1950 y 1970 (published in 1955 and 1975).
C R O P  C O M P O S I T I O N  
1950 1970
Hectares
Cropped: 153,793
— ^Of annual crops: Winter
112,933 hectares. *
* Mexico, SRH, Coraision del Papaloapan, Preliminary Data from the Censo 
Agricola y Ganadero 1970. and "Cultivos, 1961."
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Forestry is successfully competing with agriculture m  the southern 
Highlands around Juarez, Villa Alta, and Mixe. Sheep and goat production 
remain important in the western Highlands, but the inappropriate  ^
technology is having severe ecological consequences in the mountainous
parts.
The typical form of land tenure is still the centuries-old commu­
nity, which operates on the basis of individual plots, with pastureland, 
forest land and boundary control communally operated. Because of uneco­
nomical yields, technology is quite poor— except in the Canada, and in 
Palmar de Bravo-Esperanza, where PLANPA has recently been working. In 
these places there were perhaps 100 to 200 tractors in 1970. It is 
interesting that although two thirds of personal income in the region 
comes from agriculture, only a quarter of its gross product does.
Assistance to Agriculture in the Basin
Effective agricultural extension by either the SAG, the Commission, 
or sugar mills has been notably lacking, and yields of most crops are 
still far below their potential. Agricultural investigation has had 
little foresight. The center in Cotaxtle, Veracruz has overemphasized 
maize, which is certainly not the crop of the future for tropical areas. 
Also, their soils are considerably different than those common in the 
Basin. El Palmar in Tezonapa has done some interesting research on 
tropical fruits, trees and spices, but has participated in no practical 
application of results. Some livestock research in La Posta de Paso del 
Toro, Veracruz and Playa Vicente, Veracruz has been done with new feed 
sources, but local ranchers are slow to adopt them.
The PLANPA program appears to be filling a vacuum. There have been 
very few projects aimed directly at increasing commercial production _ 
among small farmers. Credit for agricultural production was almost nil 
until the late 1960s, except for sporadic attempts by government banks, 
which often failed. The Commission's credit projects in the Colonization 
Zone were also unsuccessful. Credit has vastly expanded, however, in the 
1970s from both the private and public sectors.
The National Clearing Commission worked in the past sexenio to open 
up unused lands via mechanized clearing. The Livestock Commission is 
giving credit to introduce livestock production on ejidos.
In 1976, a major national reorganization of sugar production took 
place, that— besidesincreasing thepriceofsugarcane tried to^ 
introduce incentives for better technology. A prior technical assistance 
program had failed, but a new extension system is being tried out.
Meanwhile, the national level Maize Plan— an emergency type of ■oper­
ation to raise production of basic foodstuffs has promoted improved 
technology for maize, beans and rice, but has stifled the much-needed 
diversification of tropical lands out of maize,
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Until the 1970s C0NASUP0 played a very minor role in the Basin. 
With notable increases of national minimum prices in the past few years, 
they have won a larger part of farmers' business. Although private 
marketing remains a difficult problem for small-scale producers, 
CONASUPO's quality control standards pose a major obstacle for their 
participation. Local production credit arrangements usually involve 
receipt of a part, or all of the crop by the creditor, which also 
reduces supplies for C0NASUP0.
Economic Diversification and Employment
Agro industry has always played an important role in the 
economy and this is increasing. Diversification has further 
the service sector.
Basin's 
strengthened
Indeed, the Input-Output Matrix showed very little total growth in 
the primary sector from 1963 to 1970 (see Charts 4-8 and 4-9), except for 
fishing. Meanwhile industry grew at 6.7 percent and services 3.8 percent 
annually. Although construction— with a national growth rate of 9 
percent annually— grew only 2.5 percent per annum, this rate rose 
markedly after 1970, with Commission projects and other investments.
During 1950 to 1970, the number of primary workers declined from 
about three fourths to about two thirds of all workers. Yet, sur­
prisingly, the percentage of transformation industry workers did not 
change, although there were minor increases in construction, extraction 
and electricity. Nor did the percentage in commerce or transportation
change. The big increases were in services and government work, as seen 
in Chart 4-9.°/
But by 1970, industry provided 47 percent of total income. The 
relation between the growth of industry and services and employment is 
very complex. During 1963 to 1970, primary workers were leaving faster 
than incomes in the sector were rising. In the industrial sector, 
incomes rose three times as fast as employment in an already high income 
per worker sector. Only in the subsector construction did both indices 
rise at the same time. In services, increases in employment were greater 
than increased product, which suggests there are a lot of marginal 
workers.
Textiles, sugar milling, beer and electricity were the major early 
industries; later cane processing took the lead and coffee milling and 
oil extraction became important. Except for the sugar mills and some oil 
wells, and weaving in the Highlands, all industry was located in the 
Industrial region. Of total industrial employment censused in 1944—  
including small auto shops, tortilla mills, etc.— 77 percent was 
concentrated in the Industrial region, 13 percent in the Lowlands, 3 
percent in the Tuxtlas and 7 percent in the Colonization Zone.
_/of course, the large number of "unspecified" workers in the 1970 
Census makes these statistics less than conclusive.
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CHART 4.8. DISTRIBUTION OF THE VALUE OF PRODUCTION IN 
THE PAPALOAPAN BASIN*
(pesos)
19 6 3 1 9  7 0
57191.9 mi l l i o n
Aj’r Leulture and 
}. i ves t oc k □ Industry Commerce and Services
* Mexico, SKIi, Com i sion del Papaloapan, Pi a^nostico Soc [ooconomi ca do la ■ (See Append
4 - 0 . )
CHART 4.9. SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORK FORCE IN 
THE PAPALOAPAN BASIN*
19 5 0 . . . 1 9 7 0
■j(iM79 1C PA i ‘ddt.'JOi !CPA
flexion, SIC, Sept uno y Neveun Ccnso do Poblncidn. I'rt) (published in. ll>hi .uni 1972).
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In 1970, more than a quarter of industrial value came from "dynamic" 
industries with complex technology, such as chemical products, paper and 
electrical equipment. Maps 4-4 and 4-5 show the change in the spatial 
distribution of industries, notably its concentration in the Lowlands. 
This contributes to its higher standard of living: while average product
per person working in the Basin in 1970 was $5378, industrial production 
per worker was $52,542.
The Industrial Region
Chart 4-10 describes the changing EAP by region. The only major 
change in the Industrial region was an increase in service workers. 
Industry has always played an important role there. In 1945 the two 
beer factories were expanding, as were the six sugar mills. Textiles 
were still strong,U Tehuacan was famous for its mineral waters at 
the time.
As of 1970, there has been a huge expansion and diversification into 
all types of industries including a paper mill, chemical plants, rubber 
packing plants, grain mills in Orizaba/Cordoba; and animal feed, soft 
drinks and cement factores in Tehuacan. Still, a slowdown in the economy 
has led to a shortage of jobs. This was the most likely reason for the 
drop in the rate of demographic increase there.
The Lowlands Region
The Lowlands in 1950 had nearly three-quarters primary workers, 
although it still had a higher percentage of workers in other sectors 
than did the three less developed regions. Sugar mills had been in the 
area since 1892, two each in Tlacotalpan, Tlalicoyan and Amatitlan, and 
three in Cosamaloapan. Later one was built in Alvarado. Almost all 
other industry was very small-scale. Other than the more important ones 
shown in Map 4-4, there were various traditional raw sugar mills, iron 
works, carpentry mills for nixtamal (pre-cooked maize for tortillas) and 
bakeries.®/
By 1970, both the scale and diversity of industry had changed. The 
region had less than two-thirds primary workers, and had nearly doubled 
its proportion of industrial workers, while a quarter of the EAP was in 
services. These trends had obviously intensified in the 1970s.
The main sources of industrial employment were still the sugar 
mills— eight of them, with another ready for operation in 1977. Apart 
from the Tuxtepec paper mill, and a new paper mill MEXPAPER to be 
finished around Tres Valles, these are all transformation industries.
U The first mill in Orizaba was established in 1836; three nearby 
plants in 1882; one in Rio Blanco in 1892 and in Santa Rosa in 1898.
— 'To give an idea of scale: Cosamaloapan municipio with a popula­
tion of 17,000, supported 21 mixtamal mills and 22 bakeries.
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CHART 4-10. CHANGES IN THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION 
BY REGION IN THE PAPALOAPAN BASIN*
REGION
Industrial
1950
71,274
1970
110,628
Lowlands
70,160 95,019
Tuxtlas
30,697
64,028
Colonization
Highlands
18,840 32,430
Agriculture 
and Livestock
Industry Commerce 
and Services
* Mexico, SIC, Septimo y Noveno Censo de Poblacion, 1950 y 1970 (published 
in 1952 and 1972).
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In addition, the increase in population and urbanization have 
multiplied many times the demand for local grain mills and other such 
small-scale industry. The zone within 30 miles of Tuxtepec is really 
beginning to take on an industrial flavor. Industrialization has 
attracted many outsiders to the area; reflected by a marked increase in 
the urban population. Meanwhile, the increase in agricultural work 
available has induced a nearly comparable permanent rural migration. The 
cane harvest remains the major focus for seasonal migration.
The Tuxtlas Region
The Tuxtlas region is still primarily agricultural, with about three 
fourths of its EAP in that sector, even now. In 1892, there were three 
sugar mills one in Acayucan and two in San Juan Evangelista. Another 
was set up in 1905 in Cuatotalpan, which was the only early established 
one remaining in 1950, A handful of other small-scale transformation 
industries completed the list. Only cigar and pineapple processing were 
important.
By 1970, an important soft drink and water bottling center had 
developed in the Catemaco area. San Andres had several new investments, 
as did Acayucan. Fruit packing had grown in.importance in Isla and 
Tesechoacan. Despite rapid immigration, there is still a shortage of 
agricultural Laborers.
The Colonization Region
. the Col*onization region there is really no "industry" as we speak 
of it m  modern times. The percent of "industrial" workers changed from 
1950 to 1970 from less than two to eight percent. Besides a small lemon 
essence plant m  Chiltepec, the activities in 1950 included primarily 
native craft production, textiles, pottery, coffee milling. Today, some 
barbasco processing which uses very simple technology— has been added to the list.
The Highlands Region
Like the Colonization zone, the Highlands remain little affected by 
modern technological industries. Yet, because of the scarcity of good 
agricultural land, there has always been a relatively large and constant 
portion of the EAP doing other types of work. The lack of iobs in this 
region is chronic.
Back in the Z940s, there were three sugar mills— two in Puebla and 
one in Oaxaca— today there is only one. Ixtlan had several small 
sawmills, which closed in the 1950s . Handicrafts— particularly textiles , 
weaving and ceramics— have always been important. Coixtlahuaca is the 
principal producer of palm hats. In 1950, it was estimated that most of 
the adult population of this district were involved. Leatherwork is 
important in Teotitlan; ceramics in the Mixe; huipiles (a type of woman's
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dress) in Jalapa de Diaz and San Jose Miahuatlan; ixtle (weaving fiber 
from the maguey) in San Francisco Cajonos; basketry in the Canada.
Logging and sawmill operations have become a notable source of 
employment and income particularly in the greater districts of Ixtlan, 
Etla and Cuicatlan. And mining has been and continues to be to a lesser 
degree, an important occupation. The principal metals are gold, silver, 
lead and copper. Of nonmetallic mining, almost half is for cement and
lime.
Demographic Changes
The population of the Basin between the Census years 1950 and 1970 
increased about 70 percent, somewhat less in the first decade than in the 
second, but still less than for Mexico as a whole. By 1976, it must have 
had nearly 2 1/2 million inhabitants. The regional economic changes that
havetakeirpTacirarereTrectedBy
urbanization. Maps 4-6, 4-7 and 4-8 illustrate these changes over time.
The 1950s. In the decade of the 1950s, the fastest-growing regions 
were the Lowlands and the Tuxtlas, both at around 4.4 percent 
annually..2/ The Colonization zone— then being colonized by the 
Aleman Reservoir resettlement programs and other groups, such as the 
colonists of Abasolo, lagged slightly behind at 3.7 percent. Annual 
growth in the Industrial Region (2.5 percent) was around the national 
average. The Highlands, including case study Ixtlan, experienced several 
natural disasters, leading to large-scale emigration and only 1.7 percent 
increase. There is good evidence that much of that emigration was 
to other parts of the Basin.
Nevertheless, while the census showed a 49 percent increase in the 
number of people originating from outside the Basin, there was a 65 
percent increase in tho se orig inating in the BasIn but 1iving out side it. 
And by 1960, only eight percent of the Basin's inhabitants had come from 
out s ide.10/
Most emigrants went to Mexico City. Veracruz received many emi­
grants from the Puebla and Oaxaca portions of the Basin. The major^immi­
gration centers were the case study zones of Tuxtepec, Tehuacan, Orizaba, 
Cordoba and Cosamaloapan. Most newcomers were from other tropical areas.
9/ Tuxtepec, Playa Vicente and Acayucan all registered net immi­
gration rates in these years greater than 50 percent. The Tuxtlas and 
the region east of Playa Vicente had net immigration of 5 to 50 percent. 
The total population of Playa Vicente, San Juan Evangelista and Tres 
Valles increased 100 percent; Acayucan 75 to 90 percent, and in Hueyapan, 
Catemaco and Acula, 50 to 75 percent.
A£/piaya Vicente had the greatest number from out of State— over 
25 percent, due to immigration from neighboring Oaxaca. Tierra Blanca, 
Tres Valles and Sayula had 10 to.15 percent from out of state.
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The 1960s. During 1960 to 1970, the major growth region was the 
Industrial, with a 39 percent increase because of new industrial jobs.
The first flush of immigration over, growth rates declined in the 
Lowlands and Tuxtlas to around 3.3 percent, and in the Colonization zone 
to 2.7 percent, due to the decline in Commission activities and general 
agricultural stagnation. The Highlands region, on the other hand, 
recovered somewhat, mainly through local population increase.
The 1970s. During the first half of the 1970s, population growth in 
the Industrial Region was very slow. By contrast, in the Lowlands, 
population grew about 40 percent in those six years— more than six 
percent annually. Over half of the new inhabitants there were located in 
the towns. Tuxtepec was a major destination for immigrants, with the 
Tierra Blanca zone in second place.
In the Tuxtlas, growth was between 25 and 30 percent, or four per- 
cent yearly. Here, over two thirds of the new settlers are found in the 
countryside, with the relative level of urbanization remaining about the 
same. Contrary to this trend, total population in the Isla zone began to 
stabdlijzeatJ:hi&rime,withurbanin-migrationpredominanL.------ -------
In the Colonization Zone, population grew between 30 and 35 per­
cent, about 5 percent yearly. This also reflected a flow to the 
countryside, since the relative level of urbanization actually went down. 
Abasolo's experience followed the general trend.
Urbanization and New Zones of Influence
The most important demographic change was its marked urban charac­
ter. In 1950, only 29 percent of the Basin's population was urban. The 
major cities of the Industrial zone were the undisputed economic centers 
of the Basin— the major source of inputs and consumer goods, and the 
major market for production. Orizaba had over 55,000 inhabitants; 
Tehuacan 23,000; Cordoba, Mendoza and Tierra Blanca had over 10,000.
By 1970, 39 percent of the population was urban. Over 60 percent of 
the increase in population over the two decades had gone to towns.
Cordoba and Orizaba had grown to 78,500 and 92,000 respectively. There 
were very large increases in people living in towns over 10,000 in the 
Lowlands area. In 1976, there were 19 towns over 10,000 in size, of 
which at least 9 had over 20,000 inhabitants.H/
Thus, although Cordoba, Orizaba and Tehuacan continue as the major 
urban areas, they are no longer the only important sources of inputs and 
markets. Several "zones of influence" have grown up, particularly in the 
Lowlands. Tierra Blanca (30,000), originally a railroad center, is the 
center for the northeastern lowlands. Cosamaloapan (30,000), an old
11/These town populat ion figures are estimates 
Eradication Commission and municipal authorities.
by the Maiana
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commercial and sugar town, influences the middle plains. Tuxtepee 
(50,000) is, next to the city of Oaxaca, the most important commercial 
confluence for the Oaxacan highlands and much of the Colonization zone. 
Furthermore, its central location in the Basin’s system of roads has made 
it a commercial center for the entire Basin.
Loma Bonita (22,000), a pineapple and industrial center, has a 
smaller zone of influence in the southeastern lowlands that extends into 
much of the lower Tuxtlas area. Lerdo (12,000) is a sugar cane, center in 
the northeastern Lowlands. San Andres Tuxtla (30,000) is the commercial 
center of the Tuxtlas, with Acayucan (30,000) somewhat less important, 
but with strong links to the southeast.
From 1970 to 1976, the most notable urban growth was seen in 
Tuxtepec, Isla, and Tres Valles (in Cosamaloapan).
It is the growth of these urban centers which has led to the rapid 
development of the region. The existence of a sizable population center 
attracts skilled personnel, provides more economical services and absorbs 
a great deal of manpower particularly in the service sectors. Avail- 
ability of services and a fairly large labor supply are important attrac­
tions for industry. Since most land resources in the Basin have been 
laid title to, and there is rapid natural population increase, only the 
growth of towns is warding off a minifundia or landless labor problem. 
Further, the emergence in the Lower Basin of several smaller-scale 
centers rather than one or two larger centers has provided a less 
erratic transition to urban life for the inhabitants. There is an ease 
in rural-urban relations not found in Mexico's very large cities.
Welfare Improvements
Urbanization, total production increases, and communication in them­
selves do not ensure improvements in welfare. It is apparent, however, 
that there have been important advances, particularly in the Lower Basin, 
as shown in Chart 4-11,
Housing, There has been a comparatively small improvement in 
housing conditions in the past twenty years. In the Lowlands, the 
standard home is still a large hut with unsealed walls and a palm roof, 
These homes, however, are increasingly wel1-furnished. Beds or cots are 
now very common, as are nonearthen floors. Stoves are used, although 
many women prefer to cook the majority of their food on the traditional 
wood fire in the back yard.
In the Highlands, however, most of the native housing types of adobe 
or wood still provide inadequate protection against the cold, and here 
the lack of improvement is a notable failure of development efforts.
Increasingly, in the urban areas or more prosperous rural ones, 
houses of plaster and cement are being constructed, with several rooms 
and plumbing. Clothing all over the Lower Basin is quite modern in 
style. In the Highlands there are still some areas where the native 
dress is worn, particularly by women.
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the th^commercia^consumpt ionHofbaS t^ St3PleS °f the diet in
most o f  the pop ulat ion.  Household fowl and ?  r ™ ains f a i r l y  low for 
festive days maintain the protein • plss’ and meat served on 
Lowlands. I„ many p la ces  the «"  re<Julr?raant e f f i c i e n t l y  in most of  the 
10  l e s s  lo c a l  s l a v e r i n g / J r f “ a* e pHcaa haa lad 
consumption is  very low. Local avail ablPPe d o u t  instead. Milk 
and vegetables is falling, especially*^ , ! S  and consumption of fruits 
the overall successful fight a e a , W  - ? -an 3reaS 1 Nevertheless, with 
food marketing,  the n u t r i t i o n a l  s ta tu s  of  p a r a s i t e s  and improved
in th e  Lower Basin i s  much improved. m° S ° f  the P°Pu l a t i °n at l e a s t
?nd ee^age faciHties^^incrfasing6 w * l ab11^  °f good drinking water 
is still far below the national average, “ y 1970 "th"8 “niversal- Zt 
nif leant improvement only in the Lowlfnrf 7 • ' there was really sig-
siightly better than population g r o w t h * conat-=tion doing just
Sewerage availability in IQSn rT™  . „
Industrial Zone. By 1970* the Lnwl ^ almost ml. except in the 
f o r  about a th ird  o f  thei^ i n h a b i t a n t s .8 *  TUXtlaS Z° nea had — age
Basin~~af feet ing welflretaj that “ f*health'^pro***^1 Pr°grain in the
- - a s  u s r ^ s s s ^  -
ago were m a la r ia ,  o n ch o c e rco s is ,  i n t e s t i n a l  d "  h problems 30 years 
p i n t a .  When the Commission b J «  w o r k d” e" e > t a >>erculosis and 
treatm ent c e n te r s  and s p e c ia l  b r i e a d e . ’ - V  SSt Uf> 1 3  Pre v e n t i°n  and 
with the SSA. By the mid-1950s,  m o r bidifvT6 and “ ^ o c e r c o s i s ,
had dec l ined  to le ss  than ten per tho,.«« a ^ * 3 * ° f  the maJ ° r  d is e a s e sper thousand inhabitants.
uni" IS
water, plus a change in cultural hah if- - ,P r fewa£e and drinking
important correctional tools. Infant mortal if S?n£ta?ion are the most above the national average.13/ mortality is still considerably
39 h o s p i t a l s ' o r ^ c l i n l c s - - n e a r l y ^ l l ^ i n * t h e * ? tdr8  *• “h° le  Basin andy ai  m  th  In ustrial Zone, with the
— 'M ajo r causes o f  m o r t a lit y  
e n t e r i t is  and c o l i t i s ;  pneumonia, 
c o ld s  and whooping cough.
in  order of frequency were; 
a c c id e n ts , in fa n c y  d is e a s e s ,
g a s t ro - 
m e asle s,
f lu c tu a te d  between 15 /10 0 0  b ir t h s  in  19 5 0  5 5 /lo n n e ? ” fo red in  V e ra c r^  
1965 and 8 2/100 0 in  1970. In  Oaxaca t h * '  ln  1956> 6°/1 0 0 0  in
10 0 /10 0 0  in  1950 to 70 /100 0, too low ’ to b . °  1 “ a l , le v e l dropped from
moved frora 1 2 5 /1 0 0 0  -  » 50 to 90 in m 5 i i M T * t h e  r a t e
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T5 2970
exception of Tierra BUnca, "and^rprivltrsanatoriuma.
ware 102 clinic., .16 Bakn! In the Highlands, only
These are concentrated in t hnsoitals supported by a few
Cuicatlan, Guelatao; and “ ^ ^ e s T r f ^ i d L  by SSA, IMSS
scattered health cen*era' s ial) and ISSSTE (Institutu de
(Instituto Mexicano de SeguroSocial1 "Brujas"— witches, and
SeguroSocial para Trabajadores delJs^do). on t0 a Urge
"curanderos" using herbal remedies are
extent. f
,,f of this has been a change in the age s t r n c t ^ e  °  One direct result of this . the population was under 25 years
the population. In 197 > tw0 h 14 Consequently, the EAP has
old and nearly half were younger than
declined.
Income Changes . ;
* r  i-Vi  ^ R ^ flk  o f  M.GX IC O  StU Ciy •
We have very rough inc“ * W O  were not remarkable. but
In r e a l  value, the changes beteenl h the rest 0f the nation,
now the Basin compares somewhat J ^ ant as a source of income, suggesting 
tfajCS r r i g i : s r ^ ^ o r : : i r r : rirfound among industrial and other 
workers.
, r f-Vto Basin by official s tat is
The annual average rural income or^ impoverished Highlanders,
tics is 610.140 <$*1 845) f^r example, the Lowlands
and thus underestimates tne g 
region.
Graph 4-1 shows results from a household^consumption^survey^one y
the Commission for the Rio ^-“ l^ural zones in the Lower Basin,
relatively better off than mo ® -eg are certainly representative,
but those in the lower inc°“ . US$500 per year, or assuming
Average expenditures per cap Those at the lower end of the seal
plrcent EAP, US$1768 average income.^Those 
average about US$1300 yearly income--
For Rio Blanco farmers ,  t h e ^ " d u ^  to* the a v a i l a b i l i t y  of some year-  
about 16 Percent , which -  ° the por tion  is  es t imated at
round cropping.  In neamy
about 25 percent.
/ ■ pnditures in 1976 were $6542, or US$500.14/Average per capita e x p e n d ^  ^  1Q hectares) the figure was
For the lower range 4, 086 bablv represents total income as well as $4565, or US$365, which probably represe ^  percent) then this
expenditures. If one assumes ?"300 us and 0f $1758 average income. The 
represents an income of about $1300 US, an iince much expenditure
f i g u r e ,  for the upper income range “^ ’wee or saved.probably not reported, and somewas
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GRAPH 4-1. FAMILY EXPENDITURES IN THE RIO BLANCO 
ACCORDING TO FARM SIZE* IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Tobacco, Beverages, 
Entertainment
Shoes and 
Clothing
Medicine and 
Medical Care
-  This group spends 38% of what the 
group wrth 50 hectares or more spends
50% of clothing, 45% of food expend!- tures. ^
— ' I f the family has five'members, th< 
average Income Is $5000. We assume
that with an EAP of 25%, each worker 
supports 4 persons.
* A s p e ' c t ^ S ^ 01"13—  d£l PaPaloaP“ h "I* Capac:
Veracruz"^°1976?0nOmlC0S del D1StrlCt° de
de Pago y Otros 
82, Rio Blanco,
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Educatiorvaljmprovements In
education ate - f l e e t e d ^  ^ ^ r a t e .  At
1950, only 44 percent ofOut°1 0 0 <Tschools in the Basin. There were on 
that time, there « « e  about 1 o£ 387 3tudents.
two junior high schools, with _ . te
Advanced schools begun »  * e  195^ ^ ^ ' l l c h o i r f o r c h e m i c a l
Alvarado, schoo Gueiatao and.Zongolica.
boarding sc oo citizens over age ten,
By 1970, literacy had reached ^ p e t c e n ^  ^  schools had rf.en
8 t i l l  under the n a t io n a l  average.  2 5 0 0 p r im a r y ^ c h o o ls ,  85 j u n i o r ^ ^ ^ .
S T - E I c *  an ”l8 vocational *ig*. schools^ a primary educa-
■ “■ ■ ■  S ’ !*. s a & s . r 3 S . * —  “  5-‘ -
.................. :...r ....I.__ __ _____________ __ ____________ ____ ___• the past sexenio, hundreds of ^ the entire Basin
= r -  —  -  * -
There are th ree  new
high and high schools. _  Papaloapan
u s ® -  » ■  “ s ' ; s  i r £ “ «
« i : “  i;u ~ -  “
Spanish. This was. principally
third were monolingual. „ v i ne individuals ■
, -f non-Spanish speaking moiv_
Although by 1970, the_percent o:£ ^  ^  an absolute numerical
about 8 to 10 percent each
Summary
Although the °i‘p“ in ‘iStl,“ t « c ^ g Ul-‘M  " ^ ^ ^ b e fore^agri­
grant s^fr^^nontropi cal regiooa^ ^ There^ is ^ a^long^way^t^„8iiind
culture ie ttoderuteed. er ‘ V  P sr,c Righleod zone, echte.e
. t l „  , „ „ , c  e t r e r e u l e . . , .  -  ,
■»“  tt* " » <  W t . W “ —  “ “ “ ■ ’
82
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The standard of living there is
and in several areas the benefits o ev with which to expand the
basic physical and social infr^  The following chapters examine
prosperity so evident rn T ^ f o l  ^  which
four of these places, in_an accempL 
encourage this type of growth.
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CHAPTER. 5. economic dynamism in the basin— four case
STUDIES
In the preceding chapter, we„pr?S! ! ^ t\appened, ^ a t d i d n ' t  happen 
"change" in the Papaloapan River t it The mere accumulation of
in thS course of 30 years of "development ^ t h e  changes occurred, 
this data, however, gives easing land under cultivation? Why
Which programs were successfu Droblem in the Papaloapan? What
is labor absorption a relatively minor P ™ W £ h^ ( ^  d^velopment was 
factors encouraged industrialize^on. ^  luckj how much to private
inhiat ive? ^ Hav^wehf are K i t ! ’ spread evenly through the population.
df d  for^formal^orrelat ion "ana^is ^ F u r t h e ^ o r e , as was noted
ear lier^development has ^ varied ^ ^ j ^ ^ ^ g j g g h g ^ f n t e r e s t t  therefore, to
1 studj'irdejth^ndividual examples of _ successful development, and to 
conclusions from their combined.experiences........
Our definition of s u c c e s s f u l  d e v e l o p m e n t ^ ^  1) ^growing ^
economy'in terms of production, > dQf labor and provision of jobs.H chose^fou^ a r e a ^ o f 6 particularPdynamism in the Basin: Isla, Abasolo
del Valle, Tuxtepec and Ixtlan.
The Zones of Stud^.
Map 5-1 shows the location of these zones.
"Tuxtepec" probably provides ^he most dr^atic ^ example and^radical
r a n g r o f L ^ i c  - Se - ^ ^ ^ t h e  p o p u ^ - o f
Tuxtepec, Oaxaca had suffere , decline anyway because of the
o£ the year before. The “ ^ S s  T^erewere"about 40 ,000
collapse of the banana oom in . d j^ve Df the municipios in the
in h a b i ta n ts  in the zone— whic - h t e o e c  O i i t l a n ,  Ja ca tep ec  and V a l l e
D i s t r i c t  of  T u xtep ec -T u xte p e c  C hU tepec ,  O j x t i  , i 30 ,0 0 0 .  The
Nacional. By 1970, th p P neoule and a real boom-town
city of Tuxtepec in 1976 had 50,00’ "“ ^ t ,  traffic jams. The cityatmosphere: construction everywt^re pavement t ^  ^ portant
has become the heart of the Industrial Zone. It is the
commercialandindustria ce ^  State QfOaxacaanditsprospects 
second most importan ci y e nd rubber are the growth crops of
affect the entire zone. Sugar £an hectares of land that were
the past decade and they cover has been a host of social investments
never in cultivation ^efo^ *  ter water and sewage systems. There
r e er r ^ e 1 a c t ° r i e : ;  T ones, and several under
construction.
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"Isla" refers to the area within the boundaries of the municipio of 
Isla, Veracruz, in the Tuxtlas region. Thirty years ago, there were 
barely 6000 people living there, 2000 in the town of Isla, a small 
station on the railroad. The area was poorly communicated and only a 
fraction of the land was cultivated. Host was dedicated to very exten­
sive grazing except for subsistence crops and some minor pineapple 
production. Now, this is one of the richest and most dynamic areas in 
the Basin. Its wealth comes from well-managed cattle operations, a real 
boom in pineapple production, both for processing and the fresh fruit 
market and an enormous community effort to bring modernity and civiliza 
tion to the town. There are probably close to 12,000 inhabitants in the 
town now, and 20,000 in the whole municipio.
The area "Abasolo del Valle" comprises a large colony in the 
northern part of the municipio of Playa Vicente, in the Colonization 
Region. At the time the Papaloapan Commission entered the Basin, this 
colony did not even exist, and the zone, mostly tropical rainforeest, was 
practically uninhabited. Today, Abasolo del Valle is probably the 
richest colony in the Papaloapan Basin.This movementinto Playa Vicente 
was almost purely spontaneous and is one of the most successful examples 
of nondirected colonization movements in Veracruz. Almost all the land 
in the zone has been cleared— primarily for livestock production and in 
the past few years a rapid process of technological change has taken 
place, despite relatively poor communications. In just that one colony 
today there are 3000 inhabitants, and hundreds come seasonally from 
nearby colonies to work there.
"Ixtlan" is the zone which refers to the bulk of the Sierra de 
Juarez in the state of Oaxaca. Its towns, centuries old, are perched on 
the sides of steep mountains, and its citizens have always struggled hard 
to make a living. Before the Papaloapan Commission was ever created, 
they were doing an admirable job of surviving through an assortment of 
means. But in the two decades that followed the great flood of the low­
lands, the Sierra went into decline due to a series of misfortunes and 
political problems. Emigration by the early 1970s was pronounced and the 
living conditions of the inhabitants quite bad. In 1972, however, a new 
forestry program was started in the Sierra by the Tuxtepec Paper Hill, 
coupled with small-scale investments from other sources.^ These have 
suddenly reversed the emigration and have resulted in major improvements 
in incomes and living standards in Ixtlan. Commerce is on the rise and a 
number of small-scale industries have been opened. The experience of 
Ixtlan demonstrates that development programs in the marginal highlands 
areas can be not only viable, but have very important rewards from the 
standpoint of employment creation and slowing down the flow of poor,
.unskilled.migrants.to.the.cities ...........................................
Data Collection
In order to collect the data for these case studies, various sources 
were used. Since one of the most important changes to be measured was 
land use, a study of aerial photographs was undertaken. A series shot 
for the Papaloapan Commission in 1954 was used as the basis for maps
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portraying the "before" picture in each of the four zones. Another 
series shot in 1972 was used for the "after" maps.
The National Census of Population VI, VII, VIII, and IX were used 
for demographic data and living standard indices. The National Census of 
Agriculture and Livestock was used for production figures, as well as the 
preliminary data collected for these Censuses for information at the 
municipal level. The Industrial Census of 1950, 1960, and 1970 provided 
basic data on the industrial sector activities.
Almost all of the detailed information, however, came directly from 
the producers. For all industries mentioned, information on employment, 
production, prices, technology came from company files or through inter­
views with company managers. All information on credit lines, both 
private and public, came directly from bank personnel. Interviews were 
carried out with staff members of all the government assistance programs 
mentioned in the chapters. The various departments of the Papaloapan 
Commission had invaluable data on all aspects of the economy and on their 
own programs. The archives of the municipios themselves provided most of 
the data on history, municipal investment and much of that on population 
and production. Much of the historical infomat ion also came directly 
from individuals whose lives were spent in those areas. Forty farm 
families were interviewed in depth.
A great effort was made to corroborate all of these sources of data, 
because, as can be imagined, they did not always agree. What is pre­
sented then is, unless qualified, what the author considers to be the 
most reliable information.
Particularly important to a discussion of employment were population 
figures— for which there are no figures anywhere for 1976 that are com­
pletely reliable. Once a "best estimate" was chosen, an attempt was made 
to classify demographic increase into natural increase, immigration to 
rural areas and immigration to urban areas. The rate of natural increase 
was assumed to be 3.5 percent yearly--the Mexican average— for all but 
Ixtlan. It is probable that the true rate is lower, but to avoid over­
estimating immigration, this figure was used. Local population estimates 
from the local school census, transport facilities, municipal records, 
and the Malaria Eradication Census were used to separate rural and urban 
population figures, as well as obvious sources of new workers such as new 
industries, for which exact figures were available.
The next step was an attempt to divide the new population by sector 
of employment. The 1970 figure for percentage of population in the EAP 
was generally applied to the 1976 population figures. Where there was 
suspicion of overestimation of the new labor force, a lower rate was 
applied. The resulting figures for sector employment— taken as they were 
from impressions of the various persons interviewed, or compiled from 
available but incomplete information on number of industrial jobs, number 
of commercial establishments, etc.— are not exact. They are meant to 
provide an idea of how labor patterns in each zone have changed.
CHAPTER 6. TUXTEPEC: THE NEW CENTER OF THE PAFALOAPAN BASIN
The city of Tuxtepec, Oaxaca is the heart of the Papaloapan Commis­
sion's territory. Today, it is the "boom town" of the Basin, and the rich 
countryside around it is finally revealing its potential.
Traveling down any highway to approach the city, one is greeted by 
either intense sunlight or intense rainfall, depending upon the season. 
There are cool plantations of tall rubber trees, bunches of bananas hang 
ing all along the river, and a sea of sugar cane in every direction, that 
is particularly lovely when in blossom. (Agronomists say that cane should 
not be allowed to blossom, but maybe they have overlooked its aesthetic 
value.) The area around the city is fairly flat, but the foothills of the 
Sierras lie visible to the south, and farther, the tall mountains them­
selves. Map 6-1 shows the city and its physical relationship to the hin­
terland municipios upriver.
Entering urban Tuxtepec \J one is struck by the traffic, and the 
“bustTe“of“consfrucTtorr^crewBeverywhere. Nearly 50,000 people^live thnre 
now. The streets of the city center are filled with shoppers in modern 
and native garb. Enough of the city is new that the bright pastels of the 
concrete block houses are nearly as pretty as the thatched-roofed homes on 
the outskirts.
There are great contrasts of wealth. Ducking off the paved streets 
with their fancy houses, one is likely to be met by a family of pigs or 
chickens escaping from some poor man's garden or shack.
Yet the place clearly reflects its "civilization." Almost no one is 
left out on the quiet, lighted streets after 9:00 in the evening “-over a 
third of the families have televisions —  and a city ordinance required the 
bars to be hidden from public view.
The scenery turns abruptly nonurban upon leaving town. The coastal 
plain is dotted with bananas, sugar cane, chile and pineapple fields, and 
herds of cattle. Yet rural Tuxtepec is fairly densely_populated. Those 
living in the rural communities are in close contact with the city.
The most fertile agricultural lands in the zone are along the rivers. 
Moving up the Santo Domingo and Valle Nacional rivers,^the terrain becomes 
more and more rugged outside the narrow river floodplains and nearby 
rolling hills. Plains change to rain forest. The mountains receive up to 
4000 millimeters of rain annually, among the highest in the Basin. To the 
west there are rice fields, to the south tobacco, to the southeast maize 
andbeansandsugarcane. M a p 6-2 givesthelocation of the mainsoil 
types and rainfall patterns.
1/ Henceforth, we will call the city of Tuxtepec "urban Tuxtepec," 
the rest of the municipio "rural Tuxtepec," and the four upriver muni­
cipios collectively the "hinterland." "Tuxtepec" refers to the entire 
municipio.
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MAP 6-1. "TUXTEPEC" ZONE: MUNICIPIOS
K E Y
Railroads . . . .  
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All-Weather Roads 
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Swamp . .... . . 
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MAP 6.2. "TUXTEPEC" ZONE: RAINFALL AND SOILS*
K I L O M E T E R S
Railroads........
Navigable Streams. 
All-Weather Roads. 
Cultivated Land. .
Swamp     • ■ ■
Rainfall — - Isoyet
Alluvial Soils . . 
Second Class Soils *
/  /  /i
*Comision del Papaloapan, Programa del Bajo Papaloapan (Cd. Aleman, 
1974).
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Except on large private ranches, there is much more poverty evident 
here. The mountains are full of Indians living at a near subsistence 
level. Nonetheless, they too have important interactions with the city, 
with bus transportation the major link. Many amenities of modem life 
are visible in the larger hinterland towns.
The Nature of the Changes^1945-1975
The picture back in 1945 was very different. Only 5000 people then 
claimed urban Tuxtepec as home, and the 1944 flood had driven most of 
them out. Although the town was also then the center of the Oaxacan 
Greater District of Tuxtepec, the outlying municipios had very limited 
relations with it due to complete absence of any transportation other 
than the river system. The Chinantec, Mixtec and Zapotec mountain people 
spoke their own Indian languages and had a fairly closed social system. 
The large ranchers controlled most of the valleys, used for extensive 
grazing. Almost all ejidal agriculture, even on the coastal plain, was 
of the subsistence type, using shifting cultivation techniques.
The extraordinary changes that occurred since then are quantifiable 
(with confidence) only through 1970, with the national census data.
Since the most dramatic developments took place after 1970, we have been 
forced to use "best estimates" derived from official and unofficial 
sources to construct a picture of modern Tuxtepec. While the resulting 
numbers are probably wrong, their magnitudes should reflect accurately 
the changes that took place.
Communications
Probably the most radical single change wrought between 1945 and 
1975 was that from relative isolation from the rest of the country and 
state to complete integration. Maps 6-3 and 6-4 compare the systems. 
Urban Tuxtepec is now the hub of the Basin's transportation net, and the 
most important link for the Central Plateau to southern Mexico.
Population
The region's population more than tripled, as shown in Graph 6-1.
Not only did urban Tuxtepec itself grow to be a major city, but there are 
urban centers blossoming in the communities of Ojitlan, Valle Nacional, 
Benemerito Juarez, Papaloapan and Chiltepec.2/ ( 9_). While in 1950 the 
urban population— i.e,, Tuxtepec city— accounted for only an eighth of 
total regional population, it now acounts for approximately a third,
U the first two have over 2500 inhabitants; 
between 1800 and 2000.
the latter three
-93-
MAP 6-3 "TUXTEFEC" ZONE COMMUNICATIONS AND AGRICULTURE, 1950^
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MAP 6-4. "TUXTEPEC" ZONE: COMMUNICATIONS AND AGRICULTURE, 1976
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GRAPH 6-1 POPULATION CHANGES IN TUXTEPEC,
1930-1976*
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
__l
1976
* Mexico, SIC,
(published in 1932, 19^, ’ comision para la EradiTuxtepec Municipal government and Comisio p luxtepeu r information.Paludismo of the SSA iy/°
Eradicacion del
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Agriculture
The dramatic transition of the ►„
primarily subsistence agriculture is It ■ c“ ™ er“ al farming from 
6 - 1  and 6 - 2 . In 1950, the only important c o l  ^  ? ~ 3 Snd 6 ~ 4  and ®.rt.
bananas on the riversides, a little bit of * ercial Production was of
livestock raising and fattening, all l o c . t e d ' c W  the rivers^1101087
coffee, chile^etobaLorcaneyandScomhere' T  d?versif i^cation into rice, 
Almost a l l  the f l a t  lands in the " " " e r c ia l  maize and bean product ion,  
short-fallow agriculture except alon Cleared for semi-peraanent o r
to Palomares. Mature l a n d ^ t i c ^ ^ " ^  if ^  ° P - ad roadtwenty percent is now in cultivated • lncreased, and at least 
o f  c a t t l e ,  up from 25,00 0 in  19 5 0 .3 / PeCle8,  There a r e over 125 ,0 0 0  head
i " .p o r t i : : :ybf tla : : : yl i : : f r i L pr: dr euLt i hon is bnow repiacing « « *•  -commercial crops. The charts a .ave 6een opened over time to
agriculture throdgh^976tec " real growth of
Fallow periods inluch of the*T r e ^ T ^  f“ t0r“ are not “ eluded.
ten years, which has been the main inefntife td “  least in half in onlyagricultural inputs. In 1950 . incentive to use purchased
yere  being used, now most f a m e r s ^ f l n f I v ^ f ° r  chem ical “ P it s
?hPUi- Sk?wed land tenure patterns remaif leaSt one "modern"
the large landholders are participati™ id’«bU- V ldatarios as well asP r t ic ip a t in g  m  a g r ic u lt u r a l  expansion.
Incomes and Employment
6-2 p l ™ "  Vif  “  ■ ?“ “  17.000 i„  1 ,7 6
In 1950, only five percent of the workers°wifes b u d ion of the EAP.
13 percent in  s e r v ic e s .  By 1976 14  ! f l  f  P! ° y a i “ in d u s try  and
percent in services. In urban T.’.xt! " d  were ln industry and 22
fS L " - " 1” 1' °f '»«*• tL ’in  n
: z i . r . V T ^ n  *■ - •  < ■ » » .sugar mill, paper mill, rice mill lndu?trles now include a
i » 5 ,
total district, at ^ s t ^ O o l T w e r e  pastureland “  the
cattle was surely iess than one animal per hectare’. “ “  °f
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CHART 6-1 CHANGES IN LAND USE IN TUXTEPEC
1950-1970*
1 9 7 5-
Lands officially
200,700 hectares
277,000 hectares
' , . tlre Greater District of Tuxtepec. The municipios included in this
±6950 data is for District Area.
study account for 70 percen o , , ,„r 1970-75.
fr„„ 1970 data, adjusted from field research and official dace .W  Figures are fro. 1970 data, ........
. . . --- - 1 490 V 1970 (publisher
!
CHART 6-2. CHANGES IN CROP COMPOSITION IN TUXTEPEC, i9f.n-1970
sore cHnter and spring/summer cropping. Because much of the 
land aret l7L(ri“ cPr” red--th7rdo°ernct represent exactly the guantlty of land utilised.
6/ See Appendix 6-A for crop composition in each municlplo.
£/ Note that the cropping fallow index dropped from 3.1 In I960 to 2:1 in 1970.
„ -> , iQfii1' "Frutalea 1961," "Cultivos 1970," Frutales,
* Mexico, SRH, Comisi6n del Papaloapan Cultivos 
1970"(unpublished).
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HAP 6-5. "TUXTEPEC" ZONE: . INDUSTRY, 1950
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MAP 6-6. "TUXTEPEC" ZONE: INDUSTRY, 1976
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, . . niitlan and Valle Nacional are
"important" and highly . With growth in these
also enjoying a period of commerci P ication system,
Living Standards
in 1950, a third of * *  .Tuxtepec.no. “ | ° ^ dp® n S u “ « « 8 o r t. « « e
but outside the Tuxtepec municipi . h ^  ^  very low. Less than a 
facilities, living standar s g was literate. Flooding
was*a*frequent £ £ £ ? -  ^  l ^ - d  J y  health problem were
endemic.
Chart 6 -3  gives  Census - d  f i s s i o n  s t a t i s t i c s i U -
cators for the early 1970s. This . ibl ^ident. The city has been
.zation"that took place since th®" .is.still.fat.superior.in..
£u ll y  protec ted  f r «  f  ooding In r a s ever ywher e .
t,rSnn TuxteDec. but tnere n<*v<=
r.nl tural Change
The modernization of ^ * te£®'nhaST£are have been significant changes 
physical appearances a^ . P r^ Uaue to substantial numbers of. educated^
people^who'came in from o u t s i d e .  tha“^ n d u s t r U s T a n d T a d i c a l l y  changed the
traditionally ran Tuxtepec.
, „ "House of Culture," whose auditorium is
The town is now building was established last year and.
already finished. An Ath^e“ 'd to attract tourists. Most interestingly, 
regional sports events “  cane farmers now have local ban
a very large number of small sug
accounts.
There i s  strong emphasis ° " vf  “ u i e r t e a c h e r s l ^ n d ' a l l  agrar ian  
in  the Tuxtepec municipio now have ti three kindergartens, seven
communities have primary schools in the town. There are
primary schools and seven juniohig teachers’ education, and
forest technology, as w e u  
cane workers.
. , ■ mndern city by anyone's definition.
Urban Tuxtepec is certainly prosperity, and the potential
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Traditional Tuxtepec^
mnn vpars old. The first settle- 
The town of Tuxtepec is at chinantec and Ojitec
ments were in th. foothill^ b ^ t  Tuxtepec has been th. « * . £ « •
zsrjzz*.s t - s - s a -
rutbefrndlacfo' The site urban Tuxtepec
was°the £ ^ 1 ^ 2  wbichP couid be traveled to by boat
pp. 17-19). center for most
Furthermore, the town was looked to as £°Vicente it was a "boca
f  T \ Z l l T o r X o l T o f  the6mountain” through which all travellers an 
trade from the highlands had to pass.
The earliest record of a serious water
..1800’s.flooding.began.to.occur f  day.-.The resulting.sediment was..
stayed on the land only three «  four day ^ interruption of
beneficial to crop production. « £  '*«« when the c ty water
trade except what was ?°™ ®  in the highlands prevented trading
bound. But muddy conditio
well (3_, pp. 38-39).
Railroad and Revolution!-n -H  K s v o i u u u .  .jt r— —— —  . ,
During the late 1800s, the Verf  r^ " ^  °“ef
• -u; d\ a * v . u y ^ “  and this reinforced its p
importance for the Sierra. of£ee at this time,
0 3itlan grew substantial “ °“ tS °*r^ e"o“ its tobacco exports of 
and Valle Nacional was Part^ a^ - o w n e d  plantations in the latter werebigb-buality “  ^Spanish own^ ^  populo-- P«t. o f ^ ^ .
forced to import contra rv»i hantecs , who, upon losingcounty to replace the indigenous Ch r i o n  became infamous throug
h d  L  the hills (4, PP: O ' - 1* i;e f aL r  camp and depository for polit 
out Mexico for being a virtual si a
ical prisoners of the Dias reg .  ^ ^  ^  lowlanda £urther
The extreme concentration the tobacco owners
heightened local resentment . t holdings were broken up.
....................................................................................... ..................................................................
ff.r« of Green Gold:__ 1920s> u>om. —
.... » * • &  s s s ! . »
Wherever
planted
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t° roatan (Gros Michel) bananas Tho u *
age of pro.perity-.at least for th f  - ™  ln the fruit market marked an
In  1928/29.  -40 percent of I n  taxes T o T Z t *  ° f 5 p r iv a t e  8™wers involved 
T h ^ p e r io d  is  . t i l l  re fe rred  to . .  the e r , T f  t T v e ^ - ^ ^ g ^
N o n e th e le s s , population in *-
the populat ion o f  the whole r e v i I I  ? eVer exceeded 5000.  I n 1930
Census. Over h a l f  l ived in Tuxten<»WaS 2 8 ,9 0 7 ,  according to the
and an eighth in  V a l le  National .  ? ° munlc lpi°*  almost a th ird  in O j i t l a i
for  ran c h in g , There were evel  fomf I I o s L s  0 .  V  Che e n t i r e  d i s t r i c t  
t ime.  Over the next  two decades t h e m l  k “  Brown Swise made at th is  
c e n t e r s  o f  the Basin.* ./ U ) .  ’ "  8 became one of  the f a t t e n i n g
S ta g n a t io n :  1930 .  - a  1940s
Plantations. Thfjise^e^alnlt^r^emilln'' and devastated the banana 
overcome by e s t a b l i s h i n g  resistant chf” lfally c o n t r o l l e d ,  and is  only 
to depart and T u x t e p e l V V c o ^ n Z r *  % ! ' £ '  <=»>o..-in.teJLl
cushion o f  ranching,  u n t i l  recent  yea". ly re covered> desp i te  the
Around the early 1920s p
begun to increase, and this-coupled^wnTlacT *uration.of flooding had 
effectively stifled important agliclt V  k °f 3 Profltable crop—  
Many ejidos were set up by Cardenasm ^ I T !  "  °n the floodPlain. growers avoiding the d i s p u t e s ^ 0n e ^ a b a n d o n e d  by the banana 
were more often established il a T h i u l  B"  the other ajidos
history. A good
» u l-“ ($13'5
the V a l le  Nacional and San C ris to b a l  Rile!" “  far 8 8 the branching of
Tuxtepec,  and f iv e  t i c k  b a t h l ^ r c h i l t e l l l l 13110"  in the m™ i c i p i o  o f
m only. T h i r ^ I x t r l l o l I ^ d  f l o l ^ 4 i s . worth S 4 - 50 in  1944
1947-1974 ,  with 1947 > $4 . 3 0 . Commission i n f l a t i o n  in dices  fo r
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Almost the entire population of the city moved away that year. Many 
returned after the waters subsided and homes were rebuilt, but in 1950, 
there were still only 5800 persons living there.
The Papaloapan Commission and Two Decades of Development
When the Papaloapan Commission was created in response to flooding 
and general interest in tropical development, Tuxtepec was its center of 
operations. All of the Commission's first major capital investments 
served to benefit the city directly.
Flood Control
After completion of the Pres. Miguel Aleman Dam, the flood dikes 
along the left margin of the Papaloapan River, and other flood control 
projects in 1954, the city of Tuxtepec was never again flooded. Along 
with the right margin dike— prompted by damages of the 1958 flood— these 
effectively protected the Zone from major flooding. About forty percent 
of the land by the rivers is now being cropped. Since there is still 
minor flooding periodically, the main products are tonalmil grains and 
flood-tolerant sugar cane.
Road Communications for the City
Certainly, the Commission's most stimulatory investment in the 
Tuxtepec Zone during the 1950s and '60s was in roads. Map 6-4 shows 
the all-weather roads, both paved and resurfaced, as they appeared in 
1976. Numerous less expensive roads passable only in the dry season were 
built as well.
The paved roads to La Tinaja and Tlacotalpan effectively connected 
Tuxtepec to the outside world during the Commission's first few years.
By 1970, there were 3 to 35 vehicles per hour traveling the La Tinaja 
road.
For the city itself, the two bridges that were built over the 
Papaloapan and Tonto rivers marked a new era. For the first time ever 
urban Tuxtepec was physically accessible all year round.
Opening the Hinterland
The Commission, in its first flurry of activities, tried to open up 
the hinterland municipios as well. During the 1950s an all-weather 
road was built to Oaxaca, the state capital. Despite its extraordinary 
roller-coaster ride south of Valle Nacional, this road provided the first 
opportunity in history for the mountain villagers to move goods other
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than by human power or small canoe. Much new land was opened in Che 
feeder municipios to exploit the advantage. Commercial crops of tobacco 
became important in Valle Nacional; cattle numbers increased in Jacatepec 
and Chiltepec; and more maize was planted throughout the hinterland.
The resettlement of the Mazatec Indians to make way for the 
Aleman reservoir of the dam caused considerable upset in the Tuxtepec 
area, the affected municipios being part of the Greater District of 
Tuxtepec. Resettlement was very hastily carried out, with many people 
reluctantly moving out of their homes only as the water began to cover 
them.
One of the resettled zones was La Joya in southeastern Jacatepec.
In the initial enthusiasm over the colonization venture, a resurfaced 
road was built in the mid-1950s there. But because of poor local 
resources and local politics, the project was abandoned and maintenance 
of the road east of Pueblo Viejo was dropped for lack of funding in the 
early 1960s. The colonies fell into abject poverty. Meanwhile, those 
ejidos serviced by the road from Pueblo Viejo north experienced a sharp 
rise in prosperity.
The response to the first resurfaced road through Ojitlan in 1960 
was even more marked. As the number of truckers increased, agricultural 
prices rose significantly. As a result, the total area in cropland 
nearly doubled in the municipio within the decade. With a decline in 
funding of the Papaloapan Commission in the 1960s there was little new 
construction, but expansion of the land along the previously built roads 
continued to stimulate the economy. Whereas high value crops like 
tobacco and some rice were the only important commercial crops in Ojitlan 
in the 1950 s, in the 1960s mai ze and rice product ion were emphasi zed 
and some sugar cane, while tobacco declined in importance. The first 
major increase in Ojitlan town's population occurred as a direct response 
to increased mobility and prosperity.
As of 1960, Tuxtepec municipal authorities estimated that about
25.000 people— 40 percent of the Zone's population— were linked with 
Tuxtepec through paved or dirt roads (9_, Anexo p. 2). Increased land 
clearing in rural Tuxtepec took place with most vigor in the late 1960s 
after the roads to Chacaltianguis and Loma Bonita were opened.
Between 1960 and 1970, cropland expanded in Tuxtepec and Ojitlan 
from 20,000 to 40,000 hectares. Bananas were reintroduced as resistant 
plantain and (Musa paradisiac a). Lacatan, Robusta and Valery varieties 
were found. Cattle pastures, maize, chile and sugar cane predominated.
Road-building kept pace with population growth and by 1970 nearly
30.000 persons— still forty percent of the population— had road access to 
the city of Tuxtepec C9, Anexo p. 2) and it was well-established as the 
commercial center for all of rural Tuxtepec and the hinterland.
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Agricultural Change
Outside the expansion of total land area, there were few major 
changes in agr iculture in the Tuxtepee Zone * Mai ze and rice remained the 
two most important crops grown, mostly on ejidal land. Because of lack 
of machinery to facilitate clearing efforts, lack of capital, and crop 
prices too low to justify the investment, only a few hectares on most 
ejidal parcels (which averaged ten to twenty hectares in size in the 
lowlands, less in the hills) were utilized.
Because the fallow period under shifting cultivation had declined by 
1970 to around 5:3 years cropping from 6:3 in 1960, and wider 
traditionally, pest problems grew such that the compesinos were forced to 
begin using commercial pesticides. Otherwise, there were almost no major 
changes in agricultural technology through the 1960s,
Direct programs influencing agriculture received little emphasis 
fromtheCommission'scivilengineers, and h a d v e r y l i t t l e effect. Two 
experimental stations in La Granja and La Isleta were built fairly near 
Tuxtepec, but few practical results were forthcoming, and almost no 
extension facilities existed to bring results to the farmers. There was 
little continuity in research as the centers moved often from one 
ministry's jurisdiction to another's .
In the late 1950s, some commercial rubber plantations were planted 
under a Commission program, particularly around the La Mina area, and in 
Macedonio Alcala in Jacatepec. In 1962, the program was taken over by 
INMECAFE (Instituto Mexicano del Cafe) under its diversification 
program.^./ About 2000 hectares were planted on 24 ejidos in rural 
Tuxtepec. The results from these investments were not felt until the 
1970s, due to the long period required for rubber to begin producing.
The private ranching sector made few advances until the late 1960s. 
The animals were low quality, and the pastures were native grass^ 
varieties under minimal management. Then, the price of beef nationally 
began to rise, particularly relative to crops. Private ranchers rapidly 
expanded their herd size, either with personal profits from Tuxtepec 
businesses or with capital provided by the Banco de Comercio de Oaxaca, 
S.A., which had arrived in the early 1960s. Between 1960 and 1970, the 
herd in rural Tuxtepec and Valle Nacional tripled, causing a net decline 
in cropland in the latter. Ojitlan developed a huge herd almost 
overnight, and in Chiltepec cattle numbers doubled. Appendix 6-A gives
In 1960, there was high internal demand for rubber, worth M$150 
million. So in 1961, the government put a tax on foreign imports, which 
money was used to fund the rubber program. The national goal was to 
plant 45,000 hectares. By 1970, 20,000 hectares had been planted. 
Tuxtepec was one of the six regions (including Acayucan and El Palmer in 
the Basin).
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municipal production statistics. The level of livestock technology remained 
low.
Economic Diversity
The first important industry to enter the Tuxtepec Zone— or for that 
matter, the entire state of Oaxaca— was the Tuxtepec Paper Factory in 
Sebastopol. In 1954, a Canadian firm organized the plant to produce 30,000 
tons yearly of newsprint. The main factors influencing the choice of the 
site was the convenience of the La Tinaja highway and an old railroad line 
previously used for bananas, energy from the Temascal power plant, and 
abundant water. The future potential of sugar cane bagasse and tropical 
woods as sources of cellulose was an added attraction.
In 1956, a Forest Concession was established by Presidential Decree 
(outside the Tuxtepec Zone) and in 1959, the factory began to operate. The 
road to Oaxaca was built during this period specifically to serve the paper 
mill and connect it with the logging areas of the Ixtlan concession.
In 1959, textbook paper production was added, about 8000 tons yearly.
At that time, the plant employed around 300 workers. In 1964, the mill 
expanded, and the following year the Mexican government bought up all the 
stock.: Between 1966 and 1971, the plant was semimodernized, and production 
increased to 55,000 tons a year, requiring an extra hundred employees (to 
total 400). Although the impact on urban Tuxtepec's coiranercial life was very 
positive, the industry itself had chronic cost and supply problems and most 
often operated in the red (7, p. 142-147).
Until the late 1960s, this was the only major industry in the Zone. 
There were a few minor enterprises. Timber operations from the La Joya area 
supported a sawmill in Pueblo Viejo (1956-59) and in Tuxtepec (1963^-65), In 
1955, the Banco Nacional de Credito Ejidal expropriated an old warehouse in 
Silverio, used in the 1930s for bananas, and installed it with rice milling 
equipment to process the increased commercial production.
A Summary of Progress Through 1970
Over these two decades, the population of the Zone increased 50 percent, 
meaning that the average annual rate of growth was nearly 3.0 percent a year 
--greater than Mexico's national figure over the same period of time. Thus, 
the record through the late 1960s was already respectable in the sense of 
absorbing new population. This seems to be due overwhelmingly to the 
frontier nature of the place. There was strong immigration from outside to 
work the new lands, once they were communicated with the rest of the country. 
Increased quantity rather than improved technology of production resulted.
Average personal incomes for the Zone in 1960 and 1970 are shown in 
Graph 6-3. In that period, only Tuxtepec and Valle Nacional municipios
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Graph 6-3: Average Personal Income in Tuxtepec 1960, 1970*2/
_a/ Official price indices of the Papaloapan Commission were used; 
in which: $1*00 of 1970 is equal to $1.26 in 1960 prices.
* Mexico, Banco de Mexico, S.A. ,rProducto Bruto e Ingreso Personal en la 
Cuenca del Papaloapan" (mimeo, 1971)._________________ _ _ _______________
Graph 6-4 Growth of the Municipal Budget of Tuxtepec a /
— ^1972-75, inflation rates based on official Papaloapan Commission 
figures were used, 1975—76, the average annual rate of inflation was esti­
mated to be 20 percent.
* Municipal Treasury of San Juan Bautista Tuxtepec, Oaxaca, Mexico.
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experienced increases in real incomes. In both cases, the increase was 
mainly from non-agricultural sources. In Tuxtepec, the non-agricultural 
sectors provided over half of the total personal income. Living 
standards in the hinterland remained very low; per capita income appears 
to have declined.
Although urban Tuxtepec tripled in size to 17,700, no other major 
towns had emerged in the zone. Tuxtepec itself was little more than an 
agricultural supply and trading center, though wel1-integrated with the 
nation and more prosperous than most because of the surge in ranching.
By 1970, the percentage of the EAP in the primary sector was still 72 
percent, far higher than Mexico's 39 percent. In the hinterland 
municipios, the figure was 89 percent. The muddy streets and small-town 
atmosphere of the city were the same as always, and Tuxtepec could claim 
successful, but not extraordinary growth.
The "Boom" of the 1970s
The truly radical transformation of Tuxtepec into a thriving, 
commercial, modern city took place since 1969. The changes in population 
are the most impressive: over and above the normal population growth of 
Tuxtepec municipio (assumed to increase at 3.5 percent per year), some
23,000 people apparently migrated to the city, and 19,000 to rural 
Tuxtepec (4^, p.2).,Z/
It is estimated that about 8000 of the city's 48,000 inhabitants are 
"floating," i.e. migrant canecutters and their families, students, con­
struction crews, traveling salespeople (1). But the rest are permanently 
settled there— a population increase of 235 percent in six years. The 
changes in life style and property that have accompanied this influx have 
been felt through the entire region.
Including these immigrants and the normal addition of local workers 
to the labor force (assuming again a 25 percent EAP), 5500 new urban jobs 
were created and 5600 rural jobs in Tuxtepec municipio alone. The 
probable breakdown is shown in Chart 6-4.
Improvements were slow but substantial, in the feeder municipios south of 
Tuxtepec. Chiltepec has experienced the most change, probably due to 
both its nearness to Tuxtepec, and the location there of the paper mill. 
The town's population nearly doubled in size between 1970 and 1976,
Valle Nacional town grew by 20 percent. Ojitlan, though it got no 
bigger, grew more prosperous.
U The number of native entrants to the labor force is based on an 
extrapolation of 3.2 percent per year increase in the labor force and a 
25 percent EAP, The number coming from within the District was estimated 
from population increase and jobs available in the rest of Tuxtepec.
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CHART 6-4. SOURCES OF NEW WORKERS IN TUXTEPEC, 1970-1976* — ^
Workers in Urban
Workers in the
Feeder Municipios
Workers in these municipios enter­
ing the labor force for the first 
time
-/ We estimate that there was a rate of increase of the labor 
force.of 3.2.percent.annually....
* These data are estimates based on the autliorrs research.
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Sources of Urban Change
Urban Tuxtepec has been the focus of most of the changes, and the 
most obvious difference there is the explosion of commercial activity. 
Indeed, it is the tertiary sector that has absorbed most of the new 
entrants to the labor force. (See Graph 6-3.) Unlike places such as 
Mexico City, this growth of the service sector does not seem to reflect 
largely superfluous activity. Rather, real incomes in the zone have 
risen so much that there is a thriving demand for services.
But the key to a place's ability to profitably employ a large 
service sector is rising incomes in the directly productive sectors, 
this reflected by the increase in total taxes collected in Tuxtepec muni-
cipio for public services, shown in Graph 6-4.
Beginnings* The Adolfo Lopez Mateos Sugar Mill
The sources of the new-found prosperity are complex, but the initial 
impact on city incomes was made by the local Adolfo Lopez Mateos Sugar 
Mill, which began to operate for the 1968/69 cane harvest.
The mill was built in 1964 by-FONAFE (Fondo Nacional de Fomento 
Ejidal) on contract to the French Societe Fines Lille-Cail, with a capa­
city of 720,000 tons over a 180-day harvest. In 1965, the federal 
government, in a reorganization move, had the Nacional Financiers, S.A. 
acquire the plant from FONAFE along with four others which had been 
privately owned, and formed the Operadora Nacional de Ingenios, S.A. 
(ONISA) 03).
In its first full harvest, in 1969/70, over 300,000 tons of cane 
were processed. Seven hundred thirty-five workers were hired at the mill 
itself (8). Most of the first workers came from outside Tuxtepec, and 
this influx of outsiders had a big effect on the "style1 of city life, 
the demand for products and the social structure.
By the 1975/76 harvest, the plant was processing 530,000 tons of 
cane— a 70 percent increase from 1969/70. Factory yields are very 
efficient. The increased production required hiring 100 additional 
workers. Now, 287 are permanent employees, and 548 work from 
mid-December to June for the harvest season, in three shifts.
Because the factory is nationally owned, its workers are relatively 
privileged and wages have risen to more than offset inflation. Combined 
wages rose from $10,5 m* in 1969/70 to $31.4 m. in 1974/75. This 
supported the first major surge of Tuxtepec commerce (£).
In addition, the mill itself built many new penetration roads. 
Government Investments
In 1969, the most destructive flood in Tuxtepec's history struck. 
Although the city was not affected, both of the dikes experienced major
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breaks in several places to the north, and the municipio suffered 
considerable damage to infrastructure and crops._/
This disaster brought national attention to the region after a 
decade of disinterest. The Commission was again generously funded and 
put under the leadership of a powerful native Oaxacan leader, Ing. Jorge 
L. Tamayo.
The biggest project for the Commission was the proposed Cerro de Oro 
Dam in Ojitlan municipio. Extremely rapid silting of the Papaloapan 
River was making the A1eman Dam less and less effective for flood 
control. Although there are likely to be no major agricultural gains 
from the new dam, it probably is necessary to prevent further major 
flooding.
The project, however, is highly controversial. In the first place, 
some 20,000 Chinantec Indians are going to be flooded out of their homes 
in Ojitlan by the reservoir. Secondly, many Tuxtepecanos who owned river 
landhad been frightened by the 1969 flood and blamed the disaster on the 
Temascal dam. They were afraid of what might happen if another dam were 
built on similar terrain by the same engineers.
The Commission and Tamayo, who assumed great personal responsibility 
for the project, were obliged to in some way quiet these reactions. For 
the Chinantecs, the very costly venture of Uxpanapa was devised and— as 
resettlement schemes go— careful public relations were carried out to 
avoid the tragedies of the Mazatec experience. Simultaneously, the Com 
mission put in effect a program of roads, electricity, drinking water, 
schools and town improvements for the rest of the Ojitlan municipio. 
Tuxtepec, they launched a similar program of infrastructure, both to 
promote development and appease the Tuxtepecanos.
Construction of the dam began in 1973/74. Millions of pesos were 
spent in just two years, and much of this was funnelled through salaries, 
wages or services into Tuxtepec pockets. When dam construction was 
halted in 1976, some of the nonlocal construction workers became perma­
nent residents of the city. Dam construction was reinitiated in 1977.
The Commission itself had an important effect on population. At the 
peak year of 1975, a third of the several thousand Commission employees 
lived in Tuxtepec city.
8/ 881 farmers on 2130 hectares were affected, with a loss of about 
$11.9 m. in agriculture alone— about eight percent of total Basin losses 
in land and money. Three fourths of the loss was bananas; another third 
maize; the rest rice, cane and fruit trees. Cattle losses were minimal
(2., p. 12).
9/ Because much of the infrastructure was built on land ostensibly 
to be flooded, the ejidatarios were even more cynical that they would 
ever be flooded at all, and the resettlement work was that much harder.
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Other federal money was channeled into Tuxtepec through the 
influence of Ing. Victor Bravo Ahuja, a native Tuxtepecano and former 
governor of Oaxaca who became President Echeverria's Minister of Public 
Education, One-hundred-ten schools were built in the municipio of 
Tuxtepec. Several new institutions of higher education— vocational and 
technological schools— are among Tuxtepec's leading assets now. For the 
first time, young people of the central Basin seeking education can get 
it there.
Feeder Municipios Infrastructure. In Ojitlan, almost every public 
work of any sort was done after 1970. There had been only one small road 
other than the main one before 1972, Afterwards, many penetration roads 
were built, and there is a plan for paving the town streets.
The Commission was the primary mover in this, through its recompen­
sation plan for the flood victims. However, the direct cash payments 
made to the carapesinos for indemnification were also spent in great part 
in Ojitlan, to the subsequent benefit of the commercial class there. The 
paving of the road to Ojitlan stimulated further trade from beyond.
Communication was also important for Valle Nacional. After the road 
to Oaxaca was paved, traffic increased through here, and proximity to 
Tuxtepec could be more easily exploited. Between that, and other govern­
ment projects, particularly electricity and urban works, the town looks 
completely different from what it was seven or eight years ago. The 
houses are "nicer," potable water, some drainage facilities and telephone 
service are available. In 1970, the first junior high school was built 
there. Since 1974, the municipal budget of Valle Nacional has risen 
markedly (17). Chiltepec received drinking water in 1971, telephone 
service and a telesecundaria in 1972, An active local priest began a 
medical dispensary and a vocational school for children ten to fifteen 
years old in about 1974 (18). The new educational facilities in Tuxtepec 
have been made available to hinterland youth, but this is probably the 
extent of the city's direct effect on welfare in the hinterland.
Industrial Expansion *i
The two leaders have long been committed to attracting industry to 
Oaxaca. Tamayo, besides being Executive Director for the Commission, is 
also director of the Tuxtepec Paper Mill; Bravo Abuja's term as Governor 
is most remembered for its emphasis on modern industry. With growing 
interest at the national level for economic decentralization, Tuxtepec, 
with its excellent road system, was a logical choice. It is the closest 
locale south of Veracruz City which is still within a reasonable distance 
of Mexico City, the major national market.
i Tuxtepec Paper Mill. Besides the Sugar Mill, the leading industry 
remains the Paper Mill. Between 1971 and 1976, production there rose 
from 55,000 to 70,000 tons yearly. With only six more employees, there 
was a 40 percent rise in productivity. This productivity improvement was 
directed in large part to improved salaries for the 400 plus workers.
The mill pays out seme $.5 m. weekly in salaries (13). Since 1969, all 
the staff has been Mexican, and particularly the recent changes attracted 
many technicians and specialists to the area.
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from the in creased  spending P° ^  ^  XHMECAFR rubber
?„bh»r Processing^laBi- T^e f ically to give the ejidal rub....._.f^ (11 .— ,u7-p.it.ilas set up spec 1 ' . stable.market. .......
S f S  -
advantage of the campesinos. o£ latex, the plant has
After •nd-1"^diM o o “ onrinUbi~k f o m  ^ ^ " ' “^ t ^ ' U c h n S o g y  is\
I' "““ o f  th“ low price^often^'1”
ces-” ranging6 from $5 - ^ 0 ^ ^  ^  is not high puality. 
paid to producers in p , T h i r t y - f i v e  workers
Some 600 campesinos supply ^ " m ^ - a f t e r  bringing in , 
were employed at  th e ^ fa c t  ^  day were required .
new machine— bd, . in new machinery and
... T , 9 7 0  the Silverio rice mlll p been successful
began^a^ew~credit ^ program^^Even^so^the gn^private ^ competi tors^have^^
empioying
in three shifts^ ht~ in management.
41 workers and eign a t t r a c t e d  more
,»ntration of skilled workers hais fac-
Others. The new and public. Several built
i n d u s l ^  Tuf epeC’ o°c ssing?Chemical and others are now being 
tories for barbasco processi g,
............... n jS <2 r h v  . ................................................................................................................  ............................. .............................................
road system has 
. effect of Tuxtepec's position 1° fg70's boom. TheThe hub-1ike ef ^  construction during th shortened
been highly reinf°rC ^ jha, Oaxaca. Ojitlan and Agu J y labor,
paving of the roa “  acilitating the movement of
rravel time markedly,
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Graph 6-5:
Sectoral Distribution of New Workers in' TuKtepec 1 9 7 0 -1 9 7 6 *a/W 
These estimates are - -  ™ ^ t h e  ‘c S “
income sources by local ffir:J_als Gf the Fapaloapan Commission, 
Municipal government, and otficaals 
i i cnrvev .t-ViA authoi
Commerce and Services 
Industry and Construction 
Agriculture and Livestock
1970□  ^ i  q7A EAP active mPortion ot iy/o
.............. ....................................................................................................................................................................
w  „ t . » » , » « «  - ” !,=“ ” d “ 19,0
•taved in the same j°bs in 1976‘
c/ These data do not include migrant canecutters or floatrng sales­
people.
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that grew up almost overnight Tho
4 2n n 1C6 S e C t0 r ' 0 f  5500 „ ! v  j o b .  i nr e t h r e > ' 9 5 - ^  c rea ted  in «>e
4200 were in commerce and s e r v i c e s  k ’ U  ia l i k e l y that  around
grew from 400^ in 1970 to 715 in 19^6 f  C O a m e r < : i a l  e n t e r p r i s e s
nsactxons is estimated by one bank —  ’ The toCal value of
c rea ted  in h in te r lan d  commerce. ' SeVeral  hundred J o b .  were
b ran c h e s . I n m m b e r ^ ^ h o v e v ^ n e w 1 ^ 3 " ” • Veracruz or oth er n a t io n a l  
e x c l u s i v e l y  from oth er  p a r t T o f  th ?  a0” "e r c i a l . entrepreneurs  were almost 
»b0 expanded or opened !  bus in ess  t t P* % Diatur i c t - or lo c a l  people
ranchers, who finance one from r 3 f°Ur,:h are °™ed by big
d® Comercio had in 1976 447 h pJoflts of the other (14) The Ran
the number in 19/3. ’ USSrs of -™ercial credit-^ughlydoZ T e °
Noncommercial activities in
rom some 300 workers in 1970 in gover^In^ t h e T  ^  flso important. 
on’ teaching, banking, etc n l  ™  b’ the Commission, transeorts- 
to around 1000  in  1976?  ”  se= to r a l  work force  in  Tuxtepec grew
. Chart 6-4. shows the o r i g i n  o f
from Oaxaca?"^ *°UrCe °f mi^ants to T u ^ ^ f J e r a c r u z
f0" Cthe pSor°Wth' “  “ o p ^  T u x " ™ 6?’ com_
ror the positive distributional cha-am • • y been “osc responsible
ithout the specific programs and inves T ^  ^  °f regi°nal prosperity 
Tuxtepec, it is doubtful that those L  f r nCS ‘hat effected r u r a l ^
prospered from the commercial i ' ^ f C e ^ d  - l -  have
luxcepec development
The__Importance of s,„„ r —
s v v t i i i  o v / 0^ ^ ^  d -
previously unused iTTuxTerpecPlandechUteCane' 70°°.On ^ t h a t ^ . " 111' 
Machinery Complex, with 150 of its L  P ,"“niClpio8' The Mill’s
clearing since 1969. Most of the land i^n f ’x ^  d°ne a11 the
W  8r0™  °nly “ b-‘« « c .  Wh°d i-ittle commercial
Cane production involves some 73nn ■ ,
labor IS very important. In 1976 i200 agrlcultural workers. Migrant
for the harvest, plus about 13 LL . f™  =
are from Guerrero, the rest from Oaxaca SeVent^ ®  Percent of these
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a HPvised to radically improve
of the 1970 Presidential decre farmer incentives (ex-Because of the t-hroueh increased farmer ui
- - - - -  -  -  -
far less sharply (8) •
1971 1976
First year planting 
Ratoon crops
$56 42/ha ($88.60/ton) $“ 00-700/ha
$2354/ba (33.63/ton) $4500/h
i* .v,,,. risen considerably*
P r o f it s  fo r the farm ers ave there *s much
Cane production technology ^ a m e  land area One
room fo r continued P60 percent of the land in  p ro d u c t s
e n g ineer e stim a te u ££ ic ie n t  to o b ta in  the same w e ll-s u it e d  fo r
would have been sulUc,u , t* !a,*.d is not pnrf.cu.nrly «technology. Also, much of the
cane.lt/ _ Mill with the farmers w a s  -  -  as
^  V, 1 Q 7 S  the relationship of the Mil tera used worksThrough 19/3, cne The credit sysiem
everywhere in  m echanical work d°tie by the mi , ■
by subtracting the costs ^ cHnend from the final price or
harvest costs, and a yvini5 ^  landholder is minimal, an
The work actually re9 
lost no role in decision-making-
, * a rhat the farmer wouldi 1976 were designed so t . The de~The new cane laws o . pntives for better cultivation.^have more i ndependence and ^incentives “ d 'ipation in mechanizationhave
cree should foster more direct buy machinery. The ne* /
a^riallv by providing him credit 7 historical experi
especially, effect. But since the area fi£ficulties with theas yet had littl the traditional dirt . . received
ence with cane product- , nd the new ideas are be
mills, relations are still 
' tt, n €*onf ldsncs ♦
Private r.artle Expansion
officially valued at M$250 m., °
In 1975, the Tuxtepec herd was off lly herd size range to
. fa n . 31. But estimates of . thf I , _ „ n <„ the muni-; • ,■ to n 3). But escimaLca60,000 animals (.9, P - >  about 30o private ■attlemen in the muni"
-  -  -
- --- . g gb]_o yial soils,
1 0 / The best production by . Highest sugar yield^. Qf
which make up about a garter (50.60cm.) clays, found on about 
comes from cane grown on deep
the land.
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hectares . H /  One of h ,
in Tuxtepec, stemming f r o m ^ r e - L v o W  ®kewed land tenancy systems is ranching in , pre Evolutionary patterns ThQ ^g m  Lniitepee and Valle Narirmai u P, n8' 1716 advance of
or so large property owners E U d ^  ■ h8S alS° been limi-ted to the 200
l i v e s t o c k  production on e j i d o s  is  e^co 'rav  f "  ^  H t t l e  « « e c t e d ?
haoo q U a l l t y » rafche r  than to re p lace  l i m i t  % ^  f X p lo i t  unused land of  
ppened among la rge  ranchers  in the vaiu abie  c r o p l a n d - , ,  had
Tuxtepec o f  "gentlLsn ranchers" 7 7  7  7 *  tradUional resistance in few years, however* the art- ; t- a technological progress Tn t-v,
uric P°hitiVe- ThS tW° Lpo«0LatdfaPct8reSSiVe r" chi"« has b « E Tprice changes and banking credit. f tors encouraging this were
f r / r : ” * 1 k » : "  ; i L ~ ; : . r  s - . »
n a t i v e  grasses  f  danced technology" 7 7 ^ "
l l ' T ' S *  38 S S S ^ t h e r . T & . - ^ S d a )  are very good in the ra in y
7 season; chere was «  « * « «  to
^ 9 /6  f and W3S Switched t ^ p a s t u r e 11_ A U h o u g h ^ ’ ^  1 9 7 I / 7 2 > ^ e n
com petit ion for land fr^m c ro ps ^ 7 7 ? ”  i n . 19 7 4  Hee'f i m p o u n d
The price declined from $14.50 in 197S f "fin**1068 offset this advantage 
Here was a strong i n c e n t i v  fo " i n t e r s  ° $7  5° ia  ^ 7 4 .  As a resu t f  
l e v e l s  and pay o f f  e a r l i e r  investments ? t0 mainta ia  incc^e ’
stock production lost much of its dv anlmals- Since 1974, a ve_ 
remained predominant, but the „ Fattening operations
increased in recent ^ars ““" h "  °f rearing operations markedly
Although the 150-mPmhp^ t
n e i t h e r  c a t t l e  f a ir s  1 ^ 7  ‘ 7  ASS° c i a t i ™ Hosted
supported changes in breeding h e a l t h ' s  “l ln at lo n  Programs, the group 
s tock  A ssoc ia t ions  of  the Tuxtepec Disc ■ *PaStUres ' Union o f  L iv e -  
aboratory with the SAG and a ssoc ia te d  Dp !  sponsora<l an Animal Pathology 
been responsib le  for  e x c e l l e n t  r e s e t s  * leh haV*
Most of the animals are special;,„a c
7  7 7 "  Zebu a d eb - B r o ^ S ^ " " 8 “ d . " i l kvlcft h i g h - q u a l i t y  b u l l s  are eh. „ “ rown Sw lss . g e n e t i c a l l y  im prove
planted to A fr ican s t a r g r a s s  (Cvnod a ™ ” 0"  b re e d s ‘ Much land was 
M i l s ,  decumbens) s ince  1970, a T t k ^  and PanS ° la  grass ( D i g i -
Returns on th is  investment are ran f  a ,  pastu raa are r a r e l y  f e r t i l i s e d  
changing very slowly.  Potedly e x c e l l e n t .  Technology i s s t i l l ’
11/ One
percent of the 
1000 hectares,
Commission technician suggested ,
an“ often “  7  Z°ne had “ tens and often much more.
perhaps 
of land
five 
of at least
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 ^ , Kv ,-he private banking institu-
Most of the changes * « «  > y f i s s i o n  survey in 197 that
Cions in Tuxtepec. This « « *n new cechnology and expansion 
concluded that the greatest constraint
was financing. flrg
« ■ * — > « f f r .  ;“ r s u r trm! “i r , u »-  sataW B« Z"“i •g&tfZSS-onario" (long-term) credit for a ^ u i r i * £ «  ^  (BANC0MgR) in 1976 
and tractors. The Banco de ^ " / l i v e s t o c k  credit- more than double
* i. i o 19 percent annually* vmlrfers* Tbere are 3of interest is 12 per private property holders. £
in Tuxtepec, works entirely di, £or maize and beans and l80 ca“  
" i F / u S H - S e s t l ^ f e c t o ;  ^ ^ “ S c n v - S ^ n i ' f u n d s  at the expense
of commerce*
..v-wiio Policies *"*• P°°rer Farmer-^! = = = “ ------------_ = = = = = _ ... ----- ^ ..of ..ru ra i  development...- .....
The impact of  President E c h e v e r r i a ^  p ^ ^ ^  For p r iv a te  banks ,
were f e l t  most in  Tuxtepec dhr0US. t s  £or a g r i c u l t u r a l  c r e d i t ,  and^
t h i s  meant increased f e d e ra l  requ the Bank 0f  Mexico. In addi
expansion of the red iscou n tin g  prog inmECAFE rubber and coffee
Cion, money flowed from the cof ” (elision Ganadero), the National Land
t-Vio T ivestock Coitunission \ \ and. tbs Tobaccoprograms, the Livestock vrorional de DesraontesJ, ana t-ne
f ^ ^ " t ^ ^ O O ^ l d a t a r i o s  were r e c i p i e n t s  of such c re d i  , 
f r r i u i  p o r t io n  of  the e . i d a l  s e c t o r .
c r e d i f f o f  l o n T - t e ™  - P i - 1 ’ - P — nt haS b6“  ^  ' .
Improved crop prices have been *“8£ “ “ Tnt Ae* standards of living 
credit-cum-technology programs, and [ i n  e® is t s  for  smaller produ­
c e  rural zones. The coyote problem *“ 1 1 ^ ^  especially in chile,
c e r e ,  and the p r ic e  di££e/ entr i a l  £a™ eTs who deal  with the c i t y  market in 
- r  f r u i t ^ a n d  m flk  ^  - h ^ h e r  ^  - r e
D e s p i ^  such d i s p a r i t i e s  b e n e f i t  in s trengthenin g
f a m i n g  can be p r o f i t a b l e  ha *een ° f  ^ c u l t u r e  on a d e c l in e ,  with 
the c o u n try s id e .  Only in  and bean8  th e r e ,  the promising ■
reduced production fo r i c e  was nearly h a l te d  because of  land exp
c u l t u r a l  progress of  the ivou 
priation for the dam.
P t o d u c t i o n ^ ^   ^ s to
The iack of access of dw'wer^etaingly to
modern technology was chronic, u n ” th“ « ported use of f e r t i l i s e r  and 
Tack of financing. Without began after 1970, with
improved varieties m  the u* P 1 9 7 6 , only £our out of seven
- k / r e p ^ t l f ^ u r ^ i e r t u l ^ r ,  improved varieties or tractors.
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A1 though ^ he e ^ d a ^ r J o a ^ e ^ x ^ e  a T - t% i>fhdeCli,,ing ^ s J 2 / .
soils of reducing fallow periods overmuch °fh the det™ ntal effects on 
of rising population pressures But bera’ °bllged to because
were wil l ing  t0 work £ ith  the ^  credit  ^  ° f  t h l S * many <= «P«in o .  
fear  of banks. programs, despite t r a d i t io n a l
The most v i s i b l e  public  c r e d i t  .
the small farmer was that of the Banco d ^ C  at technifieation of
Tuxtepec.  Although a moderate amount o f  !  Rural ^ ^ R A D  in
J ' " ° "  ^  before u n i f i c a t i o n ? i n ' 1975 ' I n  v ^  funnelled t r o u g h  the
dropped from the Tuxtepec office and L 1 VerfCruz loans were 
everyone that owed money, causimr a vr" ^ j ^ ? ’ they initially dropped 
spec ia l  p ro je c ts  are directed through the ° f  confusion- Several  
Commission, the Land Clearing -g *th Bank* such as the Livestock
c r e d i t , but these v i l ^ & ^ U t ”  ^  S i l V e r i °
The program has now stahi1 i ,
(the branch which covers O j i t la n )  a n d ^ T ^  I 0* ? 8 t0 Jalapa de Diaz 
increased, m the 1976/77 cycle  th f  1  '  ? * c f on« l  branches
in 47 credit societies in rice and " *B k worked with 1133 ejidatarios 
aocieties in livestock production, “six'tv Pr°ducCion, with six
introduced to— or continued with_m^rh ^ Parcent of those assisted were
Technical assistance and mechanized Production.il/
e f f e c t  of  the Bank program has been ? CCOmpany a l ! the loans.  The main
cropping pattern remains the same (1 9 ). cultlvated; the double
. The National Banco de Mexico S A ai ,
o ' r ^ ' T 6 ’ tUC th r° U®h the P r i v a ^  b a k i n g  s v s t V eV griCUltUral  « . d i tOf the Fondo de Garantia set up in 1974 ! ? ; T  ®re is an office
project described in Chapter 1 TPn ’ ^  h supervises the FIRA 
by BANAMEX is  for e j i d a t a r i o s  t h r o L w u 6^  ° f  the " e d i t  administered
c a t t l e 5° t h ndlvldu^ls ° n Seven ej idos- 90epercent o ^ t h  pf ogranl reaches c a t t l e ,  the res t  is  for grain crops Mo /  f  ° f  the land ia nsed for
opened areas around the Palomares highway Vsr ^  "  the newly
percent on the loans.  y ' jarnings are of  one to two
and the VaUe C i o n a l " Pa m e" " 8^ d ti® C°-1’5 t0nS per hectare, 
declines over time. Rice yields raneedJf ^  q J ldos a U  reported
machinery losses and declining soil [WhlCh they blame on high
one farm from 12 to 14 tons p L  he tare i ^ ’‘ ^  yielda
tons m  1976, on unfertilized land ^  I960's to 10 to 12
mechanTzed^aize^roduc^ion^for^ ^(datarios received credit for
mechanized rice, l51 e j h ^ . V f T c ”  « 9 ej idatarios ;°for
ening, five societies. Also thrpp rb ■ reedlnSj one society- for 
beef fattening and three JeciivL r“ r] credit '
edlt for Poultry production.
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Commission program, but 70 P crops a££ect;ed are maize,
prop erty  owners t h r o u g h > e 0 axaca s in ce  1974 has  worked with
chile and rice, lne .my. _ arp now five groups with a
" s o l i d a r i t y  groups" of  ™ allholderl  ^ H i v e  years c r e d i t , p a r t i c u l a r l ytotal of 134 members. They receive up to five years creon, y
for  c a t t l e  ( 16) .
Ejidal Livestock Credit
Because of  i t s  comparative p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  there  la  J " y ere S t
l o c a l l y  in  promoting l i v e s t o c k  production on e j i d o s . .(Eapeci y 
1972-1974  l o t s  of  c r e d i t  for  re ar ing  was provided by the US.) Two 
s p e c i a l  f e d e ra l  coamissions have been working with t h i s  mandate.
The Livestock Commission was begun by?the
...and a r r iv e d ..m  Tuxtepec m ..ug.. . .rjvrtirat....A t.the.beginning,...t h i s ...........2ss.“srMi a jw s r i  ■!— -
tenancy difficulties between the two groups.
To qualify, a credit ^ ^ y ^ u s t  have at. least ten ” a^ ers and^lSO, 
hectares of  land available. The cattle are give g ^  salary 0 f
along with cattle^rheadCe,Technician; give courses to the ejidatarios 
at Sa^ sub p ro fe s s io n a l  l e v e l .  V e te r in a r ia n s  from SAG P ^ da " ed;cal Care'
were o r i g i n a l l y  in ranching,  o th ers  £ « c u l t u r « .  « ar e
l : i ; - pc ^ i c ^ . T o l h S r . e. ^ ; . r - L r  J  —  *  p- * . .
Apart from this, the Livestock Commission is petitioning for a Semen 
' Bank,  and is  s e t t i n g  up a course on inseminat ion techniques .
The National Program on Land Clearing was al“  .beg™.
President Echeverria. It subsidizes the^ncorpor.tio^of^e^:faring
a g r i c u l t u r e  and l i v e s t o c k ,  P“ n“ pah i  h ^ ‘ government covers through the 
i s  done by machinery, the cos t  of  which_the ? ov Tuxtepec and
hamuhuat The Program was most a c t iv e  in  Loma Bonita ,  but iuxtepeBANRURAL. lne r most prosperous ejidos,
^ t « o PViei“ andPp:;ai:i;arwere ^rticipants and openly acknowledge the 
enormous influence of the Program.
Planners stress pasture initiation because 
sowing, which i s  necessary  to prevent regrowth, and the
BANAMEX does not work with more agricultural ejidos because of a
lack of technicians for the assistance program.
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These public programs are having a very beneficial effect on private
ranching. During the 1960s there was almost no local market for ?
heifers. Now many ranchers sell youngstock to the bank and to eiidal
fattPnP 3S W6l^.as each other> and are earning more than they were in rattening operations.
Commodity Credit
r, , h W NMEaAFE^ aS tw° P r a a m s  in Tuxtepec providing commodity credit for rubber and coffee. These reach over a thousand ejidatarios.
The original programs for rubber were begun by the Fapaloapan 
Commission. They finally came into fruition during the 1970s. This is 
a particularly profitable enterprise for the 600 farmers involved, since 
the market is very good. The government buys most of the latex, either 
for the Tuxtepec processing plant or for other government factories.
ifteen percent of the farmers' receipts go for paying back the initial 
loans for planting and maintenance. The program has had a favorable 
effect on participating ejidatario's incomes and technology,
The_coffee  program j u s t  began in 1973 in  Tuxtepec,  and a f f e c t s  
farmers in  Tuxtepec and V a l le  Nacional m unic ip ios .  The program was a 
d i r e c t  response to trends of  d e c l in in g  c o f fe e  production in those a r e a s .
The technicians organize resident producers, to provide technical 
assistance, introduce high-yielding varieties and help with marketing.'
n 1974, INMECAFE bought two "beneficios" in Barranca Seca and Perro"' 
Quemado to process the group’s production, although much is already
£herePareeabout S O O ^ M ^ r  h“  be8}“ t0 inCreaSe »**»**'icently.ere are about 800 ejidal society members (with 1150 hectares of
c o f f e e ;  about 60 percent of  the r e g io n s '  producers. The agency i s
wi l t l i n  V n 0 j U U "  (which has 800 h e c ta r e s  in c o f f e e )  and po s s ib lywill begin next year to operate there. ■ "
TABAMEK i s  Crying to improve the production o f  tobacco in Tuxtepec 
emphasizing the V a l le  Nacional  a rea .  S ince  1972, there  has been an
increase m  production, but no turn-around in the basically depressed 
economics of tobacco on marginal land.
cheapness compared to crop establishment. They also put up fencescattle bath and access _roads.14/ ’
Agricultural Labor Demand
Of the total number of increased jobs in the Tuxtepec zone 
were in agriculture, an amazing increase of 34 percent. This w< 
w elmmgly in urban linked Tuxtepec municipios. This fact sugge
5700
over-
ts
—  We don't have the exact data from Oaxaca, 
the total cost was $700 per hectare for establishi 
per hectare for estab1ishing cropland,
but in Veracruz, 
ng pasture, and $3000
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contrary to current pessimism— there is much room to expand employment in 
this sector elsewhere in Mexico as well, particularly since well over 
half of new employment was through intensification of production, beyond 
mere land expansion.
300 to 400 new jobs in the feeder municipios came from land expan­
sion and intensification; another few hundred workers have permanently 
migrated to Tuxtepec municipio.15/ But because wage rates and work 
opportunity remain limited, many of the rest do seasonal work in Tuxtepec 
to supplement local rural incomes.
Employment on Newly Opened Lands. Between 1969 and 1976, 12,000 hectares 
of cropland were opened through cane expansion (7000 hectares) and pro­
duction credit for maize, rice, chile, coffee and tobacco (5000). About
16,000 hectares were opened to parture through private herd increases 
(12,OOOjJi/) and ejidal livestock programs (4000). Even under exten-
sive technology^?7 around 2000 man-equivalents (meq) of employment 
would have been created. Because of the intensive credit programs 
undertaken, new employment grew instead to over 3000 man-equivalents. A 
single labor meq is often composed of part-time work by several laborers 
summing to 12 full months. Meanwhile, part of the increased labor was 
provided by workers already in the labor force. We can estimate that 
roughly 2000 additional individuals were supported .JJ*/
Effect of Mechanization. Mechanization has as yet had little nega­
tive effect on the demand for manual labor. The more prosperous, high 
employment survey ejidos rent or own tractors. Where topography allows, 
they are advantageous to coordinate the planting of rice and maize, since 
either rubber, chile or sugar cane plantings or harvests conflict with 
the labor requirements for the tonalmil and temporal grain crops. There 
is considerable double cropping in some places, for which a tractor can 
be justified for rapid and high quality seedbed preparation on extensions 
of land over 4 or 5 hectares. So far, there is little use of mechanized
15/ xf one assumes a natural population increase of 3.2 percent 
per year, the population of the four feeder municipios should have grown 
from 43,000 to 52,000 in 1976. New jobs were needed for about 2250 
workers. Some 350 found jobs in towns.
11/ Assuming 25,000 new animals for private ranchers, at two 
animals per hectare.
11/ Goeffie lents for the intensity of technology are ad apted 
from the data collected in the Tuxtepec case studies. Typical extensive 
employment is 8 has/meq for crops and 40 has/meq for ranching; for 
intensive employment, 5 has/meq for crops and 20 has/meq for cattle.
18/ E.g., the 1200 migrant canecutters work full-time for six 
months of the year; the corresponding number of meq's is thus 600,
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harvesting for any crop, but it is likely that such mechanization would 
have serious consequences for those seasonal migrants from the hinterland 
or outside states who receive a large portion of their income from har­
vest work. Already the increasing wages of canecutters has led to 
increased mechanization for lifting the cane. Also there may be con­
flicts where labor demand is already carefully organized through crop 
diversity in different microclimates, and complex reciprocal labor rela­
tions.
Seasonal Labor Distribution. Agricultural demand for manual labor 
in this zone is fairly continuous, as is illustrated in Chart 6-5, which 
shows seasonal labor requirements by product. The lowlands and the foot­
hills have distinctly different cropping patterns, due to different rain­
fall and soil types. The coastal plains produce mostly during the rainy 
season, because of lack of moisture in the winter months. Some double­
cropping is possible in the foothills, but in most of the foothills and 
mountains of the hinterland municipios and southern Tuxtepec, drainage 
conditions are such that rainy season maize production is very difficult. 
Moisture is sufficient in the winter months to support a major crop then, 
and in some places flood-tolerant second crops may be grown in the rainy 
season (6).
Increased tonalmil maize and chile production in Jacatepec demand 
labor during the period of least demand on the plains. With improved 
communications, new crops and newly opened lands, the patterns of labor 
demand have reinforced the relations between the two ecological zones.
Sugar cane demands help to balance ejidal labor distribution over 
time. The influx of outside workers for harvest work is still only a 
minor part of total labor. Rubber tapping requires almost continuous, 
year-round labor.
The resurgence of banana production also helps even out labor demand 
in Tuxtepec municipio, since the slow months for bananas correspond to 
the peak months for other crops and livestock. The peak months for 
coffee labor in Valle Nacional correspond to the dry season on the 
coastal plain, and the peak work period for part-time labor on the coast 
fits in neatly with seasonal migration supply.
The growing importance of livestock production in Valle Nacional,
Chiltepee and Tuxtepec has probably had a net positive impact on labor 
demand. On ej idos, the introduction of cattle provided an income sup­
plement to the group, rather than displacing labor or attention to basic 
crops. Where new privat e land was opened to pasture, there was an 
increase in employment for the landless. But where cattle were substi­
tuted for crops, net employment probably went down. No private ranchers 
surveyed in this zone had a high employment/land ratio.
Land Tenure Effects on Employment. Land tenure affects all these 
variables. Large ranchers, have poor to medicore labor absorption, 
despite high capital investments, Most work is done during short periods 
of the year, at which time, relatively large numbers of part-time 
laborers are hired. The ranchers had significant off-farm income— mostly 
from other ranches which were integrated into a single coordinated 
productive unit.
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Most ejidos "good" labor absorption which we consider to be fewer 
than 20 hectares per man-equivalent employed. High-employment, 
high-income ejidos were distinguished by large size and abundant natural 
resources and had often benefitted from government programs. There was 
little parttime labor used in these ejidos, except for the cane and rice 
harvests. The major labor effect of the new programs was fuller 
utilization of the ejido's own available manpower, with subsequent higher 
incomes per worker.
Some ejidos— small or with marginal lands— were forced to look 
outside the ejido for supplemental income. The minifundista had a high 
labor/land ratio, but the plots are so small and returns from banana and 
maize product ion so small, that incomes are very low.
Employment Patterns by Class. Landowners have the advantage of more 
secure and steady employment than the other groups. They have a better 
cash flow in general, and usually higher incomes. Certainly, they have 
been the prime beneficiaries of agricultural price improvements and 
better market conditions.
In general, those with claim to land, regardless of how small or 
poor, tend to remain on the land and do not migrate.
Ranchers very frequently have outside income sources - either 
multiple farms, or businesses in Tuxtepec or smaller towns. Tuxtepec 
ejidatarios holding land rights rarely need to seek supplemental outside 
income, but those in the more mountainous parts with poorer land 
resources are forced to find seasonal employment. In the ejidos 
interviewed in the hinterland, at least a third of total income came from 
outside the ejido. Obviously, the larger parcel size in the lowlands (20 
to 25 hectares), compared to the hinterland (8 to 10 hectares at most) is 
a major advantage. Of course, during the peak cropping seasons, many 
ejidatarios hire part-time labor for their own parcels.
The minifundistas, who do not have the benefit of strong reciprocal 
labor and support ties, such as the ej idatarios have, nor the capital 
base of their larger neighbors, have shared little in the Tuxtepec boom. 
The only exceptions to this are the few private sugar cane farmers who, 
Like the ejidatarios, have benefitted from price increases.
One of the obvious beneficial effects of Tuxtepec agricultural 
progress has been to create conditions where increasing numbers of 
ejidatarios without land rights can be supported on the ejidos. In other 
parts of Mexico and the Basin, this is one of the groups most likely to 
emigrate to the cities and elsewhere. Of the four survey ej idos in which 
nearly all income was generated on the ejido, three had almost as many 
adult men without rights as with them, and the other had over half as 
many, yet migration was not a serious problem.
On the two ejidos with limited land resource, there were still at 
least half as many without rights,-but here considerable outside 
employment was needed to supplement incomes. The major benefits to the 
hinterland have come through availability of seasonal wage labor in 
Tuxtepec. Most of this group retains their home in the hinterland and
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large numbers have not permanently migrated to Tuxtepec despite better 
cond it ions there.
One element that slowed down the entrance of the younger generation 
into the full-time EAP of the ejido— and thus postponed the land 
squeeze— is the availability of advanced schooling. Of the 3000 young 
people now studying locally past sixth grade (not including the telese- 
cundaria program, which reaches many more) at least a third are from 
local farms. This reduced new entrants into the agricultural labor force 
by several percent, and although they must still be supported, they are 
less of a political or social problem for the ejidos.
It is the student rather than any other sector, which is permanently 
emigrating, particularly from the hinterland. Since Tuxtepec has begun 
to grow, many of the zones' students now stay, with fewer going to Oaxaca 
and Mexico, but the drain on the hinterland has been significant.
The position of landless labor is better in Tuxtepec than in most of 
the surrounding areas. This stems from the increased opportunities for 
year-round agricultural work, higher demand in general for agricultural 
labor, and the opportunity to seek employment in town if rural jobs are 
not available.
While there is sufficient work in physical terms in much of the 
hinterland, the difference in pay rates attracts them to seasonal labor 
around Tuxtepec. In late 1976, the wage in Chiltepee town for manual 
labor was M$30 daily; in Tuxtepec's countryside, it was $40-45 per day 
for an eight- to ten-hour day. In Ojitlan, the wage rate grew from $15 
per day in 1972, plus food, to $30 in 1976, rising to $45-50 at peak 
periods due to competition from rates in the Uxpanapa resettlement zone. 
On hinterland ejidos, landless laborers are often paid even less, and 
although payment in kind is common and may be worth more, most workers 
want an income for monetary purchases.
Those landless workers living in ejidos far from the rapid communi­
cation routes remained in the hills until very recently. Migration 
patterns there involved movement from the mountain to the municipal caba- 
cera, rather than outside the municipio. Cabaceras grew while total 
municipal population remained fairly stable.
The evidence of declining per capita incomes from 1960 to 1970 in 
much of the area, and for many minifund istas and ejidal maize and banana 
producers post-1970 illustrates the uneven distribution of benefits from 
classic development investments. The reversal of the trend was made
poss ible through money flows to the poorer sec tors either directly.......
(through credit, product prices) or indirectly through employment-gener­
ating investments,
The migrant laborers from Oaxaca and Guerrero who work half the year 
in the sugar cane fields are a somewhat privileged group among migrants 
because of government minimum wage (M$57/day for 1975) and benefits. 
However, costs such as social security and transport are important and 
minimum wage is often not paid. Rice, chile and pineapple harvest 
workers are local. There are significant wage differences between rich
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and poor landholdings. One Tuxtepec ejido paid only M$12 a day plus 
meals for a work day of 8-9 hours; a private farmer complained that he 
paid M$50 daily for 6-7 hours work.
The sum effect of changing agricultural labor demand is that there 
has been very little migration out of the Tuxtepec zone in the last ten 
years. Movement to Mexico City continues, but is not increasing. Net 
farm incomes are rising and, with a lag, agricultural wages. Part-time 
work in Tuxtepec city is a powerful buffer against tight years in 
agriculture, and counters the necessity of looking to the huge cities of 
the north to find jobs at such times.
Summary: The Value of Integrated Rural Development
Tuxtepec, then, is an example of a place where "integrated rural de­
velopment" has been carried out. The city and countryside has been inte­
grated economically as a single unit, with growth in each sector posi­
tively affecting the other. The balance was acquired in numerous ways, 
and the Tuxtepec experience offers many practical lessons for building up 
dynamic urban centers in the countryside.
Basic Requirements
Basic to success is a communication system which effectively con­
nects villages and small rural centers with a central town, which is then 
connected by modern highways to the country's major cities. Successful 
marketing, low input prices, worker mobility and reasonable costs for 
infrastructure construction are dependent upon good communications.
Support prices that allow farmers a reasonable profit margin are 
absolutely critical to any sort of rural development. While the role of 
industry is likely to grow, its potential is limited by the huge capital 
investment required. It is therefore agriculture which must be depended 
upon to initiate contmercial growth in rural areas.
This is impossible without rising farmer incomes; witness the stag­
nation of the rural sector of Tuxtepec before 1970. Only the expectation 
of respectable earnings will induce poor farmers to risk purchased inputs 
for intensification, such as they have recently done with rice, cane and 
the particularly difficult transition to livestock production. The 
experience of the 1970's indicates that maintenance of high prices, while 
it does not guarantee development, is a precondition to successful credit 
of technical assistance programs.
Employment Stimulation
Much of the technological change that has taken place in Tuxtepec in 
the last six years has been of a type that intensifies production and 
employs more labor, because technological improvements have been coordi­
nated with the local labor patterns. Tractor power for land preparation 
in an area recently opened to double cropping makes sense; tractor power 
where there is no serious labor constraint and where the tractor directly
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substitutes for available labor does not make sense. The evidence in 
Tuxtepec suggests that simple technological changes can be as effective 
in absorbing workers as opening new land.
The experience with sugar cane illustrates the potential to increase 
land in production without the need for expensive colonization schemes, 
or opening new lands whose ecology is not well understood. This is by 
inducing ejidatarios to use all their land resources. The highly 
efficient sugar mill appears to be operating in the black, while 
providing both high industrial wages and high raw materials prices to 
hundreds of workers.
The promotion of such a product with a ready market in a local pro- 
cessor is a sturdy base on which to build a city's economy. More value- 
added accumulates in one place, and the commercial sector gets the extra 
boost from expenditures of industrial workers. Industrial concentration 
is an undeniable advantage, providing the benefits are distributed
locally,.and widely,.through wages, raw materials payments, or.profits.in
a collective enterprise.
Stable working relations between farmers in different ecological 
zones should be encouraged. Where possible, however, it is even better 
to establish direct programs with year-round local benefits. While the 
labor force of the Tuxtepec hinterland has benefitted somewhat by in­
creased agricultural production and job opportunities in the municipio of 
Tuxtepec, there is no comparison between their living standards and those 
of farmers who directly received credit, government assistance and new 
infrastructure.
Official credit can be a powerful force for changing technology and 
improved incomes and employment. This was illustrated here by ^ the newly 
prosperous ejidos working the Clearing Program and rubber credit. A 
good credit program, however, needs good administration and must be as 
flexible as possible. There are still considerable problems on some 
Tuxtepec ejidos with misunderstood debts and delayed inputs arrivals.
More crops could be covered——perhaps yuca, bananas, some garden crops. 
Timetables should be more in the farmers' hands to facilitate the 
multiple cropping that is the traditional farming pattern of many 
Tuxtepec zone producers, and improve yields in that system.
Credit for large private fanners or ranchers can be used to encour­
age greater intensification and employment. So long as the political 
scene is such that land concentrations will not be broken up, this is a 
way to make them more responsive to social needs.
Urban Investments
Construction projects for local infrastructure can concentrate 
money, skills and buying power in a small urban center, while improving 
the standard of living and reducing urban/rural dichotomies.
A portion of the projects can be financed by the people themselves. 
Once rural incomes have risen through price, credit or communications 
policies, many ejidos in Tuxtepec helped to finance their own projects of
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buildings , schools, sewerage and potable water. The townspeople of 
Tuxtepec assisted in their share of the costs of street paving. In these 
situations, the government position might best be one of coordination, 
such as the Commission held in many cases.
The immigration of "outsiders" is a fundamental goal of development, 
to broaden the spatial distribution of economic activity. Those groups 
with little money will be attracted by jobs. In Tuxtepec's case, they 
came from fairly nearby, but it is likely that even people from the north 
would be induced to come to the zone, at least for jobs outside of agri­
culture. To attract skilled and educated personnel, good education 
facilities, amenities of life such as paved streets, a cultural center 
and movie houses must be available,
A Network of Regional Centers
Certainly, the experience of Tuxtepec shows that tropical urbaniza­
tion is viable, and indeed, a strategy to be fostered. Furthermore, this 
can be done in such a way as to integrate the countryside. In the Basin 
itself, there are other small towns that have potential for similar 
growth. Tierra Blanca is already doing well as a commercial center. 
Places with 5000 to 15,000 inhabitants— such as Isla, Playa Vicente, San 
Andres Tuxtla and Acayucan— which are already located along major 
highways, are prime targets for development. Places such as Ojitlan and 
Valle Nacional could play the same role for the highlands.
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CHAPTER 7. ISIA AND LOCAL INITIATIVE
e -i cn in the Papaloapan low-
The municipio of Isla, ?  °Bia was not until recently
la n ds ,  but nearer  to the Tuxt las  _o  ^ a c t i v i t i e s  Quite on i t s  own,
. majir focus for Papaloapan ^  Cultural region in the
the place developed into the most progressiv
Basin.
The village of Isla is small, and most 
frontier town. The railroad passes h t run-down and cluttered.
Where the ‘^  « modern as Tuxtepec. Several
But the center of town a ff- lights. There is a brand newsquare blocks are paved an^ have r f and some fine
municipal park complete with newly 
ice cream parlors.
Driving down the very well-
eral large factories, but m o s t o M a p  7-1 showsthemajor 
kept pastureland or large P ™ * P P j ef^r the*a U uvial soils'by the San Juan 
physical features of Isla. ^ soils which have drainage problems are
and Tesechoacan Rivers, the ? ^  rainy season lasts from June
not particularly good ^ for ^  t [y frotn 1300 to 1800 millimetersto October. Total ramfal 1 varies oniy 
yearly. Soils are well-drained.
Many farmsteads ^ “ 'Tuxtepe^ Smatlefranchers’
r .  S L - t r r .  ~
, r .  r-i S  « .  • » '  - •  " iv*1'
: r . r i ; . s 5  to.ai, «».
The Nature of the Change^
Tci.u kVDG of development was
The most significant insince the town's beginnings early
the leading role of local some’growth and progress and very sue
in this century, there has be . Growth in population and em-
cessful responses to external mid-1960s when the Isla area won
ployment opportunities peake . since chen> isla has managed
t r m r d t ^ r s f p r o r u c r i r L d - a ^ r u r a ^  wealth to . -markable aegree.
Population
Graph 7-1 illustrates P°PuJa“ ™  ^ e ”first rtlee'decades, but around 
Cion. Growth was fairly rapid during‘1 7  forward at a rate of over five 
the l a t e  1940s , population began  ^ an(J almost 7 1 / 2 percent i n
percent p e r ^ e a r ^ n  t h e t re ge re  mQ8tly from other p a rt8  of  Veracruz,
e its concep-
especially ^  m'^icipio of Tlacotalpan,
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MAP 7-1. "islA" ZONE: PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
San Jiidro O
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GRAPH 7-1. DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH IN I SLA*
Year
existentes'' of the Comisidn para laa/ The "Relacion ^  localldade^exxst^ ^  ^  popi;lation of Villa
Eradication del Paludxsmo o p d la Comunidad de Villa Is a,
-in 1976. The "Estudio Integral -pacultad de Medicina, 1970) ol
1 1  » ('Tesis Universidad Veracruzana, . and the estimates.
g S S S M ® * 1 ™ ............
followed Garcia Torres.  ^ 1950 and 1970 (published
* - viu a  isia" (iaia’in 1952 and 
Veracruz: Febrero, 1971).
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the 1960s. During the W O s  TpopulItTon ’sT* ^  slightly in
whole municipio at about 3 to 3POf ^ at lo n  aeeraed to have s t a b i l i z e d  in the
een cleared and occupied L J J  *U  ^  la"d ^
to be only half the nah'fln.i L  blrth rate he]j uiie national rate m  1970.
Communications
--d.dnu na
!re in 1976 appeared
c a t e d ^ i t h  the " r e s t  l i f^Kex i c o f  m V " o ^ T t o ’  d "  " ‘ k l ng. been c~ i '
UP the interior of the zone, giving L cess t o l ™ h ^  ^  1946 Hrst opened 
Tesechoacan and the railroad at Isla Man 7 routes on the
cations in 1950. But access was stiil v e L  i L i t T  ^  State °f co™ i ~  
a real disadvantage, and the local inhabitant,, m * Sma11 Producers were at very isolated. 31 lnhab^ants still considered themselves
The road system that has been built Im * 
national network. A paved road to th. Slnce ls P^t of the main
the Tuxtlas region. Isla is connected b ^  h^aSt ^  inCeSrated Isla with 
Tuxtepec and beyond in the west and t e mo^ern two-lane highway to 
Southeast. As a r a . u l t !  L  y ^  Iatl“ ”  t0
crossroads, as shown in Map 7-3. °me SOinewhat of a regional
Agriculture
l i v e s t o c k  products ^ " p i n e a p p l e ’ con‘ inu®f c° S producer of 
a g r i c u l t u r e  in  1950 and in  1970 w ere ' the  ^ f f e r e n =ef between I s l a ' s  
ermzation of production, relative to other a lnt?nsiflcation and mod- 
t r o p i c s  in g e n e ra l ,  and the f a c t  that  the L k  l “ . Basin and «  the 
Cleared and put into production r ™  "  ® tlre rautucipio had been
percent o f  the land is  on 25 e j i d o s  '  ^  ? ~4 and 7~ 5- "><>« 40
Chart 7-1 compared land use patterns dn t 
was previously part) in 1950 and Isla [n 197n ^  " (°f Which Isla
land had been cut by more than half to bi97^  ^  a,"0Unt °f “"exploited
Although as of the 1970 Census, less than hail Prim?rily int° Pasture, 
species, It is estimated-that in 1976 close t a landwas l" cultivated 
changes in crop composition are shown’inchart°7!°_percent waa C9). The
about 60,000 head.I/ Total Copland has'” 6 SreW by 75 P ^ e n t -  to
at all. Pineapple has again become overwhe??bly d.lan8ed “ ttle, if
comprises over half the total cron an erwtlelmln81y important, and
production and the fact that there is little ?eCa U? % ° f growing value of 
values have risen tremendously (7 ): and “"cleared, land
k f This is  a c o n s e rv a t iv e  figure__a lcm
Association put the number at'about V 00 0 ~ . s % l i r te  frOT the Livestock 
now- ' as there are probably many more
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MAP 7.2 "ISLA" ZONE:
COMMUNICATIONS AND INDUSTRY, 1950
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MAP 7 — 3, ' ' T C T  4 ,F 7nvr-r>ISLA ZONE: COIMJNICATIONS AND INDUSTRY, i976
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MAP 7-4. "ISLA" ZONE: AGRICULTURE, 1950
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MAP 7-5. "ISLA" ZONE: AGRICULTURE, 1976
K I  L O M E T E R SO 5 IO
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CHART 7-1. LAND USE IN ISLA* 
(hectares)
Tesechoacan (107,010 hectares)-^1 Isla (52,000 hectares)
— ^During this epoch, Isla was part of the municipio of Tesechoacan, Veracruz.
* Mexico, SIC, Censo Agricola y Ganadero, 1950, (published in 1955). Mexico, SIC, Censo Agricola y 
Ganadero, 1970, (published in 1975).
CHART 7-2. CHANGES IN CROP COMPOSITION IN ISLA, 1970-76*
1 9  7 0
Hectares Cropped: 12,400 Sa3Q
* Mexico, SRH, Contis idn del Papalo apart, Preliminary data from the Cer.so Agricola y Ganadero de 19 70 ; 
"Cultivos, 19 70;” Mexico, Direccion General de Agriculture en coordinacion con la Agenda General 
de la SAG, "Cicio Agricola 1974/75 de Veracruz,” (Xaiapa, Veracruz: Marzo, 1976).
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Year Value Per Hectare Type of Land
1958 $30
1960-65 $1000-3000
1970 $2000-5000
1976 $2500-3000 River lowlands
$3000-3500 Brush land
$4000-7000 Cleared land (US$320-560)
$10,000 Land by highway (US$800)
Thers are officially registered about 500 ranching plots and 200 
agricultural plots (8).
Agricultural technology in Isla is one of the highest in the Basin; 
Nearly everyone uses fertilizer, pesticides and improved crop varieties. 
Tractors are very common. The John Deere Company put up a sales center 
in Isla in 1973. Between their sales and others’ there are probably 
about 300 tractors in the zone (20) .2/
Artificial insemination is popular, and many ranchers fertilize 
their pastures and provide dry season supplements. All use fertilizer, 
pesticides, some improved varieties and tick control. All but one had 
their own tractors; six out of eight use cultivated pastures; five out of 
eight artificial insemination.
Economic Diversification
Isla remains primarily an agricultural economy. As of the 1970 
Census— illustrated in Graph 7-2— nearly two thirds of the EAP were in 
the primary sector. In 1975, livestock production was estimated at $452 
million; agricultural production, $81.9 million; industrial production 
$42 million (6_) .
Only around half of gross product and personal income in 1970 came 
from the primary sector O ). The major industries are three fruit pro­
cessors which employ a total of 100 full-time workers and about 2000 
part-time workers during the packing season. These industries, although 
they employ a smaller number of workers, exercise enormous influence on 
Isla's economy.
There are also three small cheese plants which produce over 12 tons 
of cheese monthly, and two small rice mills. Each hires fewer than half 
a dozen workers.
Commercial activity has increased since 1970, and has probably ab­
sorbed most of the new entrants of the labor force.
John Deere sold 220 tractors in Isla and surrounding muni- 
cipios, about half inside Isla. They estimate that half the tractors in 
the zone are John Deere.
GRAPH 7-2. SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION
OF ISLA, 1970 AND 1976*
Agricultural Sector
Mexico, SIC, Noveno Censo de Poblacion, 1970 (published in 1972); data 
for 1976 estimated by the author.
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Living Standards
Is 1 a has been a relatively high-income zone in comparison with the 
rest of the Basin, because of high-value pineapple production. In 1970, 
gross product was eleventh highest of the Papaloapan municipios outside 
the Industrial Region— about the same as Tierra Blanca, but lower than 
Tuxtepec and the neighboring pineapple capital Loma Bonita (5).
Living standards in the town are high. There was potable water, 
sewage, electricity, a hospital, and a junior high school. The rural 
area was not so well-endowed. There was minimal infrastructure and lack 
of schools brought its literacy rate down to 58 percent. See Chart 7-3 
for present living standards in Isla town.
The 1970's was a boom time for Isla, however, and both average 
incomes and living standards went up. One banker suggested that there 
were now two or three people with $4 to 5 million in capital (US$320,000- 
400,000); 12 to 15 with about $1 million (US$80,000) and 40 to 100 with 
$200,000 - $400,000 (US$16,000 - 32,000).
The wealthier farmers had their own wells and one had his own sewage 
system, but there were still few rural works. Few ranches had electric­
ity service; few ejidos had potable water. All had their children in 
school, and two were professionally trained veterinarians. Most of the 
ranchers had televisions and radios; there were several televisions on 
the ejido. Even in the least prosperous unit in the sample, houses were 
neat and sturdy and there were a few private cars.
Sources of Isla's Development: The Early Years, 1900-1945
The roots of Isla's development date almost from the time of found­
ing. In essence, the sources of growth have remained the same; it is 
mostly the intensity of activity that has changed. One more or less 
interrelated group of private individuals has been responsible for stimu­
lating most of the changes.
Isla1s Founding
Until the present century, the Isla area was very sparsely populated 
by ranchers. When the Veracruz-Isthmus railroad was built in 1900, it 
passed by "Limon de Guerrero," a ranch belonging to Alonso Isla Camacho. 
What is now the town of Isla was then mostly covered by lakes. In 1904, 
Mr. Isla managed to arrange for a train station there to be called "Isla" 
(4).
During the Revolution, the zone was devastated. In 1917, many of 
the ranches were burned down. Their owners fled, leaving cattle to roam 
wild. In 1918, Alonso F. Isla Niemeyer inherited his father's land and 
made a deal with the Compania Agricola Abastecedora de Cereales to 
regenerate the place. "Limon de Guerrero" was to be its center (4).
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CHART 7-3. LIVING STANDARDS IN VILLA ISLA*
Percent of the population
Nutrition: Drink milk daily 72
Eat meat daily 45
Eat meat 3 to 4 times
each week 25
Eat meat 1 to 2 times
each week 30
Housing: Brick or cement, with flat
roof, latrine or inside 
bathroom, cement floor 22
Brick or cement, with roof of
asbestos sheeting, latrine 
or inside bathroom, and 
cement floor 26
Wood, with roof of zinc or 
oilpaper - half have 
cememt floors 33
One-room, with roof of oil­
paper*. earth floor,
outside bath 19
With furniture including:
bed, dining set, closet,
living room set 45
Appliances: Television 75
Radio 82
Gas stove 56
Refrigerator 38
Record player 30
* SalvadorGarciaTorre,"Estudiointegraldelaccmunidadde VillaIsla, 
Veracruz" (Thesis, Universidad Veracruzana, Facultad de Medicina, 1970).
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This was a group of technology-oriented people who wanted to moder­
nize and mechanize grain production. The company brought 13 tractors and 
the personnel to work them, but ultimately failed financially in 1920.
The village, however, had been born and now had a population of 300,
These people turned to raising the cattle left over from the war, and 
some staple crops (4).
Introduction of Pineapple
By 1920, the first pineapple plantation had been set up in Loma 
Bonita, Oaxaca. In 1924, an American came to Isla, rented some land from 
Mr. Isla Niemeyer, and started to plant pineapple in a small way. Not 
until two more foreigners, one English and one American, came to Isla in 
1928-30 to plant the fruit did local interest stir. Pineapple was a very 
appropriate crop for the sandy, low fertility soils of Isla, with few 
risks from disease or other environmental problems. (4).
The market in Mexico City and in the United States grew steadily for 
pineapple, and Isla grew along with the expansion of its pineapple 
fields. In 1932, 40 freight cars of fruit were harvested. With the 
money made from the plantations, farmers bought more cattle. Still, the 
larger ranches in 1932 had only 30 to 40 head apiece (4).
In 1925, the first industry in Isla was set up— a sawmill founded by 
the same Mr. Isla Niemeyer. Wood was sold to the Port of Veracruz for 
dock construction. Second class wood was sold at reduced prices to 
Islenos for house construction. The mill employed about 30 people (4),
Immigration
During the 1930s and 1940s, many immigrants were attracted by Isla's 
boom. Landless workers came to work in the pineapple fields, made good 
money and bought their own land. Wealthier Veracruzanos from the river 
cities came to invest in the zone. Over this period, population growth 
ranged between five and eight percent yearly.
In 1936, the Associacion Agricola de Cosecheros de Pina was founded 
with 135 members. World War II brought a bigger boom in pineapple 
production to Isla, as the United States was cut off from Hawaii, and 
bought up supplies to feed its troops. The first pineapple packing plant 
was opened in 1942. The association grew to 204 members; cattle numbers 
increased and the town grew wealthier (4).
Sett lenient, 1945-1965
The boom was short-lived, however. When the war ended, the pineap­
ple market collapsed and the privately-run packing plant failed in 1947. 
Shortly afterwards, hoof-and-mouth disease decimated the cattle herds.
This double disaster might have halted Isla's growth altogether had 
it not been for migration after 1947 from the flood-ruined zones by the 
rivers, and the new stimulus that arrived with the immigrants. 1950 to
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1965 marked the completed settlement of Isla zone, and the foundations 
for the 1970s leap into prosperity.
New People
After the 1947 flood nearly wiped out the town of Tlacotalpan, many 
of the emigrants there headed toward Isla, where relatives and friends 
had already settled or had business interests. These people were warmly 
welcomed and given substantial assistance in getting started in the Isla 
community.
These people in turn not only brought their cumulative wealth and 
ranching and commercial know-how, but were energetic about making their 
new home as civilized as the old. By 1950, the population of Isla then 
part of Tesechoacan— was 6318, with almost a third living in the 
village.
Isla rallied quickly economically. A splinter group of the old
PineappleAssociation— theBuena Vista group— playeda leading role with 
the Tlacotalpan immigrants in improving the town's living standards. In 
the 1950s, each member paid $10,000-15,000 toward improvements— lights, 
drinking water, roads and schools— while the other townspeople gave what 
they could. In 1962, the electrification of the entire town was 
completed and a health center and hospital were set up (21).
This group was progressive in other ways as well. Being an import­
ant employer, due to very large pineapple holdings, the group made sev­
eral far-reaching reforms in labor management, increasing salaries, and 
providing medical care and protection to employees (21). This tradition 
was continued— not always smoothly— but has resulted in a more equitable 
distribution of wealth and better relations between landed and landless 
than is found in most parts of the Basin.
Communications
This initiative for progress extended to communications. In 1945, 
the railroad line was Isla's only link to the outside world. To take 
full advantage of the World War II pineapple market, the Pineapple Asso­
ciation constructed a road 28 kilometers long to Garro in the north in 
1946, The operation involved not only building the dirt road— at a cost 
of $650,000— but dragging the river and fixing the embankments as well. 
This connected them with the Tesechoacan River and gave access to the sea 
(4).
I n 1954,theIslenos,theCommissionandtheSantiagoTuxtlaauthor­
ities participated jointly in building 42 kilometers of all-weather road 
joining the Garro road to connect the two towns. With heavy traffic and 
bad weather conditions, its maintenance was very expensive, and Isla 
petitioned the Commission to pave the road. The Commission authorities 
refused, so in 1958, the Buena Vista group financed the resurfacing of 
the 62 kilometers on their own (4_).
In 1962/63 Isla was connected to Playa Vicente in the south by a 
dirt road which was passable only in the dry season. The road east to
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Rodriguez Clara was the same. A resurfaced road followed the railroad 
lines from Mata Limones to Juanita. To the west, the Mata Limones road 
connected with Tesechoacan and then to Ciudad Aleman, a trip which until 
1965 required three to three and a half hours travelling. All these 
roads were financed jointly by the Commission and the Isla authorities. 
Because of the help offered to Isla by the Commission and its Vocal Ejec- 
utivo, a statue was raised there, the only one in the Basin, to Raul 
Sandoval.
Progress in Ranching
As a reaction to the devastation of the hoof-and-mouth disease, 36 
ranchers joined together in Isla's first Livestock Association in 1946. 
Their goals were to improve techniques, lower freight costs, cancel sales 
taxes, and help improve owner/worker relations. By 1964, there were 
about 350 members (4). The ranchers made a comeback, both through Asso­
ciation efforts and the experience and financing from former ranchers 
of Tlacotalpan, and others from Cordoba who were attracted by the 
apparent economic potential in Isla.
Starting in 1960, the group helped host a yearly Agricultural 
Cattle Industrial Exposition the first week of June, which coincided with 
the religious Sacred Heart of Jesus celebration and the annual Pineapple 
Fair C4). The object of the Expo has been to display improvements 
achieved in the area and to introduce new industrial products. For these 
fairs, cattle have been brought from as far as Texas, Canada and Kentucky 
for demonstration and sale as breeding bulls and dairy cows.
In the same year, the first Nestle's collecting plant came to Isla, 
at which time they began to collect 15,000 to 20,000 liters of milk 
daily. The livestock industry of Isla was beginning to turn into a 
scientific enterprise.
Progress in Pineapple Production
The first packing plant in Isla, Conservas Fausto, S.A. was inter­
ested mainly in chiles, and had worked with pineapple only in limited 
quantities (500 tons/year). When it closed down in 1947, the Pineapple 
Association tried to buy it. Due to a series of problems and apparently 
some shady dealing, they were unable to, and Mr. Isla Niemeyer took it 
over, and converted the plant to Empacadora Isla, S.A. which began 
producing in 1949 (4_).
Problems continued, since the plant's capacity was too small to have 
a serious effect on the local pineapple market. The farmers meanwhile 
had appealed to the Veracruz governor for aid after the post-War bust.
In 1952, the National Bank of Foreign Commerce acquired the plant to 
modernize and expand it. Yearly production of 5000 tons was 
achieved— 200 tons daily over 42 work days, in three daily shifts.
During January and February, the plant worked with chiles jalapenos; in 
May and June with pineapple (4).
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In 1954, the National Bank, of Ejidal Credit acquired the plant along 
with almost all of the Loma Bonita plants .2/ Credit programs were 
put into effect and experimentation began with the use of hormones to 
spread out the harvest from two to six months. By 1958, average annual 
production hit 12,000 tons, and by 1968, more than 18,000 tons ( O  •
By the mid-1960s, Isla had grown quite prosperous. Most of its 
land was cleared and being cultivated and population was beginning to 
stabilize. The zone was prepared for another surge of activity.
Isla as a Free Municipio
Isla's dynamism was not shared by the rest of Tesechoacan nor its 
county seat, Villa Azueta. In the mid-1960s, Islenos were paying 
roughly $520,000 to Azueta in taxes and receiving very little benefit in 
return. A strong movement grew for a "free municipio to separate from
Teschoacan. ----------  - ------------ ------ -------- —  — - ----  ------
Municipal Activity
Isla was declared separate by the State Assembly in December 1967. 
Since then, the budget of the municipio has risen to $4 million, probably 
a quadrupling in real terms (8) ,ftf Append ix 7-A shows calc ul at ions 
for estimating the real increTse in average incomes from 1970 to 1975 
about three and a half times.
Population growth slowed down and total population in 1976 was about 
18,000, with between 12,000 and 14,000 living in Villa Isla. The living 
standards seemed comfortable, and did not visibly reflect such a drastic 
change. It appeared that most of the new wealth was reinvested in houses 
and in less visible consumer goods such as cattle, tractors, and 
children's professional education.
Islenos point proudly to a number of impressive social improvements 
since they became "free," particularly in town. The potable water system 
was extended; some streets were paved and drained and provided with 
mercury 1ights. Several new schools were built including a junior high 
(1967), a Telesecundaria (1968) and a high school. A park and municipal 
center were built as well (6).
...'.J]..The" one that is left there also changed hands many times;
Villaria (1940), Compania Empacadora Loma Bonita, S.A. (1955), Heinz 
International (1964), and Productos Loma Bonita, S.A. (1974).
4J An informant who worked in a government office in Isla for 
more than 20 years noted an increase in monthly taxes for the Federal 
Government from $60,000—70,000 in 1965 to $250,000 in 1970, This 
reflects partially increasing tax rates and inflation, but he thought 
they reflected at least a 50 percent increase in real incomes (21).
-152-
The emphasis on improvement by landholders in Isla is evident not 
only in their support for public projects, but by the fact that those 
with money enough send their children to be educated, in the professions: 
agronomy, veterinary medicine and accounting being the most frequently 
mentioned. A good number of these have returned to help on the farm, 
which is significantly affecting the technological level on these farms, 
and by demonstration effect, on their neighbors'.
New Roads
The more recent communications projects have been funded and planned 
by the federal and state government, rather than solely local initiative. 
The road to Santiago was paved in 1970 by the Commission, after being 
devastated by the 1969 flood. A bridge: over the San Juan river replaced 
the ferry.
Since 1967-68, the road from Is la west had been paved. In 1973, the 
Sayula highway construction by the Commission reached Santa Fe, and the 
time required for the trip from Isla to Aleman was shortened to one and a 
half hours, despite detours at the river crossings. Now that the bridges 
have finally been finished, the route takes only an hour.
A project to resurface the road to Playa Vicente began in 1970. 
Another resurfaced road to Colony Abasolo del Valle in Playa Vicente 
Municipio was begun in 1975 as part of a PLANPA project, scheduled to be 
finished in 1977. The Playa Vicente road will provide southern access 
for Isla to the Tuxtepec-Palomares highway and hence to the southeastern 
part of the Basin and Salina Cruz.
The road to Sayula is scheduled to be fully completed in 1977, at. 
which time Isla will be directly on the major Mexican highway out of.
Coatzocoalcos. Already, Isla's commerce is showing signs of awakening as 
the first traffic on these major crossroads trickles through. Certainly, 
the benefit for the fresh pineapple growers and beef fatteners has been 
tremendous as marketing costs have been more than cut in half.
When this system of roads is completed, Isla will undoubtedly be the 
crossroads of the eastern Papaloapan. With easy access to both major 
highways to southern Mexico, the region is sure to show dramatic growth 
in the next decade, and this expectation is encouraging increased invest- 
ment in the zone.
Pineapple
Along with Loma Bonita and other pineapple communities of the Basin, 
Isla now produces about 85 percent of all the nation's canned pineapple 
and nearly half of its fresh fruit. Despite the presence of processors 
since the 1940s, the national fresh fruit market has always been Isla's 
forte until the past couple years. Today probably 30 to 40 percent of 
the fruit produced is sold to the packers (12).
Through mutual assistance, some technical aid by the factories, and 
the Exposition, pineapple technology has improved greatly and is as high 
as any in Mexico. All growers in the case study farms used fertilizers,
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pesticides, tractors, and calcium carbonate to artificially lengthen the 
growing season.
Prices in Isla are generally higher than elsewhere, in part because the 
soils are more apt for pineapple and the fruit is sweeter. Also, until the 
early 1970s, Isla had better road communications than Loma or elsewhere.
The crop is quite profitable, even for those who produce for the 
low-paying packers. Per hectare costs and returns are computed below.
In 1972, gross income was estimated to be $8770 annually; now it is
(50 tons at $900/ton)
(25,000 + 4000 transport 
+ 2000 extras)
Net return 14,000 (US$1120)-*/
For a 50-hectare plot,there i s a  $500,000 to 600,000 profit yearly— about 
US$40,000 to 48,000.
The Role of the Industries. The major role of the packing plants 
has always been as a market stabilizer, a source of employment, and a 
source of value-added locally. Particularly since the opening of ade­
quate truck communications which facilitated access to the fresh fruit 
market, their role has been as "buyer of last resort" because prices are 
higher for fresh fruit.
Although the plants account for only ten percent of local income, there 
have been many advantages in having the processors in Isla. Most of the 
profits are extracted locally.,6/
In 1970, it was estimated that the ejidal plant alone contributed 
$37,500 in municipal taxes, $2 million in salaries of factory workers and 
those involved in loading railroad cars, and $460,000 to the railroad in 
freight charges. It produced $9 million worth of goods, nearly 90 per­
cent of which was exported. Nevertheless, in 1972, the plant was working 
at only 30 percent capacity. It was operating at a loss, primarily be 
cause high fresh pineapple prices, supply problems and inefficiency were 
making them noncompetitive in the international market U_).
$12,000-15,000 (18_).
Gross return 45,000 
Costs 31,000
...... 5/ p f there is a fallow,.this is reduced.in real value to $11,250
per hectare, since only three-fourths of the land is in production.
6/ Xn the fresh fruit export trade, the "coyote" takes his share 
from both the producer and the consumer, but most of the value of the higher 
prices abroad are captured by the foreign import and retailing concerns.
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The Empacadora del Oriente S.A. was founded in 1966 to pickle pine- 
apple pieces. It has 33 permanent workers and about 300 during the pack­
ing season. Two hundred and fifty tons of pickled fruit are exported dir­
ectly to the United States and another 8000 tons are sent to the adjoin- 
ing Procesadora S.A. which was set up in 1969, and transferred to the 
present Empacadora owner in 1973. Glacee is their major product, of which 
they export 2000 tons a year. The Procesadora has 15 permanent staff 
members and 90 seasonal workers (14).U
These two plants process mostly the green fruit of the "acahual" or 
second harvest fruit, while the ejidal processor uses the mature fruit. 
There is minimal competition between the two plants for raw materials.
The new plants therefore had a definite stimulatory effect on Isla''seconomy. In 1976, they merged to become one company— Procesadora, S.A
Approximate total industry production in 1968'-1976, by inputs offresh fruit, increased as follows (4):
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1976
Loma Bonita 29,000 20,000 21,643 31,675 30,000 30,000
Isla 8,745 34,794Oriente ? ? 3,800 9,000 ? ?
COFRINSA Credit. Because of the numerous difficulties of the Ejidal 
plant, in 1974 it passed into control of the Complejo Fruticola Indus­
trial, S.A. (COFRINSA) which is run by the Papaloapan Commission.!./
COFRINSA has particularly emphasized improvements in ejidal pineapple pro­
duction. There are only 25 ejidos in Isla, which own about 30 percent of 
the land, but they have been less benefitted historically through pineap­
ple production, although they have often worked in the processing factor­
ies.
In general, most of Is la's investments were dependent upon personal 
financing or the help of wealthy friends and relatives. Thus, those with­
out access to such capital did not participate as much in the progress.
COFRINSA was set up to provide a credit and marketing program in 
Loma Bonita and Isla, and particularly in neighboring Rodriguez 
Clara.!/
7 /— ' Besides pineapple, they also make limited amounts of candied 
papaya, which is often substituted for citrus fruit in fruitcake. They 
are experimenting with ochra (used as a base in soups) and cucumbers.
!/ The Loma Bonita plants previously under Banco Ejidal also 
passed to COFRINSA, although the only one presently operating is the 
Empacadora Ejidal, S.A.
£/ Isla produces only 10 to 15 percent of the supply for the Isla 
COFRINSA plant.
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The creditors for pineapple before 1972 were the Ejidal Bank (25 
percent), the Heinz Company plant in Loma Bonita (12 percent), the 
Commission (12 percent), and the rest self-financing or through private 
banks, particularly BANAMEX. When the Heinz Company suddenly withdrew all 
its credit in 1972, prior to its 1973 departure, the Commission increased 
its loans to cover a fifth of producers and the Banco Ejidal, a third ( O  • 
A Fideiccnniso de la Pina was set up, operated by the Banco de Credito 
Agropecuario. Then COFRINSA, a Fideicomiso whose president was the head 
of Recursos Hidraulicos, took it over.
The present credit program assists 22 work groups on about 200 farms. 
Credit is given for a two-year period of time at $26,000 per hectare in 
1976. Through minor assistance programs, and just greater experience, 
field yields have risen 20 to 25 percent in the last few years. The 
number of farmers, particularly ejidatarios, working with pineapple has 
risen greatly. 1140 hectares were planted in 1970, about 2000 in 1972 and 
3000 in 1976 (11) . 10/
The plant __pays relatively high wages and keeps the price for____
pineapple stable all year long to protect farmers, rather than" fluctuating 
price with supply. There were initially some problems with credit in that 
the pineapple was sent to the fresh fruit market and the debt was repaid 
in cash. There is now a ruling that a certain part of the area for which 
any fanner receives credit must go to the packers; the rest he is free to 
sell where he pleases.
Ranching
Both the quantity and technological level of ranching operations has 
increased rapidly since the late 1960s. The Livestock Association has 
continued to be very active and progressive; prices have improved; the 
Hestle's milk plant has expanded operations and several new credit 
programs are in effect. By 1971 the Association had 547 members, and in 
1976, over 700. This is thought to include about two-thirds of all Isla 
ranchers, and all the large ones (9_).
Each year, they have tried to make some collective contribution to 
Isla. In 1972 they built the new Association building. In 1973, they 
bought the land for the yearly Exposition; in 1974, they bought fancy 
display equipment for it (10). The Association is also responsible for 
land tenure problem assistance. In reality, however, this is mostly a 
nuisance, not a substantial problem. Little land is ever expropriated.
The Association does take care of organizing protective litigation when 
there are threats of invasions.
IQ/ Twenty percent of Isla's production goes to the national 
market; 80 percent is exported. In previous years, the main buyers were 
the United States, Spain, Argentina, Chile and Holland. There have been 
big increases recently in sales to Ho1land, Scandinavia and Austria, and 
there are now ties with the European Common Market.
-156-
Improved Breeding. Artificial insemination has been popular in Isla 
since about 1968. In 1973/74, the Association sponsored the opening of 
the Frozen Semen Bank financed by the ranchers themselves. There is now a 
very high rate of bull and cow renovation. One-fifth to one-fourth of the 
ranchers are now using this service, and the Bank makes $12,000 to 14,000 
monthly from sales of semen (22),
The dual purpose Zebu-Brown Swiss is the most common breed, but there 
is much experimentation here. Some Sta. Gertrudis, Charolais, Brahman and 
Indobrasil are found in crosses.
On the ranch where best breeding technology was seen, the average 
daily milk production of cows had increased from two to ten liters in 
three years— which gives some idea of the future potential production in 
Isla,
Pastures. The Association, through its educational role in 
the Fair has promoted the use of improved pastures also. Because Isla's 
native grasses are very poor, the return on this investment is high.
Fangola grass has been around for at least ten years, but most of the new 
species were introduced just since 1970.
In 1973, more than 40 percent of the ranchers had part of their 
pasture in improved species (3); in 1976, this probably approached 80 
percent. The most popular species are African stargrass, Aleman, Jaragua, 
Ines, Gigante (Elephant grass) and Merkeron. In 1973, about half 
reportedly burned their fields; most in 1976 did not. Three in the case 
study survey fertilized part or al1 of their improved pastures.
Other Advances. Isla received better technical testing of pasture 
and pasture management than most other areas because of the presence of 
the Institute Nacional de Investigaciones Pecuarios, which was established 
in the early 1970's by SAG on the road to Playa Vicente.
In 1973, a third of those ranchers who had water deficiencies in the 
dry season were using supplements, a practice which sharply reduced cattle 
mortality ^ rates. The major supplements are molasses from the sugar 
mills —which is becoming common as a year-round feed—  and crushed corn and 
sorghum silage 03).
The Association is now in the process of organizing, with the 
municipal authorities, a $25 million slaughterhouse to be shared with four 
other livestock associations from Playa Vicente, Tesechoacan, Rodriguez 
Clara, and Loma Bonita (9). Isla was chosen as the site primarily for its 
superior communicat ions.
Good Prices. Undoubtedly a major incentive for this bustle of local 
activity was the price factor mentioned in earlier chapters. The prices 
quoted for the Isla area are as follows (9):
Fattened 2-3 year old calf (per kilo) 
Year-old calf (per animal)
Milk cow (per animal)
I960 1970/71 1976
$7-8 $9 $11-12
600-800 1700-2000
800-1200 3500
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i ont- in 1975 was collec
N e s t le -s  In f lu e n c e . The N e stle  c o l l . c t i n g ^ ^  oro4uctio n  U  I i l «
ting 20,000 to 50,0UUTiters of milk daily Bonita plant
8 £  « * . < * .
» • » . . .  . . . !“ .al',s Schers from Xsla, Santiago Tuxt , T ^  . the months of the dry
2 0 , 0 0 0 - 3 0 , 0 0 0  liters come from^sla^. vi*ente sends up two routes
season, when local production is low, Playa
(19).
. . .„ „f .v,o ranchers were selling milk toIn 1973, almost two thirds o and the opening of new
N e stle  ( 3 ) .  Since the e*Pa" “ ° ? n° pea 9ed?  0£ the e ig h t ran ch e rs in t e r ­
r e d  d ed ica te d  tb m iik  production and 8 11 che re9sold considerable amounts of milk.
» e s t le -s  Prices - v e  been forcea to
milk prices. Some f resh  milk is so^ I976_ 1977
liter was: —--- *
Nestle's 
Cheese Factory 
Fresh Milk
$1.20 1.80 2.55 
2.60
3.00-3.50
3.00
The company had a program to i®nbp^ \ n d Pa° feeding supplement. With
encouraging the use of pure Holstein co Qf 3Q percent in production
Just these two changes, they claim^ ^  tropics> this program failed and
?he . ^ i S S T r o i r i ;  still the most common milk producer.
They also had a strong credit ^ * 7  "cooperation" from
1975, however, all credit w a s M e r e s t  toward fattening operations
money and not with milk once
their cattle had grown UjO *
8 - t t f  Crsdit.
important^among” the richer =a“ lemen^ ^ r^ 1Peipe^ 76Lgoes','toeLnching,
especial ly'to^ " past ureses tab lishment ,\2d In Isl«. - s t  goes to small
I T ^ i h e r  6000 liters daily is sold for commercial milk in Isla 
for cheese production.
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private property owners rv^ d-fi- •
t h V H V "  am°rtize tha as1% h™  fa0L b0th rreeding andthe bank received more than 95 percent1^ e u p e m 1975/76 c^ le.
The BANAMEX has been in t«t b
shortly thereafter. The Xsla b r a n c h ^  '*'*? -° WOrk >  ranching
opened in 1974, and in 1976 95 percent nfh'if “? °f Mexlco's FXRA program
for installations -  « • w i - " S £ .  r r  - r ? r 7r in<
^ ^ ^ - ^ H i j l t u r al Credit Program. ~
Ninety-five percent of the private 
agriculture comes through the F I M I T  ? credit in Isla for
farmers have been served8 i„the “ l 1 ? '  SlnCe 1969/70> 700
: : T r a; ln 19?6> there «are about l ^ ' t o ^  - R°driguez Clara and Involved and about 35 ejidal societies (15). 5 private farms actively
been a"d its predecessors has
Banco Ejidal in San Andres Tuxtia „ . ,rj t*lac * the Banco Agricola and
primarily for maise, rice, beans a n T l c l . £ * % * '  Credi£ is P-vided 
fending in Tesechoacan and Isla, over half? f  SeSame' °f a11 the 
part for private fanners. Before the m  r  ► "  ejldoa- a very small 
era ion was not very good, and as f  e °f.the bank, recup-
result> the credit offered decreased
since the unifir-af-ion *-u , .
- n t  of  the c r e d i t  U T .  { 9 1 0 - U  l "  " ” 5 t r i c t -  « ■ * « , ! .  and 95 p e r -  
f e r t i l i z e r s  on the - l im e - d e f i c i e n t  pfan!  recupe« ted • Since re tu rns  to
programs to in cre as e  t h e i r  use hav£ w „  Very h l g h ’ the Bank and PLANPA
agronomists are  attempting to encoUr ^ \ S“CCeS8ful• The PLANPA 
l a t t e r  have a very gooV m f r ^ t 'T n  T ^ T j c T y  ^ ““ ion; the
The s e c t o r  l e a s t  a f f e c t e d  h v  t 0 i ~ i 
ra in  fed a g r i c u l t u r e —maiae and beans p r o d * ™ ! ^  . Prosperity is  that o f  
p r iva te  farm s .  Guaranteed p r i c e s  have hfen d ^  eJ l d a t a r i ° s  and small 
the smal lholders  face f a i r l y  severe market i n T p r o b W  “ “  e j i d ° S ’ but
Changing Labor Demand m  Isla
J-sia's
f  * r ; »  ^  ^  ^  ^  -  - i n g
new jobs  were provided between 1930 and lQ7 n94° Si  and 1 9 5 0 s - About 3500 
represent permanent industrial jobs but t“  th6Se’ i°°J°bs, but part-time employment through the
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packing plants helped support another 1400 for the six months of the 
packing season, which make it an extremely important employer
Graph 7-2 shows the changes in sectoral distribution of the EAP in 
Isla from 1970 to 1976. Almost all the new entrants to the labor force 
came from other parts of Veracruz, Because Isla has become the service 
center for not only the local farmers and industrial workers, but also for 
Tesechoacan, Rodriguez Clara and Santiago Tuxtla, its commercial and 
service sector has been able to employ proportionately more workers.
iCertainly, however, most of the jobs were in agriculture, This 
increased employment was mostly affected by the availability of new lands, 
more evening out of the seasonal labor distribution, and the nature of 
management on Isla ranches. ,
New Lands
During the settlement decades, the operative factor was new lands 
being opened" up": AWut l500 hectares of cropland^eTe opened since l95C ;
probably another 2000 to 2500 from 1930 to 1950. Estimating ten hectares 
per man-equivalent, this meant that about 400 jobs were created. About
20,000 hectares of cattle land opened up— creating nearly 500 jobs, at 40 
hectares per man-equivalent.
Seasonality
Work requirements were traditionally very seasonal in Isla— the pine­
apple harvest was short, the time for burning pasture was short, and there 
was other agriculture only during the rainy season. As a result, there 
was much seasonal unemployment. Even the pineapple packing jobs coincided 
with the harvest peaks.
Because of patterns of intensification in both pineapple and live­
stock production, labor distribution evened out, as shown in Chart 7-4. 
Longer harvests and higher yields means that there is high labor demand 
through most of the year. There is considerably more labor required on 
ranches, both for care of pastures and because milk production shot up. 
Intensification on ranches has come close to doubling labor demand in that 
sector in general— labor that is mostly full-time. While sugar cane, 
never really important, and maize product ion have declined, they have been 
replaced by labor-intensive chile and pineapple production.
During the rainy season, there is sometimes a labor shortage, but 
most of the demand is satisfied by local workers. There is minimal immi­
grationfromtheOaxacanSierratohelpthepineapple harvest.
13/ Some of these individuals only work three months. COFRINSA 
estimates that between 1500 and 2000 individuals worked in the plants for 
six months (12).
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Type of Holding. Full-time labor is now far more important a factor 
for farmers than is part-time labor. Most of the part-time labor is 
supplied by ejidatarios.
It is interesting that the relation between size of operation or 
enterprise combination and labor requirements is weak. (There is a strong 
relation between size of holding and prosperity.) Two high—income, high 
employment farms experienced dramatic increases in production and incomes 
in the early 1970s, and now have more workers. One was dedicated to dairy 
production, the other had pineapple and a raising operation. A high 
proportion of their full-time labor force was employed in either construc­
tion of new buildings, fencing, etc,, or maintenance of a relatively large 
capital investment. It is notable that technology and mechanization here 
have brought substantial increases in labor requirements. Mechanization 
on the ejido during the early 1970s made it possible to cultivate all 
the available land and to continue to absorb the growing labor force.
They are petitioning a land extension and believe that if they get it, 
there will be a scarcity of labor and they will be forced to mechanize 
further.------------------------------------- ---......................-...............
The PLANPA technicians consider mechanization very necessary for 
ejidos and provision of personally owned equipment useful, because rental 
services are usually overpriced and poor quality. Where custom work is 
poor, yields in carefully tended nonmechanized plots (with cost of produc­
tion $1700 per hectare) are higher than with the mechanized plots (costing 
$3420 per hectare) (18).
In pineapple production, land preparation is almost universally with 
tractors and plows, but other operations are manual and there seems to be 
no trend away from this.
Two study ranches with the least intensive employment patterns were 
in the reputedly more intensive enterprises of dairy production with 
raising operations. This seems due to differences in labor management 
approaches.
On the intensive dairy ranch, one of the main sources of employment 
is hand milking. Its manager suggested that soon it may be more econom­
ical to buy a milking machine. Should that be the next step in the devel­
opment of the dairy industry, much of the positive effect on employment of 
intensive ranching may disappear.
Off-farm income is not as important in Is la as in Tuxtepec or Tierra 
Blanca. Those who have outside interests, hold other farms for the most 
part. Furthermore, five of the eight in the survey had at least one son 
or daughter working on the farm, which implies much more of a commitment 
to the operation than was evidenced in Tierra Blanca. The trend toward 
professional training of children is paying off— the two intensive farms 
were both recently taken over by managers trained in veterinary medicine.
Labor by Class
Isla's development is definitely a product of the private landowning 
class, which receives most of the bene fits. Solidarity and cooperat ion
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among them was responsible for Isla's remarkable success* Chart 7—5 gives 
the distribution of the agricultural workers in Isla in 1970 by class and 
Graph 7-3 shows land distribution. There are many simulated latifundio 
here, made of several combined holdings. But while land distribution is 
definitely skewed, the smaller farms have certainly had a share in 
development. Most landowners are Isla residents, not outsiders. The 
quarter (by 1970 Census statistics) of the landowners with less than 50 
hectares of land still depend mostly on maize fanning and have little 
market leverage. They remain poor and are a source of part-time labor on 
ranches and even factories. There are 25 ejidos with average plot size of 
20 hectares. The locals explain this by saying that prospective 
ejidatarios were not attracted to the plains: for lack of communications,
Land prices, free roaming cattle, scarcity of water. Probably more 
importantly, Mr. Isla Niemeyer found relatively high-paying work loading 
railroad cars, etc., for those who did come seeking land. Many of these 
were able to eventually buy private landholdings for themselves of 50 to 
75 hectares. By the time the Agrarian Department investigated the tenure 
situation, they found that most of the early petitioners had either been 
absorbed, died, or had gone to ejidos in other parts of the state (4),
The free landless labor population of Isla numbers about 2000. This 
group was definitely assisted by agricultural intensification, since more 
full-time jobs were made available, although labor demand has stagnated 
recently. Migrant labor is minimal, but there is some seasonal exodus for 
the cane harvest elsewhere. The new jobs are sopping up excess local 
labor, rather than attracting outsiders. Historically, liberal worker 
relations in the area promoted their enjoying a higher standard of living, 
as a class, than elsewhere in the Basin,
Summary: The Potential of Local Initiative
The relevance of much of the Isla experience is limited because of 
its dependence on private accumulations of wealth. But there are many 
areas in Mexico similarly controlled by "gente de razon" which could gain 
much from the prosperity and distributional effects of the Isla-type 
development.
Importance of Local Sources of Capital
It seems that a prerequisite for this growth was the availability of 
a large production surplus (in this case from pineapple and cattle), 
linked with a strong sense of community. Good things might have been done 
with low profit margins in such a spirited place (an example is Colonia 
Durango in Tierra Blanca, perhaps), but great things were done with the 
high profits. The people invested their money into productive and social 
capital. They bought more trucks than cars; more cattle than trucks, and 
more schools than statues. Good worker relations and a healthy and 
reasonably rewarded working class was considered part of "civilization."
Financing was made available through personal channels, under favor­
able if not friendly— terms and because of this process, was quite flexi­
ble compared to the predominant private and public bank financing— and
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GRAPH 7-3. LAND DISTRIBUTION IN-ISLA*
1062 private properties 
23 ejidos
CHART 7-5. AGRICULTURAL WORKERS IN ISLA, 1970*
Mexico,' SIC, Censo Agricola y Ganadero, 1970 (published in 1975).
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certainly the loan sharks— which serve most of rural Mexico. Success 
through self-financing requires that substantial capital be available in 
the system to begin with, which rules out its implementation among poorer 
farmers. Also, where there is local money, local people can be depended 
on to finance more of their own social infrastructure as well. The whole 
finance system has some lessons for future government attempts to channel 
outside capital and investment.
Technology and Education
Certainly the Xsla experience shows that technology can be quite 
positively correlated with bettering employment opportunities. Fattening 
operations need not be labor-extensive. Mechanization need not steal 
jobs. The choice of machines depends on the quality of the work to be 
done, its timeliness and its price.
High education levels and goals had a very positive effect on Isla's 
development. Children were educated to become more productive individ­
uals back at home. The "brain drain" has been less severe than elsewhere 
because of this. Furthermore, experimentation and interest in progressive 
techniques was directly correlated with educational levels. Perhaps most 
important, good labor relations have been an important community goal among 
leading farmers for decades. They have been learning to work well with 
employees and are much more inclined than the average farmer in 
Tierra Blanca and Tuxtepec to intensify labor use as well as capital use 
when increasing production.
Success of Agricultural Credit and Vertical Integration
COFRINSA's experience in the area is encouraging. Its aggressive 
attempts at industrial efficiency and product diversification, combined
successful fanner assistance, have been a strong stimulus to the 
municipio's economy. Very positive distributional effects have emerged 
because of the wide range of people affected.
Finally, Isla s growth illustrates that with good highways, even 
areas far from major markets can be competitive in agricultural 
production.
Repeating the Isla Experience
The combination of investments in roads and industry can serve to de­
velop other small towns, as in Isla. This particular model, based as it 
is on the availability of a very high value crop which early on acquired a 
large share of the market, may be somewhat limited. The fact that the 
P*"^ klero of ejidal poverty is still unresolved by this method of growth 
also limits usefulness for general policy.
But the government can encourage local participation to the greatest 
degree possible, among other groups, including ejidos. Some of the Tuxte­
pec ejidos showed that such initiative occurs in that system also where 
there is a substantial financial base and community solidarity.
There is potential to incorporate this model in the Papaloapan Basin- 
in the new rubber producing zones, centers of chile production, and in the 
Irrigation District.
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CHAPTER 8. ABASOLO AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN AGRICULTURE
In contrast to tli-e first two zones of this study, the colony Abasolo 
del Valle is still relatively isolated. Lying south of Isla, it is the 
largest colony in Playa Vicente municipio— 'with nearly 24,000 
hectares— and the outpost for the last great frontier that remains in the 
Papaloapan Basin.
Flying over Abasolo, one becomes aware of this aspect of the place. 
One has passed miles and miles of terrain with rolling hills covered by 
nothing but towering rain forest. Suddenly, a large open area appears 
with pastureland and some houses with their gardens. Scars of yellow dirt 
lead out from the opening, which are newly built roads.
The urban center is definitely rustic, but quite prosperous-looking 
for an isolated rural settlement in Mexico. Spacious houses are made of 
wood planks and palm thatch and there are a few more elegant homes of con­
crete block.
The center is dominated by a large grass plaza with a big meeting 
house, half-built secondary school, scattered office buildings and a 
statue to President Lopez Mateos, erected for his 1960 visit. The few 
government buildings are built in the modern style. The dirt roads of the 
village are very wide and are lined with almond and other trees, which 
g ive a great senseofspaciousness.
Dress in the colony is predominantly modern, although shoes are re­
served for occasions. The people here are very diverse mixture of Vera- 
cruzanos and Oaxacans, and a sprinkling from many other states.
Probably half of the colonists live around the urban center, and even 
many with plots far away keep a second house there. The farms themselves 
are fairly isolated from one another. To relieve their loneliness the 
women make special efforts to wash laundry at the stream, or prepare maize 
meal together.
There are large garden plots scattered wherever there are people, 
full of coffee and fruit trees. The acid soils— orthic acrisols— in this 
zone are low in fertility and subject to erosion because of the heavy 
rains and topography. But there is good natural pastureland. Most of the 
farm land is now used for grazing, but maize, rice, beans and sesame 
fields also dot the flatter parts of the landscape.
There are no major rivers in the area, but the high yearly 
rainfall— over an eight-month period— means that moisture is not usually 
so much of a problem here as in other zones.
There are signs everywhere of modernity approaching in agriculture.
As a colony, Abasolo is far ahead of almost all others in the Basin, par­
ticularly the directed colonization schemes, The photos on the following 
pages show what the area is like.
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The Nature of the Changes
What is extraordinary about Abasolo is the relatively high level of 
technology and incomes prevalent there. As few as ten years ago the 
colony was as stagnant and minimally productive as its neighbors in Playa 
Vicente. Today, Abasolo is a prosperous ranching community with an 
effective and progressive local government.
Abasolo1s experience is useful to look at because this sudden transi­
tion was accomplished in most part through direct government efforts aimed 
at primary sector producers. Abasolo has experienced a significant de­
crease in local underemployment and attracted hundreds of outside workers. 
There was a marked intensification and expansion of productive activity, 
and drastic improvements in rural living standards took place.
Population
Graph g-l shows thatAbasolo’spopulationgrowth was moderate until 
1970. The colony began in 1952 with 250 families, and a population of 
about 1250. By 1960, the influx of migrants was nearly completed, and 
population began to stabilize.
Subsequently, Abasolo was not a particularly important magnet for 
other migrants. Population growth over the 1960s was very slow about 
two percent per year. This suggests both that infant mortality rates re­
mained high and that there was some outmigration for lack of jobs. But 
between 1970 and 1976, the population grew 50 percent to 3000. In the 
whole municipio, only Playa Vicente town (with 7000) and Nuevo Ixcatlan 
(with 3700) are larger.
Communxcat ions
Maps 8-1 and 8-2 compare communication in the Abasolo area in 1950 
and 1970. In the early years of the colony, transportation was extremely 
difficult. Two roads were built by the colonists themselves in the 
1950s, but they were impassable in the rainy season. In the late 1960s, 
when the government assistance program began, the 18-mile (29 kilometer) 
trip to Isla required over two hours and was only made during a few months 
of the year.
But the PEMEX cut several rails during 1974, which improved internal 
transport. The Papaloapan Commission today is building a new all-weather 
road that even in its unfinished stage has sharply reduced traveling time 
andpermittedrainyseasontrucktransporttothecolony,
As a result, the Abasolo colonists, who were fairly travelled before, 
have become regular visitors to Isla and Cordoba and some other Basin 
towns. Several trucks travel daily to Isla and charge $30 (US $2.40) per 
person for the ride. In 1977, daily bus transport from Isla was begun.
The travelers— mainly women— leave chiefly for business reasons, to 
buy and sell, and contribute a sizeable portion of family income by taking 
orders from their neighbors for goods. While everyday items are carried 
in one large and a handful of small local stores, clothes are often bought
-170-
GRAPH 8-1. POPULATION CHANGES IN ABASOLO DEL VALLE, 1950-76*
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MAP 8-1. "ABASOLO DEL VALLE” ZONE, 1950
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MAP 8-2. "ABASOLO DEL VALLE" ZONE, 1976
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in Isla or Cordoba, and farm supplies and machinery parts in Isla or Cosa- 
maloapan. Banking and cattle registration take place in Playa Vicente.
The colonists are quite interested in staying in touch with life out­
side their immediate sphere. With completion of the new road, this inte­
gration should become complete.
Agriculture
The change in agricultural production has been the most impressive in 
Abasolo, Chart 8-1 shows the changes in amount of land used in the colony 
between 1950 and 1976. Up until the late 1960s the system was essentially 
one of shifting cultivation, with no more than 2500 head of cattle in the 
colony, important mostly for draught power (6_).
Only about a third of the colony— 7000 to 9000 hectares— was cleared, 
due to the financial and mechanical inability of the colonists to exploit 
fully what are really fairly large properties (J O . Technology, rate of 
land clearing and crop selection had remained pretty stable at a low level 
from the conception of the colony until the late T96’01s.
By 1976, 10,000 more hectares had been cleared, totalling about 80 
percent of the available land area. Host was planted to pasture and there 
are now about 10,000 head of cattle (6) *}J Chart 8-2 shows that while 
the composition of crops has changed little over this time the total land 
in crops has diminished.
One estimate is that of the 500 or so lots in the colony, 100 are now 
dedicated to agriculture, 250 to cattle and 150 to mixed cropping and 
livestock. Ten to 15 percent of the colonists own more than one lot, but 
four to five lots is the maximum?/ (9_).
Most ranchers have some cultivated pastures and all use tick control. 
No one is yet using artificial insemination techniques, but three ranchers 
in Abasolo have learned the technique in Isla training classes.
Economic Diversification
Probably the most important shifts in employment in Abasolo have come 
from the increase in number of landless agricultural workers, and consoli­
dation of landownings. Chart 8-3 shows the approximate shifts in land 
ownership patterns since 1968. Outside ownership has become much more 
important.
Outside of agricultural production and cattle breeding and fattening, 
there isverylittleeconomic activity.Buyingand selling of cattleon 
commission is a side occupation of about a dozen people. Major commercial
1/ The estimates range from 8000 to 14,000 animals.
2/ If one assumes that 15 percent have three lots, then there are 
about 60 colonists with multiple lots and 330 with single lots. This is a 
very rough estimate.
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CHART 8-1. CHANGES IN LAND USE IN ABASOLO DEL VALLE*
1 9 6 8  1 9 7 6
* Estimates from the Colonial government, BANRURAL officials and several 
Abasolo farmers, 1976.
CI-IART 8-2. . CHANGES IN THE. CROP COMPOSITION IN ABASOLO DEL VALLE*
6000 hectares 5000 hectares
* Estimates from the Colonial government, BANRURAL officials and several 
Abasolo farmers.
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CHART 8-3. CHANGES IN THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION
OF ABASOLO, 1970-76*
Agriculture and Livestock Sector 
Industrial Sector
|____I Commercial and Service Sector
— Officially, each parcel of 40 or 50 hectares has an owner. In 
t^^ S-lrty, many colonists control several plots in the name of relatives, etc. 
This figure is an estimate.
b /— To estimate the number of workers, we used 25 percent of the total 
population estimate given by the Comision para la Eradicacion del Paludismo.
c /Localpeopleestimatedthantherehasbeenan increaseoften 
workers in industry and commerce. Here we divided the ten equally be- ' 
tween the two sectors,
— ^This figure does not include the 700 to 800 day laborers estimated 
to be working in Abasolo who come periodically from neighboring colonies.
e/— The estimate of outside land ownership was given by authorities of
BANRURAL
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activity is controlled by a single man, one of the original settlers. He 
has a big store that provides most of the needs of the colony for what are 
judged to be fairly equitable prices, little higher than Isla's. He is an 
important middleman for agricultural products, although this role has 
become reduced in recent years.
There are perhaps twenty other stores in the urban center, only a 
handful of any importance. In 1976, there were about 22 people working in 
commerce, only four or five more than in 1970. There are three mixtamal 
mills, a handful of home-style restaurants and one canteen/billiards hall 
(9). About five masons work full-time on home construction.
Industrial activity is minimal. In 1955-56, three sawmills were 
erected, the proceeds from which the former Colonial President intended to 
help pay for the land. These closed in the early 1960s without having 
had much effect on the colonists, Barbasco collection used to be very im­
portant in Abasolo as supplemental income until 1974. Despite control 
laws, overexploitation wiped out most nearby supplies. PROQUIVEMEX has a 
small barbasco collecting plant in the entrance to the colony now (9).
Since there is little chance that any industry would choose the 
Abasolo locality over Isla, or even Playa Vicente, for a site in the near 
future, the colony is likely to remain agricultural for some time.
Living Standards
Life in Abasolo remains lacking in most of the modern conveniences 
and infrastructure, but what is there arrived only in the last few years. 
Chart 8-4 shows 1970 census information on various standards. The colony 
is served by a government-paid physician on duty as part of her social 
service graduation requirement. A potable water system was installed in 
1971, but broke down shortly afterwards due to lack of maintenance. Elec­
tricity was put in in 1973, so at that time a few refrigerators and sewing 
machines started to trickle in.
The first primary school in Abasolo had been built in the mid-1960s; 
a newer version was completed in 1972. In that year, a secondary school 
was initiated, but for political and financial reasons it was never 
completed. Only a portion of the colony's school-age children are 
enrolled. Children of the more prosperous families are often sent to Isla 
or Cordoba for secondary school, and even a few to primary school in Isla. 
There are maybe 10 "rich” citizens. The wealthiest is also considered the 
most hard-working and a great benefactor locally— paying fair agricultural 
prices and providing cheap goods in his store.
While all the children in the colony are said to be fluent in Span­
ish, a number of the older people who came from the Oaxaca area still 
speak Mixtec at home, and only enough Spanish to get by. Polygamy is 
common among both Oaxacan and Veracruz groups, as in most rural areas.
Evangelist missionaries— Jehovah's witnesses and Pentecosts— came to 
Abasolo at some time and succeeded in converting a majority of the colony. 
Among these are the present Colony President. The new religion seems to
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CHART 8-4. LIVING STANDARDS IN ABASOLO, 1970*
Percent of the population:
Literate 56.0
Of children 6-14 who
attend school 57.2
----- ^Trh—a—primary—school------------ -------------
education 6.6
Percent of population in dwellings with:
Non-earthen floor 7.4
Radio 54.9
Television
Potable water 26.0
Sewage 3.0
* Mexico, SIC , Noveno Censo de Poblacion, 1970 (published in 1972).
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be encouraging "forward— looking" and hard-working behavior .-[/ The 
rest of the colonists are Catholic, but nominally so. There is neither 
priest nor church in the colony. In general, the colonists speak proudly 
of the integrity of the local people.
The Sources of Abasolo1s Changes: Political Unification
Abasolo's advances of the past decade had two important sources: in­
ternal polifical unification which inspired strong community cooperation, 
and a credit/technical assistance program by the government bank which 
Provided capital, funds and guidance for production expansion.
To understand the political situation in Abasolo in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s requires first a look at the history of Abasolo's founding 
and development.
The Establishment of Abasolo
The original movement to colonize Abasolo came from a group of Oaxa­
cans near San Juan Mixtepec who were looking for land. In 1950, 70 
families formed the La Luz Congregation, headed by Domxtilo Lopez and 
Felipe Rojas and migrated first to Francisco I. Madero near Cordoba, 
Veracruz. Their search parties came upon Abasolo del Valle, where only a 
few scattered groups from parts of Veracruz and from the Temascal area 
were settling. They solicited government approval and made arrangements 
to purchase 11,700 hectares at relatively low rates from the owner, Sr. 
Espino Barros Luis. The Congregation officially organized as a colony 
under the regulations of the Direccion de Colonizacion Federal (3j 5),
The original colonists invited groups from other parts of Mexico to 
join, including San Luis Potosi, Sinaloa, Zacatecas, and, in particular, 
Oaxaca. Since that time there has been considerable heterogeneity in the 
colony, although Oaxacans comprise the majority.
In 1952, about 250 settlers and their families (a population of about 
1250) arrived in Abasolo, where each colonist was granted fifty hectares 
of land. When friends of the original Oaxaca settlers began to ^oin them 
in Abasolo, the colony officials solicited in 1954 for another extension 
of land. An additional plot was granted and Abasolo reached its present 
size of 519 lots J*] In 1960, President Adolfo Lopez Mateos came 
personally to the colony to give out the last few lots (4).
3 /— ' I encountered this situation in all my interviews with campe- 
sinos. They attribute the attitude in great part to their religion.
—  Officially there are 236 separate lots of 50 hectares and 271 
lots of 40 hectares.
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Problems of the 1960s. All through this time, the sense of_community 
remained strong under founder Lopez, who kept the office of President 
continuously.
In the late 1950s, the President worked out a plan to finish payment 
to the previous owners of the land and provide legal titles to all the  ^
colonists. Although he collected money from all for the purpose,  in 1961,  
the owners came back to Abasolo insisting they had never been paid U,
.9).
Friction developed, as those settlers from Veracruz state about 
15 percent of the colony's population— demanded an explanation from the 
President. Not satisfied with his answers, this group, called the 
Agrarian Department, asked for his removal. However, the Oaxacans had the
majority and voted to keep him in office.
In 1962, then, the Veracruz group of 81, which included many "gente 
de razon" separated politically— unofficially— and chose their own repre 
sentatives. They went directly to the owners to pay a second time. By
....i^^9.r .^h.e.y--were---ai4-_0-f4l^4-a4-l-y--t-i^l^d^--and^nc^^^li^ibJ_e_.fpr__.cxedit jand
other official support (3_; 9_) •
Unification in the 1970s
As the titles started coming in, other colonists were attracted to 
the group until a majority was reached in the general Colonial Assemb y. 
The SRA then named a Commission to change the Administrative Councll an 
in 1972, the new President was chosen. The office is for two years, an 
he was reelected in 1974.
For the first two years, the new government was concerned chiefly 
with unification. There are now friendly, if cautious, relations between 
the former groups and many Oaxacans are included in the government.
During 1975/76 several improvements were financed by the colony: a park, 
colony meeting house, three offices of the municipal agency and a jail.
The Council is now looking into other matters. Highest priority in 
the monthly Colonial Assembly is legislation designating an official 
"urban zone" which will permit taxation for potable water, a secondary 
school and a sewerage system. The Veracruzan colonists have spearheaded 
most development efforts and are still the leading participants m  
Abasolo1s growth.
The colony remains fairly autonomous. Abasolo has little to do with 
Playa Vicente other than its sporadic payment of taxes and some cooper 
at ion for municipal road improvements.2/
5/ Abasolo has never had to pay any urban property taxes. There 
is no treasurer in the colony, but Playa Vicente won’t register cattle if 
taxes haven't been paid. For this reason, registration was formerly done 
in Isla which was both more convenient and cheaper. Since 1972, the 
Playa government has prohibited this and made an arrangement with Isla so 
taxes are now paid more consistently (4).
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Wit h land divided into plots the size of small private properties, 
and the built-in cooperative system of self-government in colonies 
progressive activities at both levels are facilitated. Abasolo's 
organization is now better than on most ejidos, according to the Playa 
Vicente Municipal President, while each individual retains a great deal of 
independence and flexibility.
Sources of Abasolo's Changes: The Public Credit Project
In coordination with this new-found political activism, the special 
credit program designed by the public banks for Abasolo found a warm wel­
come.
Before the middle of the 1960*5, almost no one in Abasolo worked with 
outside credit. At that time the Veracruz and San Andres Tuxtla govern­
ment banks began to finance cattle expansion, and the Banco Agropecuario 
in Loma Bonita and Isla financed crop production for a few colonists.
The Plan Benito Juarez
The first project worked under the SAG's national Plan Benito 
Juarez "Infrastructure works for territorial benefits"— which was origin­
ally designed for northern Mexico. Its purpose was to build penetration 
roads and small dams on the many lakes in Abasolo to provide watering 
holes for cattle the lack of which had prevented many lots from being 
converted to grazing. The ponds were to be used also for fish breeding. 
Work was begun on cattleguards for the main roads to Abasolo. The plan 
was active 1970-1972.
Because very little had been accomplished, the program was stopped. 
The major positive influence of the program was its important stimulus to 
labor demand in the area for construction jobs.
The Coordinated Development Project
Around 1965, some credit in Abasolo for cattle came from as far as 
Villahermosa. Very few colonists were involved.
The comprehensive credit program was begun in 1968/69 by the BRAPSA 
(Banco Regional Agricola del Papaloapan, S.A.) in Isla and was transferred 
to the BANRURAL in 1974 after the bank unification. Chart 8-5 shows the 
amount of credit disbursed from 1968 to 1977.
At first credit was only given for titled land. Later, a coordinated 
development approach was devised specifically for Abasolo by the Bank to 
regularize land tenancy, clear jungle and initiate medium-scale commercial 
ranching. At the time of the political unification of Abasolo, 70 percent
6 /_  Because of problems with land concentration, which is becoming 
evident also in Abasolo, the Mexican government stopped colonizing lands 
under this system in 1965.
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CHART 8-5. THE CREDIT PROGRAM OF THE OFFICIAL BANK IN ABASOLO* 
1969 6 credit societies organized
1970 11 credit societies organized
1971 14 credit societies organized
1972 19 credit societies organized
1973/74 33 credit societies^/ in operation:
58 agricultural holdings in five societies
1975
1976
1977
152 ran c h e s i n 2 8 societies
THE OFFICIAL BANK LEFT ABASOLO IN AUGUST 
ALMOST NO CREDIT WAS DISTRIBUTED
Total credit distributed between 1973 and 1976:
M$6,570,435
. . ; b/.32 credit societies in operation, receiving” .
$5,602,049 long-term credit
898,915 short-term credit
6,500,955 total credit in 1977
— ^During 1973 and 1974, 14 new societies were organized, while 
many of the old ones had either disappeared, or reorganized•
— ^In 1977, the Bank estimated there would be a total value of 
production in these societies of $9,136,550; their combined property 
value was estimated at $10,038,000.
* Mexico, Banco de Credito Rural, Playa Vicente branch, July 1977.
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of the colonists still did not have title to their land and did not have 
high enough incomes to manage the land payments. Many plots were being 
abandoned because of this. Most farmers were working with only a small 
portion of their lots (6).
Cattle production was stressed because of the ecological suitability 
of the zone and improving markets for milk and meat. The natural pasture 
was already fairly good for cattle production, and rain and soil water 
absorption is high, which keeps pastures at high quality levels for most 
of the year. The native grasses support one animal per hectare, but Bank 
officials claim wishfully that up to five head per hectare may eventually 
be supported. The soil is not particularly apt for crop production and 
the topography offers only limited expansion for mechanization.
In 1968-1972, only production credit was provided. The program began 
to operate in full force in 1973. The land regularization scheme was the 
only one of its kind in Playa Vicente. The Bank worked with SAG to get 
the topographic studies needed for border determination; these were then 
legalized by the SRA. A special program was designed for untitled farmers 
to receive credit, who otherwise would have been ineligible. About half 
of this group participated. By 1976, only 35 percent of the colonists 
remained without titles (6_), some of whom were still waiting for Domitilo 
Lopez to make arrangements for them separately.
The massive land clearing was primarily done on land without title, 
and there was no charge to the colonists. Flat land (about 5000 hectares) 
was cleared by machinery; the hilly land by hand. The intention was to 
use the higher-cost machine-cleared land for intensive agriculture, since 
the bulk of it had no available watering holes, and save the parts with 
water for livestock. The costs per hectare of the clearing was $1500-2500 
in 1974, $3,000 in 1975, and $5000 in 1976. Eighty percent of the col­
ony's land is now cleared, nearly all the flat land (6).
Agricultural Credit
Most of the titled farmers received credit as "small private property 
owners of scarce resources" under the FIRA Designation. They are orga­
nized into societies.
The first agricultural credit was disbursed in 1973 by BRAPSA. Most 
has been for maize and rice, on land recently cleared. The Bank also 
sponsored 200 hectares of mechanized sorghum production with one society. 
The CONASUPO office in Juanita bought some of the grain in 1975, but as 
their pice for maize was little better than the local one (because of 
quality discounts) the organization did not attract many sellers.
CONASUPO's entrance into the bean market, however, has been very success­
ful because of competitive pricing. Rice is now sold to the Tuxtepec rice 
mill, which picks up the grain in Abasolo, or to Cordoba,
Credit covers 80 percent of the costs of cultivation. Interest is 
charged according to the experience and capacity of the farmer--from 6.5 
to 12 percent annually. Fertilizers, insecticides and seed are provided 
by the Bank and discounted. Full use of the credit designated for
ulture has not been possible due to a shortage of machinery (6),
-183-
Almost all fanners are soliciting credit to buy their own tractor or 
to share one with their credit group. There are only five or six tractors 
now in the colony; about 100 fanners must rent, mostly from the BANRURAL 
machinery center in Tierra Blanca. Bank officials say they do not expect 
major agricultural profits until 1978, when the machinery component of the
investment is fully integrated.
Although Abasolo farmers have been enthusiastic about using the new 
inputs, they have not been impressed by the extensionists of technical 
advice of the bank agronomists, due to some major failures where the 
advice was followed Jj
Considerable interest was expressed in Abasolo in increasing commer­
cial production of sugar cane, peanuts, sweet potatoes and cassava, if 
credit for these crops could be arranged. When the new road is finished, 
Abasolo will be within the 60 kilometer distance limit of the Isla packing 
plant, and some farmers hope to produce pineapple then.
Ranching Credit
The quality and productivity of the Abasolo soils has been declining 
for at least ten years, which is a major incentive for both fertilizer use 
and the transition to ranching. One very good farmer noted declines be­
tween 1965 and 1970 from 3800 to 2400 kilograms of maize. The climate 
also makes row crop farming difficult.
Thus the bulk of the credit has gone to livestock. There are about 
15 societies, mostly for farmers who had no prior experience in ranching. 
In 1975, about 1300 head of cattle were given to the colony. By 1976, the 
colony herd probably numbered over 10,000, The bank estimated a 60 per­
cent annual increase in animals, with half the calves returned to the Bank 
(6). The goals were not completely reached due to a shortage of young 
animals. Demand from government cattle programs throughout the region was
greater than supply.
There is a grace period of two to three years on repayment. Then for 
several years, the ranchers pay only the low interest rates. In the fifth 
year, they pay interest plus capital; after that the level of payments in 
creases until the loan is paid off (6). The only major complaint made by 
the ranchers was that cattle were sometimes valued higher than what the 
ranchers expected or thought proper.
Most of the impetus has been for rearing young stock, but many fat­
tening operations sprung up after 1974. Milk production became important
7/ 1000 hectares were planted the first year with a new maize 
variety which failed completely due to bad seed and late sowing. In 1974 
300 hectares were sown with rice which never grew. The mandatory insur­
ance that accompanies all credit paid 70 percent of the total loss, but 
the colonists were left with the rest (£).
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in 1975, although yields are still pretty low— 2.5 liters daily per cow. 
While in 1970 there were seven to ten associates from Abasolo in the Playa 
Vicente Municipal Livestock Association, in 1976 there were about 20 (£) £/ .
Improved pastures were introduced with the credit program— Pangola in 
about 1971, African stargrass in 1974, Jaragua and Privilegio have been 
in the area a long time.!/ As elsewhere, Zebu-Brown Swiss crosses are 
the preferred and common breeds, with a smattering of Irish and others. 
Artificial insemination is not yet part of the program. Most of the 
ranchers with larger herds go to Isla each year for the Fair and some have 
bought bulls there. The Bank distributes mostly registered cattle. Some 
wealthier colonists have even gone to the United States to buy good 
cattle. ■
Veterinarians from Isla, Playa Vicente and Cosamaloapan are consulted 
for health care, with the various credit societies hiring a single vet to 
review their cattle at least twice a year.
Present Status of the Program
^At the peak of activity, there were 32 credit societies with about 
350 individuals in all, or more than two thirds of the landowners. So 
far, the investment in farmers without definite land guarantees has been 
$35 million, for those with legal rights, $65 million ( 6^.
In 1975, the program was suspended. With consolidation of the banks 
under a new law there was a question as to whether this type of program 
was permitted. For about a year and a half the program stagnated, until 
mid 1977. _____ The bank branch in Abasolo closed and the office was 
moved to Playa Vicente.
I^t appears certain that the program will be continued, however. $65
million is planned for the nonregularized groups in Abasolo for 1977, and
8 /— ' Several ranchers, however, said that if one sold more than ten 
animals yearly it paid to join for the tax privileges.
U  Another source said that Stargrass and Privilegio were
established many years ago and that Jaragua and Guinea were recently introduced.
—  The bank had programmed some $30 million in credit for 1976, of 
which only $12;million came through, mostly for ranching infrastructure 
and some purchase of cattle. As of summer 1976, only three of the cattle 
societies were actually working. The BANRURAL delivered only 4000 of the
10,000 head of cattle planned for. Only three agricultural societies 
remained— comprising about 23 farms. This latter was also due to the 
dec 1ining interest in agriculture noted in the colony since the successful 
advent of livestock husbandry (6).
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another 10,000 head of cattle will be brought in, besides the 6000 pro 
grammed for 1976, but not received. The bank plans to use more premature 
crop varieties to reduce losses from the rains, and to further experiment 
with sorghum, soy, sesame and safflower 05_).
Meanwhile, other banks have become interested in Abasolo. A dozen or 
so ranchers get credit from BANAMEX, and late in 1976, overtures were made 
in the colony by the Financiers Nacional. But the BANRURAL program is 
well thought of by most colonists, and they are impatient for that funding 
to be renewed.
Improved Marketing
I Meanwhile, the Papaloapan Commission PLANPA program is finishing the 
new road. Great outside interest has been sparked in the colony since it 
was begun. Due to a number of rather ridiculous delays in construction of 
the new road, it will not be finished until 1979, despite an original 
estimate of early 1976.11/ Once it is completed, the average driving 
time to Isla, the nearest town, will decline drastically:
Dry Season Rainy Season 
(in number of hours)
Old road 2 Impassable
New resurfaced road (half complete) 1 1/2 2-3
New road (completed) 1/2-3/4 1/2-3/4
The cost for fertilizer transport from Playa Vicente to Abasolo was 
$.20 per kilo in 1976. Once the roaci is completed, this is expected to 
drop to $.04 - .05 per kilo. Transport costs in general should decline by 
half, according to the head of the credit program.
The change in product prices are shown in Graph 8-2. The change due 
to transportation is most evident in milk marketing, A few colonists 
worked with the Nestle plant in Acayucan in the early 1970s. Now dozens 
are selling milk outside the colony. Some ranchers sold to the San Andres 
cheese factory in early 1976, but the enterprise failed in M a r c h M o s t  
others have sold to the Nestle collecting plant in Mata Limones since the 
1975/76 season. In the dry season they also ship to Tierra Blanca.
For basic grains and products, the number of middlemen has increased. 
Many truckers are willing to come in now. The Bank has assisted in mar­
keting of maize, beans and rice. Chile is still being sold to compradores
11/ A road is planned under the World Bank project to connect 
Los Tigres with Abasolo and Isla. But the two roads were begun simultan­
eously, the Los Tigres one from the isolated end, such that when funds 
were cut off for the projects, there were two half-finished, useless 
stretches which together would have made up one complete, less costly 
road. Apparently, this was a bureaucratic problem at the Mexico 
City-World Bank level.
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GRAPH 8-2. RELATIVE CHANGES IN AGRICULTURAL PRICES IN 
. ABASOLO DEL VALLE**/
Maiz&k/ -----Beans
----- Beef .....  Chile
a/— The prices marked are weighted averages of survey responses,
h /—  In 1975, the price of maize varied considerably: $1.50-1.60 per 
kilo from the leading middleman in the colony, 1.90 official and 1.70 
actually received from C0NASUP0; $2.00 purchased in the local store. *
* Data from survey carried out in 1976 by the author.
-187-
who come to Abasolo in their own tracks, but improved accessibility has 
increased competition, and the price more than doubled between 1973 and 
1 1976. Sesame is almost always sold to the factory FARO in Cordoba for
vegetable oil, through an Abasolo merchant and dealers in Xsla.
Employment Patterns in Abasolo
Certainly in the short run the new programs have had a very positive 
effect on employment and incomes, Chart 8-6 gives the detail of 
employment patterns on Abasolo Case Study Farms.
Land Clearing
About 10,000 hectares of land were cleared and put into permanent 
production in Abasolo during the 1970s. Assuming that most of this was 
planted to pasture, supporting one man-equivalent for approximately 20 
hectares, the clearing should have brought about 500 new jobs. Some 60 
tractor-drivers have been involved in clearing operations and are living 
in Abasolo for at least a five-year period.
Half the clearing was done by machine, which provided no temporary 
local jobs, but local workers were paid for the hand clearing work, fence 
building and other infrastructure work, such that particularly during 1973 
and 1974 there was a very high demand for manual labor.
Changes in Intensification and Seasonal Distribution of Labor
Meanwhile, the intensification of agricultural production and the 
change in ranching methods required more work. Chart 8—7 presents the 
seasonal labor distribution in Abasolo. Because of an extra long rainy 
season, there is more cropping in general and a higher demand for labor in 
all but three or four months of the year. Also, the longer rainy season 
means that the period of high milk production is extended as well.
Now that most of the land preparation work for crops is by machine, 
the major labor input is for cultivation and harvest. This has greatly 
facilitated double cropping of large acreages. Where mechanization plus 
chemical inputs increased yields, harvest labor requirements increased.
One full-time farmer in the survey had two to three workers full-time 
before mechanization and afterwards had two full-time and four to five 
part-time May to September and January/February. In addition, two 
full-time machinery operators worked for the six lots in his credit soci 
ety.
The transition of ranching to use of cultivated pastures and more 
emphasis on milk production doubled labor requirements per hectare on the 
old pasturelands.
Type of Holding
There is little correlation of employment with size of holding, crop­
ping pattern or type of livestock production. However, the mos_t
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labor-intensive farms were the full-time cropping units, and all the 
high employment, high—income holdings have some commercial crop 
production.
Agriculture definitely employs more people per hectare than does cat­
tle production in Abasolo. Labor required for herd expansion and land 
clearing on ranches largely offset this problem. Also, the full-time 
nature of ranching employment is more stable. One of the best farm 
managers m  the Colony used to hire 10 to 12 workers for. short periods 
when he work in agriculture; now, with a herd of 230, he hires six 
full-time workers, and is planning to hire two more workers as his herd 
increases.
But the long-term implications of having chosen to encourage ranching 
over agriculture may not be as positive. Expansion in two agricultural 
units led to labor requirements increasing by a third and quadrupling 
respectively, while two cattle ranches in stable production both had 
registered slight declines, of over a fourth. One farmer expressed 
concern that crop prices will have to increase to encourage intensifica­
tion production, if employment in the primary sector is to increase.
Labor Patterns by Class
Other effects of the new changes in production in Abasolo have been 
shifts in labor requirements and ownership patterns among the different 
classes.
Most resident landowners work on their own lots and have some recip­
rocal help agreement with their neighbors. Most are full-time workers and 
those that are, have the highest employment ratios, indicating greater in­
terest in intensification. The colonist group is very diverse, with some 
aggressive and highly interested in profits, and others mostly seeking se- 
curityJLr/
Very few of the colonists have much off-farm income other than truck­
ing for those without vehicles, or the buying and selling of cattle. Most 
of them aspire to having their children work with them on the farm, 
although some of the wealthier colonists are more "ambitious" for their 
offspring, educating them outside and encouraging them to work in a 
relative’s business, as a secretary, in government construct ion jobs.
Those who travel often outside Abasolo do a brisk business in goods and 
soft drinks.
The most prosperous colonist seemed markedly different from 
the rest. He had originally come from Coahuila in the north, but had 
been living ten years in Playa Vicente. He was an avid reader and had a 
large assortment of technical books on agronomy and animal husbandry. He 
had experimented with several products on his own, and was very interested 
that the government provided an agronomist to start major experimental 
program in Abasolo.
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One possible threat to the relatively favorable employment situation 
in Abasolo is the sharp increase in the number of outside landowners that 
has accompanied the construction of the road and the Bank s interest.
There has always been a relatively important amount of land owned by 
people living outside Abasolo. Perhaps an eighth of the lots were so 
owned back in 1965; now between a fifth and a third do (6_, 9_). Most of 
the outsiders come from Veracruz, a few from Michoacan and Oaxaca. The 
head of the BANRURAL credit program estimated that by 1978, their share 
would increase to 50 percent. They, however, will not be eligible for the 
low interest credit program and will have to use regular credit.
According to the laws of the colony, land can be bought and sold 
freely, unlike ejidal land, only requiring permission of the Colonial 
Assembly.JL3_/ Officially, one person can own only one lot. With local 
and absentee owners investing their new profits primarily into land, land 
prices have soared in recent years. Land costs per hectare have changed 
as shown below: (3)
This is definitely 
Abasolo, many of 
saving money as wage
1950s
... I960.
early 1960s 
late 1960s 
early 1970s 
1976
placing land out 
tradit ionally 
laborers.
M$ 39
......... 60.....
100
200-250
300-350
2500-3000
3500
5000-6000
of reach of the 
replaced older
medium quality 
high quality 
improved quality
workers of 
retiring, bywhom
landless
colonists
About half the men in the colony now work as jornaleros (9). Over 
half the total labor requiremet is for part-time work, which means that 
there is a pretty low level of work security. Wages, about $10-12 per day 
plus food in 1960, by 1968/70 had risen to about $34-35 daily plus part of 
the product, and by 1976 to $50—60 as money wages. The Bank paid $35 per 
day in 1974, and $60-70 in 1976. Hundreds of workers from neighboring ar­
eas do seasonal work now in Abasolo, returning to their homes when no work 
is available. With population statistics, we can estimate that close to 
190 workers and their families have permanently moved to Abasolo .±ZJ
Many colonists insisted there was no excess labor problem in Abasolo. 
However, some workers (one estimate was 50), especially young ones, do go
13/ in addition, the entering colonist in 1976 paid $1000 for a 
lot to the Colonial authorities and the former colonist paid $500.
14/ If EAP rose at a rate of 3.0 per cent per year (which is a 
high estimate, considering population in the 1960's grew at only 2 percent 
yearly), then an additional 83 workers would be added to the labor force. 
Statistically, however, about 270 new workers were added.
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to Sinaloa and Baja California for the two to three slow months of the 
year. Even children can reputedly earn up to $80 to $100 daily there.
Most return, but a handful stay away permanently each year. When the 
older people leave Abasolo, they go primarily to the cities, not elsewhere 
in the country, for "retirement."
However, if the credit expansion program continues as planned, for a 
total of fifteen years, the present strong demand for labor should 
continue. Once land is in stable production, requirements for permanent 
work may slack off, causing problems unless alternative employment is 
found, or cattle production can be more highly intensified.
Summary: Rural Prosperity and Change
The Abasolo experience is instructive as a prototype of successful 
rainforest development, particularly in comparison with other directed and 
spontaneous colonization projects. It shows that cattle credit for small 
properties is definitely feasible, and gives an idea of where the line can 
be drawn, between government and local responsibility for improvements in 
colonizing areas. It particularly shows that programs of intensification 
financed by credit can provide high levels of employment.
Transfer of Resources
The Abasolo program was designed to provide initially a net transfer 
of resources to a group of poor farmers, letting them organize much of the 
subsequent production decision-making. The net transfer was about $30 
million in terms of land clearing, plus the subsidy involved in low inter­
est capital loans for machinery, agricultural inputs and cattle.
Credit recuperation has been good, and the original transfer in land 
looks like it will be paid for rather quickly in increased production, 
from the national perspective. It does seem unlikely that the program 
would have been successful had the colonists initially been personally re­
sponsible for the costs of clearing.
Now, however, because of the marked increase in local incomes, most 
of the social infrastructure desired by the community is being paid for by 
them. In this case, a direct transfer of resources to the productive sec­
tor was much more efficient than an alternative transfer of the same fi­
nancial resources to a supporting infrastructure.
Success in Cattle Enterprises
The first advantage in having chosen to encourage cattle production 
in Abasolo was that it is ecologically suitable, and that the opening of 
the new road facilitates marketing of the more valuable products such as 
milk and meat. Cattle was a low-risk, high-return investment as compared 
to crops, especially since some local expertise in small-scale livestock 
production was already in the colony. While the Bank supervised clearing 
and pasture seeding, the subsequent technical advice on livestock manage­
ment was fairly easy to provide with Isla vets and local cooperation.
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There is still considerable r o o m  for intensification, as average herd 
size now is only about half the probable carrying capacity of.the^land xn 
cultivated pastures. There is certainly the potential for fattening 
operations to be more labor-intensive here than rearing, while more 
remunerative. Great care must be taken to ensure this development. The 
said experience of cattle expansion in the Chontalpa tropics does not 
suggest this will happen spontaneously.
Program Flexibility and Politics
The biggest advantage of the entire program was that it was highly 
flexible, took place over a reasonably long period of time, and was tai­
lored specifically to Abasolo. Important local nuances of power and 
resources could thus be exploited.
Another factor illustrated by Abasolo's experience is that the only 
constraints on development are not economic. Political stability, 
coherence and support are necessary to the success of any credit program 
that focuses on a group.
The Problems
The real ramifications of the present trend in land tenure patterns 
for the efficiency of government investment "for low income farmers" 
remain to be seen. If the new, richer absentee landlords continue to hire 
local labor at reasonable salaries and at high productivity, the only loss 
will be the transfer of profits from a low to a higher-income strata. If 
the emigrants are moving out to stable, productive jobs, the exchange is 
even less important. But Mexico's past experiences give reason to worry 
that absentee ownership will instead lead to capital, rather than labor 
intensification.
Until information is obtained on the nature of this interchange, 
authorities should probably try to tecbnify the local farmers, rather than 
attract outsiders who are already knowledgeable. The object should be to 
modernize farmers as well as farms. The programs have been successful in 
this sense so far, and there should be no need for the bureaucrats to want 
to artificially inflate results by attracting outsiders of another class.
There is the corollary danger of rapid land concentration as well.
Two or three plots together is a healthy holding, but there could be no 
compelling reason for a long time for further concentration, considering 
the productivity gains still to be obtained on the single plots.
There were also problems with the technical advice tbat was given on 
crops. The localfarmers here were willing toexperiment,and already had 
substantial experience in the zone, certainly more than the consultant 
agronomists. Some of the farmers did express interest in haying a local 
experimental station— which should be quite feasible to provide through 
PLANPA or some other program.
The real test of the program will come once the land area now opened 
has been incorporated to full production. By then, the local experience
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should be quite enough and experimentation on a permanent basis be estab­
lished such that continuing improvements both with and without credit in­
centives and provisions should be possible, if the program continues to 
allow local flexibility.
Application of the Abasolo Model
Certain aspects of the Abasolo model are certainly transferable to 
most newly opened areas. Its applicability is limited mainly by 
ecological considerations. Not all rain forest land can be cleared 
without productivity declines. Then again, overgrazing has ruined many 
appropriate sites elsewhere.
For zones in which there are no untapped land resources, alternatives 
such as cattle, machinery or trucks would probably do as well for direct 
transfer of resources, particularly through subsidies, but also through 
low-interest loans. This is more complicated primarily because some 
judgment must be made as to the real benefits of such resources in the 
area, their effects on labor, on product prices, and such.
The program of credit should transfer fairly well to e^idos, where 
individual parcels are twenty hectares or larger or in small credit soci­
eties. Indeed, a very similar program ^ / is now being carried out all 
over Flaya Vicente municipio in both colonies and ejidos. Those particu- 
larly well organized politically would be most successful. The site-spe­
cificity which marked the management of Abasolo's program is probably the 
most vital factor.
11/ BANRURAL credit in Playa Vicente was increased six times from 
1975 to 1976, and will increase two and a half times more by 1977. Most 
i s earmarked for cat11e investment. About half of the ej idos and colonies 
are now working with credit. In 1977, the Bank plans to clear 20,000 hec­
tares free of charge for ejidatarios. In the Basin, only Acayucan munici­
pio has any programs with colonies like those in Abasolo.
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CHAPTER 9. IXTLAN AND THE TUXTEPEC PAPER HILL
Tti6 Greater District of Ixtlan, Oaxaca is the predominant political 
area of the Sierra de Juarez in the Upper Papaloapan Basin. The area is 
extremely mountainous, with peaks up to 4000 meters, such that the climate 
is temperate, rather than tropical, with frosts in the winter.
The numerous small communities that form the loose District associa­
tion have been extremely isolated during most of their history, due to 
these topographic barriers. Over the centuries, very solid-looking 
permanent towns of adobe were built, adorned with flowers. They nestle 
picturesquely amid the huge peaks and pine forests, hiding for a time the 
extreme poverty in which their inhabitants often live. The photos show a 
few of these towns and their surroundings. Ixtlan, the cabacera of the 
District is by far the most prosperous.
Some of the soils in the concave parts of the mountains and in the 
valleys are fairly rich, and these are used by the Serranos for permanent 
agriculture. Most of the soils, however, are Lithosol—Rendzinas, fairly 
infertile and very susceptible to erosion. The slash-and-burn agriculture 
that is practiced extensively on these lands and the overgrazing of small 
livestock have created enormous erosion problems. This appears extraordi­
nary to the^outside visitor; it is rather like seeing the Rockies stripped 
bare of their foliage in some places.
Rainfall in most of the region is less than 1000 millimeters annu­
ally, only increasing toward the northeast. Because water resources are 
so deficient, there have been primitive irrigation systems in these 
mountains for centuries. Map 9-1 shows Ixtlan rainfall patterns.
has been an important activity for decades, and mining began 
with the Spaniards. The people of lx11an, like those in most of the 
Oaxacan Highlands, have a distinctive, indigenous life style. There is 
extraordinary cultural diversity even here, where most are from the 
Zapotec culture, and are more acculturated than other Oaxacan Indians.
The Nature of the Changes
While Ixtlan remains poor relative to the other zones studied here, 
there has been a remarkable turn-around during the 1970s in the long-term 
District trends of wholesale emigration and declining living standards. 
The local infrastructure has been strengthened and so many new jobs have 
been generated that some who had emigrated before are coming back.
Average incomes in several of the communities have risen sharply.
Populat ion
Graph 9-1 shows the population changes in Ixtlan since 1930. The 
rate of growth has always been slow, less than two percent yearly, until 
1960. Then, there was net outmigrat ion and population ac tually declined.
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MAP 9-1. "IXTLAN" ZONE: MUNICIFIOS AND RAINFALL
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GRAPH 9-1. CHANGES IN POPULATION IN IXTLAN, 1930-70 *
* Mexico, SIC, Quinto, Sexto, Septlmo, Octavo y Noveno Censo de 
Poblacion for 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970.
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Sines many still return to their communities for tine Census and are 
registered as "comuneros" in the books, this is probably an overest­
imation, }J Of the four communities interviewed extensively, three 
reported having at least half nonresident population, and one about 
two-thirds. Those who stayed reportedly did so for their great love of 
the land, and a lack of financial resources or skills that would permit 
them to find outside jobs.
In 1972 the turnabout began. Two of the communities reported that 
ten to twenty men and their families had returned from the cities. 
Different statistics show the population of the town of Ixtlan increasing 
between six and 20 percent in the past few years (13).
Communicat ions
Map 9-2 shows communications in Ixtlan in 1950 there were no all 
weather routes at all. In 1960, the road to Oaxaca was built, and it was 
paved in 1969. The road to Tuxtepec was built in 1958 and paved in 1976. 
Wot until then could a real effort be made to build branch roads. During
the 1970s many were constructed at a.cost.of.about.$250,000 per kilometer,
about twice as much as for the average all-weather road in the lowlands.
By 1976, ten of the 35 communities in Ixtlan had good roads (15), as shown 
on Map 9-3.
Agriculture
Land has been taken out of agricultural production continuously since 
the 1950's. Chart 9-1 shows that the decline was by nearly half. In the 
Ixtlan community, some 2000 hectares were sown in 1955, 1500 in 1965, only 
1300 in 1976. Yields have been declining and the loss of the wheat market 
of the early 1960s hurt commercial production greatly.
Chart 9-2 shows changing crop composition. As the comuneros turned 
towards more subsistence agriculture, maize production increased. Peas 
replaced beans as the most important pulse. Even coffee, a commercial 
crop around the Yolox area, declined in importance.
The 1970s brought no reversal in these trends. Indeed, the govern­
ment programs tried consciously to reduce the importance of agriculture 
and there was about a five percent decline in land cultivated (18). With 
the advent of stricter forest control, slash-and-burn agriculture is at a 
minimum, and erosion has slowed down somewhat. There have been some 
terracing and other, conservation methods introduced, and small-scale 
programs in diversified livestock production were begun with bees, 
rabbits, poultry and fish. Sprinkler irrigation systems were introduced, 
along withsome moreadvanced technology. There is some technical 
assistance provided in most of the communities connected by roads (Spe­
cific sites are shown on Map 9-4).
j_/ Their sense of community remains so strong that in the larger 
cities, there are neighborhoods made up strictly of folks from a single 
community— "New Jaltianguisin Mexico City, for example.
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MAP 9-2. "IXTLAN" ZONE: COMMUNICATIONS AND INDUSTRY, 1950
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MAP 9-3. "IXTLAN" ZONE: COMMUNICATIONS AND INDUSTRY, 1976
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^ p  9_4. "XXTLAN" ZONE: AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS, 1976
-203-
Before the mid-1960s, almost no chemical inputs were ever used. Now 
there are some members of all the communities interviewed Who used fert­
ilizers, primarily those on humid or irrigated land. In Jaltianguis, per­
haps 15 percent had used fertilizers since the mid-1960s. The rest began 
in the past two or three years. Almost no one used pesticides. All 
varieties of maize are criollo.
Cattle were at one time important, particularly in Jaltianguis. With 
the hoof-and-mouth disease, herds were decimated, and today comuneros have 
only two to six head apiece, if any. Very primitive technology is used.
Economic Diversification
The most important changes in Ixtlan were in nonagricultural employ­
ment. In 1950, there was some important industrial activity. The centur­
ies—old mining in Natividad (for gold, silver, lead and copper) was more 
active then, employing nearly 1000 men. Two sawmills had opened in Ixtlan 
in 1949 and two more in 1953, by private companies. In 1953, 200 men 
worked in the forest year-round, a n d a b o u t 1 8 0 inthefactories,allfrom 
the community of Ixtlan. At this time, many people began to abandon agri­
culture to work in the forest (13). The mills operated until 1957, when 
the Tuxtepec Paper Hill came to the Sierra and, by Presidential Decree, 
they had to leave.
In 1962 the Paper Mill began to employ loggers, but on a much smaller 
scale. About 1500 workers bad about four-weeks work each in logging. In 
1970, only 11 of the 20 communities in the Tuxtepec concession were 
producing (17). The Maderas de Oaxaca S.A. Mill to the southeast and the 
Unidad Silvicola de las Magdalena to the northeast also logged in the 
Sierra, but from these as well as the Tuxtepec Mill, there was almost 
total leakage of forestry Income outside Ixtlan. The former is no longer 
in operation.
The 1970's brought a renewal of industrialization. Chart 9-3 lists 
the new enterprises that have come in. The first eight are all fairly 
small-scale, but in sum employ nearly 500 workers in four different muni- 
cipios.
But by far the most important impact has been made by the step-up in 
production of Tuxtepec Paper Mill, which began around 1972. In that year, 
about 1950 comuneros were employed in the woods in the Sierra de Juarez; 
in 1975 that number had doubled to 3497. The number of communities in­
volved rose from 10 to 65 (17). While in the older communities, the total 
work per comunero remained at four weeks, in the new communities, work av­
eraged 8 to 10 weeks. Map 9-5 illustrates these changes.
Mining is. still important, employing about 700 men. In Natividad, 
almost all men work in the mines; in.Capuialpan, Xiacui and Trinidad, 50 
percent of workers; in Yatuni and Yavesia five to 10 percent. Chico- 
quichil still aims most of its economic activity to supplying the mining 
communities with food and other commodities (17).
The communities of San Juan del Estado, San Miguel Aloapan, Zoqui- 
apan, Ixtlan, Teococuilco and Ixtepeji continue to sell firewood, coal and 
flowers to nearby Oaxaca. Capuialpan sells encino logs to the mine for 
construction work (1).
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CHART 9-3. NEW INDUSTRY IN IXTLAN
LOCALITY BUSINESS TYPE OF PRODUCTION DATE OPENED EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPED
BY
13 Communities 
in the Sierra 
de Juarez
Lumbering for 
Fabricas de Papal 
Tuxtepec, S.A,
Pulplogs and sawiogs Expansion
1972-1976
1972-1956 
1975-3497 
(average £ ive 
weeks per year 
per worker)
Fabricas de Papel 
Tuxtepec, S.A.
Ixtlan (also 
owned by 
Xlacui, La 
Trinidad, 
Capulalpan
IXCACIT Coopera­
tive sawmill
1200 m3 ouwn wood so i d 
to communities and 
Oaxaca City
1973 48 workers 
4 administra­
tors
Fabricas de Papel 
Tuxtepec, S.A.
Ixtlan Wooden tool 
handle factory
Wooden tool handles 1976 20-factory 
workers 
250-loggers 
12-others
Financiers de 
Oaxaca, S.A.
Ixtlan Cooperative 
carpentry shop
Wooden furniture 1976 15 to 20 
carpenters
Financiers de 
Oaxaca, S.A.
Ixtlan Shop factory Shoes for sale locally 
and in Oaxaca City
197 6 5 workers Financiers de 
Oaxaca, S.A.
Capulalpan Clothing factory Sold locally 1976 12 workers 
(pr ima rlly 
women)
COPRODEO
Capulalpan Furniture
factory
Furniture made from 
scrap wood of IXCACIT 
sawmill
1977 25 workers 
(plan to em­
ploy 50 Ln sec­
ond stage)
Papaloapon 
Commission 
and Fabricas de 
Papel Tuxtepec, 
S.A,
Jaltianguia Clothing factory Uniforms and folkloric 
C lu t. li lag
1974 20 workers 
(primarily 
women)
COPRODEO
l.a Cumbre "La Comerza" 
(privuLu nawmi.1 1)
2000 boardfeet daily 1974 10-loggers 
.1 5-Tao tnry (22 
during peak 
per iods)
Private
interests
San Miguel 
del kio
Clothing
factory
19 77 6 workers Private
interests
Cueiatao Factory for 
fruit crates
Crains made troni strap 
wood of 1XCACiT
1976 6 workers Private
Interests
* Data from: Fabricas do lhpol Tuxtopuc, S.A. oi l. ices in Oaxaca, Oaxaca; Sr. tjvaldo Jiraeae2 , former
manager of the Financiera de Oaxaca, S.A., and factory managers interviewed in 197b.
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MAP 9-5. "IXTLAN" ZONE: LOGGING COMMUNITIES, 1976
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Because more money is available to spend, commerce has picked up. 
Particularly notable is the increase in meat consumption in the commuities 
which participate most in logging,^./, Ixtlan and Capulalpan both 
provided work for new entrants in the tertiary sectors. Only a few of the 
stores are new; growth is mostly represented by larger volume sales.
Chart 9-4 shows the changes in EAP over this time period. While in­
dustrial employment had declined from 1950 to 1970, it nearly doubled in 
the next six years. Chart 9-5 shows the characteristics of the Case Study 
Communities in Ixtlan. Economic diversification is found in only certain 
communities, and there are important differences between them. Chart 9-6 
describes their economies in greater detail.
Living Standards
The Sierra was always one of the poorest areas in Mexico. But, 
except for Huautla, which has considerable tourism, it is the most pros­
perous area in the Highlands. In 1950, six percent of the people spoke 
only Zapotec; the other 60 percent were bilingual, but the "Spanish" of 
most was only used for trade or government purposes. A quarter always 
went barefoot (10).
Two thirds of them lived in the tiny municipal seats, which ranged in 
size from 400 to 1750 inhabitants. A third of the population had a drink­
ing water system. President Cardenas put in electricity. In 1950 there 
were only 47 schools in the whole District, six of which were in Ixtlan, 
and only about half the population was literate (18).
By 1970, about 80 percent of the adult population was literate and 85 
percent of school-age children attended school. The only education past 
primary schools available was a trade school sponsored by the National In- 
digenist Institute (INI). Many more had access to drinking water systems.: 
Between 1960 and 1970, the real value of personal income increased by 16 
percent, income from the primary sector by only eight percent (23).
The changes from 1970 to 1976 were most notable. In 1976, most of 
the logging communities had a health center. All had electricity and Ix­
tlan had sewage. Several new schools were built, including three secon­
dary schools. The Tuxtepec Forest Technology Institute is also open to 
young people from Ixtlan. Chart 9-7 gives some indicators of living 
standard changes.
The interviews in Ixtlan and Capulalpan noted significant improve­
ments in personal incomes for the municipio. In Jaltianguis, incomes were 
reported not to have changed, but financial stability improved. Only 
Ixtepeji, which had a very small share in logging, complained of a
U  Elsewhere, there are real malnutrition problems. One of the 
communities, which is still better off than the average, said the availa­
bility of high quality foods had declined in the past ten years.
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CHART 10-4. CHANGES IN THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION IN IXTLAN'
Service sector
* Mexico, SIC, Censo de Poblacion 1950, 1970 (published in 1952 and 1972); 
for 1976 data, author's estimates used.
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CHART 9-5. CHARACTERISTICS OF SIX COMMUNITIES IN IXTLAN
COMMUNITY SIZt
(hect
POPULATION
.)
~  FC0N0MY LITERACY m o n o­
lin­
gual
BILIN­
GUAL
HEALTH
CLINICS
ELEC­
TRI­
CITY
POTABLf
WATER
: hi 
roads
USE OF 
FERTI-
IT7PB«
OThl'.li
Jacaltianguis 1214 1400 Fruits 
Logging 
Clothing 
and note­
book fac­
tories
770/837 909 902 YES YES
(1940
YES
1963/64
Began
const
1969
152
r.10 yrs
! Some pest L- 
cides-10 yrs.
IxtepeJ i
.1500. Firewood
Agricul­
ture
Logging
(little)
Flowers
1343/
1553
574 560 YES
(Social 
Secur Lt 
Insti­
tute
YES
1
YES
(but pQ 
service
1973
or
)
Few NO
Ixtlan
Town 2100 
Munieipio 
4000-5000
Firewood 
Logging 
Factories 
Commerce 
AgrIcul- 
turn
2401/
3481
3256 2528 YES
(12-15
years)
YES
ISOQs
YES 1950
to
Guela-
tao
1960-
Tuxte-
pec -
Oaxaca
1970 -
Last 
2 yrs.
Few irriga­
tion
Capulalpan
2800 1500 Agricul­
ture
Mining
Clothing
factory
727/
835
131 All NO YES YES 1950 Began
in
1975
Few;irriga­
tion
MacuJ ] 1 1 augu a -
1000 Agricul­
ture
Mining
870/1010 1216 1206 YES YES YES 1960-
65
PEW FEW
Trinidad
..
+1200 12 10 NO
Dispen­
sary of 
Pap.Comm
|
YES YES i960 FEW j:■ EW
--— -L------ —---- _
a/ Data from the. Fabric: a de Pape 1. Tux tepee A., Oaxaca, Oaxaca, 1976. (abbreviated here FPTSAi.
A/ This refers to roads passable throughout the year.
Data from a Survey carried out in L97b, by the author. Information 
froiti the SIC, Nqyfcno Censo de Poblacidn. 1970, published in 1972. about literacy and language are
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CHART 9-7. CHANGES IN LIVING STANDARDS IN IXTLAN*
1950 1960 1970
Percent of the population that:
is literate 57 65 ,;V 79 k/
attends school (ages 6-14) ? 80has potable water 34 ? 59has sewage ? 1.4 1 /
Gross regional product ? $ 112 m
Personal income $ 33* 6 m 49.5 m
i (16.5 real
Personal income in the
primary sector 2 1 .6 m 29.6 m
(8% real increase^)
a/ 
b /
Of the population 6 years or older
—  Of the population 10 years or older 
— ^Of homes ,
— ^Of individuals in 1973 <
— ^Using inflation indices of the Papaloapan Commission in which* 
1974 = 100; 1970 = 151; 1960 * 191.
* Mexico, SIC, Septimo,_Octavo. y .Noveno Censo de Pohlacio-n (published
1953, 1962, 1972).
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continuing downward trend in personal incomes. Overall, the semi-urban 
towns such as Ixtlan, Capulalpan, Xiacui, Natividad and Guelatao are 
slightly better off than the other villages, which have similar standards 
among themselves.
Sources of Changes: Personalism in Politics
Change came about in Ixtlan almost entirely through the interest of 
certain powerful people. Their interrelations with the Serranos are some­
what unique and opened the bridge for federal money to make really 
effective contributions.
The Early History of Ixtlan
To understand the constraints that have been operative on the devel­
opment of Ixtlan, requires first a look at its history. The mountains 
have been inhabited for thousands of years. The land is communally held 
under an organization that became standard hundreds of years agoJL/
The people belong to the Zapotec culture.
The Spaniards had an effect on the region mostly through intensifying 
the local mining operations. For many years this was a source of wealth 
for the foreigners, but few settled there and Indian resistance was very 
strong against outsiders.
The Serranos have a tradition of hard work and independence which en­
abled them to survive in a very difficult■ecological niche. Furthermore, 
their attachment to their homes is reknown through the whole country.
There is another strong tradition of the communities— which have few 
everyday ties— that of working together in a crisis.
The famous President Benito Juarez was a poor Indian boy who came 
from Guelatao, and is their most cherished figure.
During the Porfiriato, the Serranos were little affected by the land 
takeovers elsewhere, but were very supportive.of the Revolution. The 
Serranos invaded the city of Oaxaca and wrestled power from the corrupt 
state governor, occupying the city for some time. They eventually 
returned to their homes, but the Oaxacans haven't forgotten, and remain 
aware of the potential threat from the mountains (18).
After the Revolution, Cardenas made some improvements in their living 
conditions, but minor. The Sierra remained isolated, with little interest 
in the outside, and little outside interest in them.
3j Capulalpan, for example, was founded in 1400 (_3 ).
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Economic Changes After the War
In the 1930's, according to the old men of the towns, yields were 
quite good in agriculture, and a variety of crops were produced and bar­
tered, In 1944 the cyclones which produced the Papaloapan floods brought 
a deluge to the mountain and destroyed parts of several towns. The commu­
nities got together to clear roads and repair bridges, with little outside 
aid.
The Serranos insist that the flood marked a dramatic change of weath­
er, after which there was a severe lack of water for a number of years. 
Just as the^weather began to "right itself," the hoof-and-mouth disease 
hit and finished off most of the cattle, hurting agriculture as well be­
cause of the scarcity of oxen teams. At this time, people began to aban­
don agriculture to do logging work. The community of Ixtlan received some 
$7 million from the factories in cutting rights and other charges (13). 
The respite was brief. When the factories closed, there was a marked" 
economic decline in the area.
"Bracerismo" began, and many from the Sierra went to look for work. 
When they returned to Mexico from the U.S., many just stayed in the Cen­
tral Plateau. With their help, others in the villages found work outside. 
Despite accelerating emigration, the sense of community remained strong in 
both residents and emigrants.
Their Present Political Outlook
Today, there is a Union Fraternal de Ayuntamientos (Municipal Broth­
erhood) for intercommunity cooperation that meets infrequently when a com­
mon cause arises The Sierra has a strong sense of cohesion and 
independence from the rest of the country.
Under normal circumstances, they want to be left alone. There are 
many squabbles between communities, particularly over land and water 
issues, and there is a minimum of intermarriage,
Most of what the municipios had in terms of physical infrastructure 
as of 1970 they had built themselves. Ixtlan put in their own drinking 
water system, as well as irrigation in the 1960s. Most of the passable 
roads that were in existence at the start of the decade (except logging 
roads) had been built by hand labor by the comuneros. The high literacy
— / The most recent example was in 1975 when they went to Mexico 
City to protest the takeover of an electricity generator by the CFE. This 
had been a present to the Sierra from Cardenas, and they insisted on and 
won, the right to control it (18).
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rate is a result of school attendence being universally mandatory.
Parents whose children do not attend are put in jail.5/
They have little faith in the national government. Until recently, 
there were very few government programs to assist the Sierra, except for 
INI. One interviewee sighed, "Of all the Presidents, only Cardenas kept 
the promises he made to the Sierra. We no longer believe in Presidents to 
help us,only in God." Also because they live so close to subsistence 
level, they are unwilling to take risks that might threaten that subsis­
tence, least of all for an outsider they don't trust.
The Personal Link in the 1970s Program
Because of these attitudes, which for the most part have been adop­
ted by for the comuneros, government programs were difficult to organize 
and implement, even when the will was there. An overwhelming part of the 
credit for Ixtlan changes goes to the personal influence of a trio of 
dedicated powerful men who had an intimate knowledge of the Sierra, and 
held the confidence and respect of its inhabitants.
The aim of these three was clear: to get as much money as possible
flowing into the Sierra, and staying in the hands of the Serranos them­
selves. The first was Ing. Jorge L. Tamayo, the mastermind of the 
forestry program. Tamayo was a Oaxacan by birth and had been active all 
his life in affairs of the State. A hydraulic engineer by training and a 
geographer of national standing, he had a working relationship with the 
Papaloapan Commission for many years, and had become an expert on forestry 
besides.
Tamayo was called in the early 1970s to make a planning study for 
the Tuxtepec Paper Mill and soon after was named its Director. At about 
the same time, he was named Vocal Ejecutivo of the Papaloapan Commission. 
He held both roles actively through 1977. He was very interested in 
technified, efficient industrial production, and large-scale development 
projects, and was a canny businessman. He saw the forest as the resource 
of most potential for Oaxaca and wanted to put the area into production as 
quickly as possible.
Tamayo was an avowed Socialist, and he pushed for industrial 
production mainly to provide benefits to the workers involved. In the 
name of the Paper Mill, and with the profits his management produced, he 
built most of the new infrastructure in Ixtlan. As Director of the 
Commission, he supported extension and credit programs. His personal 
relations with the Sierra were excellent, and his approval validated most 
programs in the communi t ies1 eyes .
U  There are two reasons behind this: they feel that they have
no opportunity to better themselves or go to the outside world without 
education; and a certain level of attendance is necessary for the Ministry 
of Education to maintain a teacher in such isolated towns (22).
-214-
Ing. Victor Bravo Ahuja was from Tuxtepec. When Governor of Oaxaca, 
he marked an era of progress for the state, as described in Chapter 6. He 
was the first governor to have some success in attracting industry to 
Oaxaca. Most of the investments not related to Tamayo's empire, such as 
COPRODEO (The Committee for Production in Oaxaca) and Federal government 
programs such as CAPFCE, CFE, INDECO, etc., were drawn to the Sierra 
through his influence.
The third of the trio was Sr. Uvaldo Jimenez, a native of Ixtlan. 
Jimenez was, until he retired, Manager of the Nacional Financiera de 
Oaxaca, S.A., probably the most important financial institution in the 
State. Even after his retirement, he had a lot of influence on bank 
investments.
With a strong personal interest in the welfare of the Serranos, Jime­
nez got a whole series of projects approved for credit with the Finan­
ciera. Among these were the tool handle factory, the furniture shops, 
fruit box factory, shoe factory— particularly for the long-term loans for 
machinery. He also arranged commercial credit for several of the shops in 
Ixtlan. He was in charge of the renovation of the beautiful old church of 
Ixtlan, as both a source of local pride and as a tourist attraction.
They were all activists, concerned about the Sierra, and together 
succeeded in attracting a huge amount of capital to the area. Through 
their understanding of and respect for the comuneros, they were able to 
help draw the Sierra more fully into the national systems, and get their 
cooperation.
Sources of Change: Projects to Stimulate Employment
The various projects that were devised to assist Ixtlan— the Forest 
Complex activities and the Commission's agricultural programs— were based 
on utilizing intensively valuable resources, and providing more local jobs 
to reverse the trend to urban migration.
History of the Forest Complex
Before the Fabricas de Papel Tuxtepec, S.A. opened in 1954, most wood 
logged in the Sierra was being sent to paper mills in the southeastern 
United States. The first important industry in the State of Oaxaca, it 
was located in Tuxtepec, along the railroad line built in the 1930s for 
bananas. The foreign-owned firm was located there because of the good 
water supply from the rivers, energy from the Temascal Dam, and the possi­
bility of future use of cane bagasse and tropical woods. Construction of 
the plant began in 1956. In that year, a Presidential Decree approved the 
forest concession of over 261,000 hectares of pines from the Sierras de
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J u a re z  and M ia h u a t la n - Ju q u i la ,  and P laya  Vicen te  t r o p i c a l  woods.!/
Before 1972, only Juarez had been logged (4_).
The original plan was to use only 100 persons in a mechanized_logging 
operation. There were strong petitions from the Sierra against this plan, 
however, and the comuneros won rights to do the cutting. This m v o  ve 
about 1,000 persons. The price of wood for the factory rose drastically
as a result.
Nevertheless, the Mill began producing newsprint in 1958. In 1959, 
they began production of paper for sale to the National Commission of Free 
Textbooks. In 1962, the plant hit capacity production--30,000 tons per 
year, and decided to put in improvements to raise capacity to
45,000 JJ (4).
But besides the high price of wood, there were other problems: old
logs destined for initial cutting were too large, often hollow, had too^ 
much lignin and needed excessive whiteners. Thus, the plant was operating
continuously at a l o s s ,  and in 1965, its owners sold all stock to the
Mexican government for $185 million — ' •
The government put in a number of minor changes and capacity was in­
creased to 55,000 tons by 1971. Since 1969, the entire staff has been 
Mexican.
The main problems of wood supply and inefficiency were not solved, 
however, which was reflected in the fact that from 1963 to 1972 the plant 
ran at a loss. From 1968 to 1972, newsprint production operated at 
three-quarters capacity, and textbook paper at one-fifth capacity. 
Newsprint quality still did not meet international standards.
Bad labor relations with the Sierra meant an irregular supply of 
wood, and the cost of extraction was high. Road building was pretty 
ficient, with the real cost more than double the competitive cost,_
inef-
6/ The breakdown for the concession is as follows C4):
1956 estimates(in hectares) 
Juarez 139,225 (79,608 forested)
Miahuatlan-Juquila 82,600 (34,395 forested)
Playa Vicente 30,000 (12,000 forested)
...........    251,825......126,003.........
1972 estimates 
65,246
103,204 (39,958) 
Not in use now
7/ Newsprint is bought by PIPSA, the Productora e Importadora de 
Papel, S.A.
8/ xhe Nacional Financiera, S.A. owned a part already,
9_/ The cost of wood placed at the factory was (O-
49% extraction 
12% roads
9% taxes 
30% trucking
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average U b o r ^ u T l )?' maintenance> poor work-  efficiency and above
logging techniques were very primitive, with power equipment rarely 
used except for  u p h i l l  skidding of  lo g s .  Crosscut saws were used to f e l l  
trees and buck them. The pulp logs were then rolled down to a track
trucksS^ed ^  hand’ Spllt’ 3nd stacked by the road for handloading onto
, Slnce_ the contracts had to be made yearly, and there were frequent
forlo'd th% l0gf ra ° 2 en St°PPed WOrk‘ In 1972> the factory had to stop 
f o r  40 days for  lac k  of  wood. Only 11 o f  the 20 communities in the I x t la n
concession were under contract at all. ian
col conditions for Maderas de Oaxaca, S.A. and Unidad Silvi-
38 onnehcaf \ Were rdly betcer- The former had a concession of38,000 hectares, but extracted only 10,000 cubic meters of wood each
Solution of the Paper Mill Supply Probl em
Before Tamayo was asked to take over the Paper Mill in 1972 he had
:hT u Y er S °f SCUdieS °" the M i U 'S probleras' ® d formulated a plan which he began to put into effect once he became Director.
Factory  E f f i c i e n c y .  In 1973, the S e c r e t a r i a  de Hacienda y Credito 
Publico gave the m i l l  a loan o f  $40 m i l l i o n  to be repaid in two years to 
carry out expansion plans. The main change was that the old stone grind­
ers were replaced by r e f i n e r s  which could be fed wood c h ip s ,  r a th e r  than 
whoie lo g s .  Because a l l  parts  of  the t ree  can be c h i p p e d - n o t  j u s t  the 
trunk--the Potential cost of cellulose should decline markedly, and the
^oeodmechipsC U 6 r te imPr°Ve- ^  1978> thS PlSnt W U 1  be U8ing
The new_addition included a wood chipper ,  a pneumatic chipping sys­
tem, pressurized filter, press drainer and other minor parts. An elec­
tronic control system was installed to coordinate production, such that 
, 7 “7 “ sedcapacity- 70,000 tons per year (200 tons per day)-could be
and led by adding only six new employees In September 1975 the
mlll--now relatively modern and efficient— normalized the new operation 
and in December began to operate at full capacity.
, . . i few problems still remain. Imported cellulose for chemical paste 
(which i s  20 to 25 percent of  t o t a l  c e l l u l o s e )  continues to in cre as e  in
cost. To keep the cost of mechanical paste down, they are using up to
net8 yet Available 3(_1^ ) ^  to utiIize a higher amount is
pf l c e . of  paper r e s i n s  subs id iz ed .  The pr ice  received  is  the in­
t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i c e ,  plus t ran sp ort  to Veracruz, plus ten p ercent .  Federal  
taxes  are lower than for  im porters .  There ere no municipal t a x e s ,  but the
factory gives a 'cooperation" of $7,000 per month to Tuxtepec, in addition
to an extremely high (property) tax of $1 million paid yearly to the State 
and Federal governments ( 1 6 ) .  y  s t a t e
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Because the Mill is paying much higher prices to the Sierra for their 
wood supply, it still operates in the red, but the entire complex of Mill, 
logging and diversified industries has a net profit.
Supply Stability
In 1971, changes were made in the 1960 Forestry Law, whose net effect 
was to provide for a more equi table distribution of income from forest 
output in favor of the landholders (5_) .A2/ Under the Forest Law, all 
concessions must also pay a contribution for reforestation to INIF 
(National Institute for Forestry Research) and to the Forestry Commission 
of the State. Of all federal taxes collected, 15 percent were returned to 
the State and 5 percent to the municipio of origin.
The role of ejidos and communities was adjusted to fit in with the 
new Agrarian Reform Law. Tamayo had been instrumental in getting the law 
passed, and used it to justify his change in policy in the Sierra.
The immediate objective was to use al1 the land in the temperate zone 
concessions and to convince neighboring communities to incorporate to the 
Mill, to stabilize the supply of pulpwood.
The first incentive was an increase in pay. In 1972, cutting rights 
were $22 cubic meter for pulp logs cut to 1.25 meters; by 1975, the^fee 
had increased to $32.62 per cubic meter (17) . Thirty percent of this 
money is paid directly to the community; the other 70 percent goes into a 
fund set up by FONAFE. Some of the communities have accumulated over $1 
million in their official funds, and have started to put the money to work 
in new infrastructure projects. The size of the annual contract is 
prescribed by the Mill foresters, for selective' cutting, to ensure 
continuous production and protection from erosions. Ixtlan has the 
highest quota— 16,000 cubic meters (17).
A "Public Relations with Communities" department was set up as part 
of the Mill Offices. The representatives, often accompanied by Ing.
Tamayo, travelled to all the towns to give the new policy line of coopera­
tion with the communities. They tried to convince them that the mill 
wasn't out for huge profits, just efficient operation.
They introduced motorsaws and winches in Atepee, Macuiltianguis and 
Comaltepec, providing $8000 to $9000 of credit (18). With a motorsaw, one 
man can cut 15 cubic meters per day versus two cubic meters per day for 
two workers with a hand saw. In response to community complaints, rain- 
gear and huts for protection during the rainy season were provided at a 
cost of $585,000. The wood quota contracts had not previously corresponded 
with the calendar year, which was a problem;so in 1 9 7 5 the loggerspetitioned
10/ When the law passed, the estimate was that the income of 
villagers from forestry exploitation in general was only about 7 percent 
of the price paid by the industries; and only .2 percent of this was 
rediscounted to the municipios.
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for and received the change for 1975. To give the comuneros confidence in 
the financial transactions, their own representatives are to witness all 
sale of wood to the mill (5).
Now, work per man averages about four weeks, and there have been in­
creases in price per cubic meter and production per worker. This gives an 
income supplement of about $3600 per worker for the 1547 new workers. For 
the original 1950, this meant an income increase of $2400 from the $1200 
paid in 1968.
As a result of these programs, total wood extraction in the Sierra 
increased by 50 percent, A similar approach in the Sierra of 
Miahuatlan-Juquila resulted in a tenfold increase there. Six outside 
communities were incorporated in 1974. Graph 9—2 shows the change in wood 
production after 1972. All is selective cutting, causing minimal erosion 
problems. While there have been restrictions of agricultural clearing for 
10 years, there has been especially strict control the last three years.
Industrial Diversification. The Forest Complex was set up to permit 
more intensive use of the forest resources. Now, probably 40 percent of 
all logs are going for sawlogs and plywood, which pay higher cutting 
rights ($66.80 per cubic meter and $72 per cubic meter respectively)
The concession area has a potential of nearly 500,000 cubic meters, 
while the Paper Mill needs only 150,000 cubic meters yearly. The Forest 
Complex was organized to utilize this extra wood. Silvicola de Magdalena 
was acquired in 1973. Etla, S.A. and Maderas del Isthmo, private sawmills 
about eight years old, were bought by the Mill in 1974. The first 
produced 80,000 cubic meters per year of specialized wood products; the 
other, in Cempoaltepee, had a capacity of 35,000 cubic meters yearly of 
tropical wood for industrial use (furniture, boards) and also had a wood 
chipper. The Compania Industrial Ayotla on the Tierra Blanca-Aleman 
highly produces cellulose based on bagasse of sugar cane (5),
Two new sawmills were organized: IXCACIT in Ixtlan and one in
Papalos. Both are communally run. The comuneros paid 40 percent of the 
original investment ($1.2 million in IXCACIT, $1.1 million in Papalos). 
FONAFE paid 9 percent and the Paper Mill 51 percent. The latter two are 
obliged to sell their stock to the community within five years (13).
The idea for this was born in 1973, during a conversation between Ix­
tlan community leaders and Ing. Tamayo, and was set up as an experiment.
The cooperative includes Ixtlan, Xiacui, Capulalpan and La Trinidad; each 
had a representative in the Administrative Council, of which Tamayo was 
President, The Paper Mill sold them the logs produced by the four commu­
nities. About 20,000 cubic meters are used, half of which come from 
Ixtlan. An additional 4000 to 5000 cubic meters are brought from 
surrounding communities (13).
In its first year, IXCACIT made very low profits, because they were 
selling the worst quality wood in the holdings, while a nonlocal person 
with ^ poor community relations was managing it. In 1975, under local lead­
ership, they did turn a substantial profit. The Papalos Mill had losses 
its first year, small profits the second (13).
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The Mill also helped support a few new forest-related enterprises in 
Ixtlan— a cooperative carpentry shop and a small wooden tool handles 
factory. These were financed through the Financiera Nacional, S.A. with 
the help of Sr. Jimenez (14).
Community trucking was encouraged by the Paper Mill. Trucking unions 
were started in Ixtlan and Mitla and provided with credit for the purchase 
of vehicles. The Ixtlan union had 200 members. There were at least 120 
trucks with minimum two workers per truck. There are strong restrictions 
now against non~communal trucking companies (18).
Finally, the Mill sponsored a vast reforestation project in the Mixe 
region of the Basin, in La Sabana, under the Fideicomiso para Desarrollo 
del Plan de Estructuracion de Bosques Art ificiales,
Planting began in 1974, of 10,000 hectares— 75 million trees of pinus 
canbea and oocarpa—  to be finished in 1980. By 1984, the Mill hopes~to—  
use this wood (only 100 kilometers away) as their primary cellulose 
source, cutting raw material costs in half (5). 11/
All the wood coming from Juarez will be directed from pulp use to 
higher-value processed items. The points and branches, now being left in 
the forest, are to go for pulp or particleboard, or a similar product. By 
1977, the Mill will hopefully obtain enough wood to expand the factory to
100,000 tons and maybe begin to produce imprint paper.
s.oc^a  ^Benefits. Apart from productive investments, the Paper Mill 
has invested quite a lot in social infrastructure for the communities, 
both to show their good faith and for development purposes. Their biggest 
investment was in a permanent road to replace the temporary logging routes 
which served the communities. They also helped to build schools, 
auditoriums and health centers, and helped the communities build stone 
roads to beautify the towns. Ing. Tamayo started an experiment, ordering 
some 200 latrines for the comuneros of Ixtlan to install in the homes 
CU). Nearly all the concession communities now have drinking water 
electricity and telephones. 9
While some of this construction was shoddy and some projects were 
imposed on communities, these investments certainly mark a positive change 
in the material well-being of the comuneros.
Agricultural Programs and Other Government Aid
The Papaloapan Commission had a lesser influence on development in 
the Sierra. But in the sense that the projects were experimental, there
—  20 million cubic meters are expected to be produced from the
area.^ About 1500 persons, mostly native Mixe, are now employed in the 
planting and care of the plantation, and are earning wages up to M$100 
daily. To minimize disruptive social effects, the work is spread parttime 
among all interested workers, rather than full-time for a selected few
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The Commission had tried to get funding in the late 1960s from the 
national government and in the early 1970s from the World Bank, for 
special projects in the Upper Basin. These were all rejected- Never­
theless, the small-scale plans of the late 1960s were carried out. Since 
1973, their funding has been reduced.
Technical Assistance
were some optimistic results. Map 9-4 (p.202)shows the location of these
proj ec ts .
The sprinkler irrigation systems built in Ixtlan, Capulalpan, 
Guelatao, Xiacui and Yahuiche in the last 12 years were received with a; 
lot of enthusiasm. This was due to the marked improvement in the security
of harvests.
In the 1975/76 cycle, 246 farmers were irrigating. For 1977, 1362 
hectares have been planted, out of 2146 "promoted." The main crops irri­
gated were maize, a 1i111e garbanzo, peas and wheat, produced primarily 
for subsistence.
PLANPA tried to do some work with fertilizers and new varieties in 
1976, but results cannot yet be measured. A new BANRURAL opened in Ixtlan 
that year.
Their other activities include pisciculture, apiculture, rabbit 
raising, soil conservation and livestock extension. Fish ponds of various 
sizes are now found in about 15 communities in a program that began in 
1974. The fish Tilapia nilotica is used for food and fed maize, purina 
feed or manure. The ponds are ^Ised to irrigate vegetable gardens as well. 
Yields up to half a ton of fish in two years have been taken from very 
tiny ponds. They hope to stock rainbow trout in the rivers as the next 
stage of the program (19).
Apiculture programs are just beginning in Analco, Yehuiche, Capulapan 
and Lachatao. There are rabbit raising operations in Capulalpan,
Comaltepee and Ixtlan. A goat program in Capulalpan failed. Poultry work 
has gone on mostly with private initiative, and only occasional help from 
the tecnicos. The economic effect of these programs has been^minimal , 
particularly since they hardly got off the ground before funding ran out. 
In general, the impetus of the technicians is needed to encourage 
cooperat ion among the local people.
A small program of soil conservation is going on in La Trinidad, An­
alco and a few other communities. The chief crops in the terraces are 
wheat and fruittrees. Yalalagisplanting maguey (a succulent that 
provides pulque, an alcoholic beverage popular in many parts of the 
country.) In the livestock field, the PLANPA workers acquired breeding 
bulls for several communities and are doing research for genetic 
improvement in goats.
Other Government Investments. Other government agencies invested in 
the Sierra during Echeverria's administration. Chief among these was INI, 
did a lot of work planting fruit trees, educating, introducing
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fertilizer and managing CONASUPO supplies. There are about 50 promotores 
in the Sierra. Although they had a positive impact here, their influence 
declined due to declining national interest.
CAPFCE, CFE, SEP and SOP also work in their respective fields. The 
source of support for this funding appears to be Ing. Bravo Ahuja's influ­
ence in the Federal government. These were part of the development plans 
applied in Oaxaca, including Tuxtepec and Oaxaca cities.
The State of Oaxaca has several programs of its own. COPRODEO (The 
Committee for Production in Oaxaca) was responsible for the small rural 
industry projects in Jaltianguis. This group began working In the 1960s 
promoting artisan industry. INDECO (Instituto de Estudio de Construccion) 
is a federal program helping to build and adapt municipal buildings, 
schools, etc.
Changing Labor Patterns in Ixtlan
Certainly the biggest change in Ixtlan during the 1970s was labor 
patterns. These mostly affected the logging communities, but have impli­
cations for expansion outside the concession area.
In Logging Communities
The communities with extensive logging activities provide the most 
employment possibilities, and the highest incomes. Most of the cotnuneros 
continue to work one or two hectares of agricultural land for subsistence 
production, but money for outside expenditures and higher quality food 
comes from the logging payments. In some cases, workers have ceased agri­
cultural cultivation altogether. Over a third of the EAP in the district 
now earns supplemental income. In Ixtlan community, 80 percent of all 
income is said to originate in forest industries. It is estimated 
that these groups work about 200 days per year. Graph 9-3 shows total 
salary increases.
At least ten percent of the resident labor force must seek seasonal 
work outside the communities. They go most often to Tuxtepec and Oaxaca, 
but also to Mexico City and the north. Chart 9-8 shows the seasonal dis­
tribution of labor in the Sierra. Most logging work takes place during 
the off-season in agriculture, the dry season. More and more, some rainy 
season logging takes place. The biggest change in the past five years is 
that ^ work is far more regular. The extent of the employment effect of 
logging depends entirely on the resource base, the forest. The pay rate 
tripled in current terms, and increased 50 percent in real terms. In 
1977, an increase in the amount of wood to be cut in the communities is to 
begin in coordination with forestry studies to maintain reproduction 
rates.
Other Communities
For those communities with little wood, the main advantage of the 
Paper Mill program is through community infrastructure benefits. Their 
only sources of income are in agriculture or mining. Obviously, because
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GRAPH 9-3. SALARIES PAID BY THE EABRICA DE PAPEL TUXTEPEC, S.A. 
IN THE SIERRA DE JUAREZ, 1963-75*
* Mexico, Fabricas de Papel Tuxtepec, S.A., "Informe Financiera de 1968- 
1972n and "Informe Financiera 1973-1975."
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of poor agricultural resources, the ability of the land to support a 
growing populat ion i s almost ni1. In these areas, emigration has cont in 
ued in full force, and those who remain depend heavily on outside 
earnings, either their own or money sent by relatives.
Hihing is still a powerful source of income for the Sierra, although 
wages are much lower than for logging work, and it is more dangerous.^ The 
work is year-round, so that in these communities, outside work in minimal. 
About six percent of the EAP is directly involved, apart from the commu­
nities whose livelihood depends on trade with the miners.
The Effects of Small-Scale Industry
The effect on the individual communities which have had some small- 
scale industrial investment has been very positive. In Ixtlan, for 
example, 100 new jobs were generated from this sector, out of a total^EAP 
of about 1600. In Jaltianguis, 60 out of an EAP of about 350 worked in 
them. In Capulalpan, in 1977, there will be 37 out of an EAP of about 
3 1 0 . The jobs are year-round andprovide fairly high incomes.
Over the whole Sierra, however, the effect has been minimal. There 
are perhaps 225 factory workers out of a total EAP of nearly 12,000, or 
less than 2 percent. Another 2 percent are employed in forestry for the 
woodworking operations.
The Effect of Agricultural Intensification
The net effect on employment seems to have been minimal for the new 
programs in agriculture. Worker productivity and incomes increased.
Small livestock production was primarily for supplemental income.
Summary: Economic Diversification for the Highlands
The activities in Ixtlan present examples of many different ways to 
diversify the economy of highly populated, mountainous regions. Whereas 
planning in most places seems to be directed to actively driving the High 
landers out of their homes to more productive employment in the lowlands, 
in Ixtlan the reverse occurred.
The Future of Agriculture
Obviously, continuation of the traditional system of slash-and-burn 
agriculture under high population pressure is unfeasible because of fer­
tility losses, and erosion which affects the entire watershed. The agri­
cultural programs undertaken in Ixtlan attempted therefore to intensify 
production, making it particularly land-intensive— small livestock 
projects, and irrigated and fertilized cropping of high-value products.
The success of these programs depends almost entirely on good product 
markets, which would make such intensification generally also more labor- 
intensive— competitive with logging or outside employment for wages. This 
approach expressly encourages only a portion of the work force to be 
involved, in order to protect land resources, and perhaps increase the 
total land area worked by each individual. The reduced level of agricul­
ture exploitation, and better methods, should diminish directly the 
erosion problem, and its effeet on the Lower Basin.
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Opportunities Outside Agriculture
Employment for most the population must thus come from outside agri­
culture-in some industrial work or services. If the area is to be 
productive, industry will have to come first. In Ixtlan, this was 
resolved by putting into operation a number of small-scale enterprises, 
and by expanding logging operations. In both cases, the initiative came 
from outside the communities.
In order to foment this diversification, there are several precondi­
tions. transfer of some resources from outside to finance operations, 
adequate technical assistance with good public re1 at ions, and a relatively 
high return to labor.
In Ixtlan, the first precondition was satisfied by the Paper Mill 
providing credit and work aids directly to the loggers. A much higher 
price was paid for use of the local resource in the form of cutting 
rights. The resource essentially became more valuable overnight. This is 
something that can hardly be created by local initiative. There are two 
of view about this type of transfer——that it is a direct welfare 
subsidy to a poor area, or that for the first time a just payment was made 
for the use of a valuable resource.
Generous bank or government agency financing of the small factories, 
which may appear to be a welfare measure, may be viewed at the level of 
national goals as a reasonable local investment with the positive exter­
nality of reversing migration patterns.
To modernize logging operations or even to set up small factories, 
whose profits are to accrue directly to the workers, requires very effec­
tive local organization and good public relations on the part of the 
outside experts involved. In Ixtlan, these problems were overcome mainly 
through the personalism of leading politicians who wielded enough power to 
overcome local factionalism.
Labor Intensive Inputs with Capital-Intensive Processing
Finally, such programs must be profitable to the workers, or the ex­
ercise in employment generation is hardly worth the effort. The solution 
for the logging communities in Ixtlan was quite complex. For the Paper 
Mill to suddenly raise their raw material price in 1972 would have created 
severe economic losses for the factory. In order to pay higher wages and 
prices in the^mountains and still break even, the plant had to be made 
much more efficient and profitable.
Since this was only possible by reducing the input of expensive pulp- 
logs, further plans had to be made to provide alternative markets for the 
comuneros' wood. The Forest Complex, with its diversified products 
provided this new market, such that by the time the Mill reverts com­
pletely to low-cost wood chips and plantation pines, the rest of the Com­
plex should be sufficiently strong to buy up most of the high quality wood 
from the Sierra.
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The smaller forest-related industries in Ixtlan and Capulalpan are 
based on the idea that wood is the Sierra's major resource, and that there 
is a good market for wood products. Whether these markets would remain 
available without the contacts of the three leaders is subject to ques 
tion. The COPRODEO and other factories are not close to raw materials 
or markets and may experience problems because of this. If marketing 
problems can be solved, small-scale industry is a very hopeful solution to 
Highlands unemployment.
Applicability of the Ixtlan Model
Since Mexico as a whole has a shortage of wood and paper products, it 
would appear that expansion of these types of programs, along with commu 
nications improvements could be successful. The Paper Mill has begun 
expanding to the Sierras of Etla and Miahuatlan—Juquila and similar 
programs would operate effectively in many wooded areas. Again, success 
would be dependent upon the willingness of the government to support 
resource transfers, efficient industrial operations, and good community 
relations— which may be the most difficult to achieve.
The growth of Oaxaca City would be a great boon to small-scale indus­
tries that do not work with a local resource, because at least the market 
would be fairly close.
Because so much of the population of the American tropics resides in 
the mountains, and its potential for agriculture is so limited when com­
pared to the lowlands and valley areas, Ixtlan's program deserves a closer 
look by policy-makers involved in tropical development.
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CHAPTER 10. DEVELOPMENT, EMPLOYMENT AND EQUITY IN MEXICO: THE CASE OF
THE PAPALOAPAN BASIN
The Potential of the Humid Tropics in Mexico
With the exception of intermittent financing of the tropical river 
basin commissions, there has been no concerted effort for progress in the 
Southeast zone, such as there was in the North. Now, however, the poten 
tial for major investments in the drier parts of Mexico is diminishing.
As the population grows in the arid portions, the pressures on water 
supplies for purposes other than irrigation are becoming a limiting 
factor. The excessive population (in relation to land) of the Central 
Plateau must either be absorbed into cities or attracted to agricultura 
lands elsewhere.
Another major Mexican economic center could be developed in the trop­
ical Southeast. The humid tropics have many different physical problems 
than are encountered elsewhere (different soil characteristics, road mam- 
tenance problems,healthcare)ofwhichplanners must be acutelyaware.
But the tropics can be a healthy and comfortable place to live and 
certainly a productive one— as the Papaloapan Basin has revealed.
And here is an opportunity to promote more equitable development.
The experience of the Papaloapan Basin was traditionally similar to that^ 
occurring in tropical areas worldwide. Economic growth was slow— the m a m  
benefits shared among a very limited group i ' : foreign investors who
exported their profits, while paying relatively low local wages; Mexican 
investors who behaved similarly; and local ranchers and caciques who 
controlled large extensions of land and other resources, or local 
markets.
But the communities described here, in recent years underwent rapid 
development in the classical sense, with substantial improvements in 
living standards (even for the poorer classes), and benefits distributed 
widely among different social groups. This was accomplished throug a 
pattern of investments which stimulated employment among small farmers and 
the landless. The multiplier effects of their greater consumption 
expenditures then triggered more employment of workers with modest means 
in commercial and service activities.
The history of the four zones discussed in the previous chapters sug­
gests that there is a relatively wide range of options for development 
planning that achieves such "growth with equity." There is not one unique 
strategy but rather an approachto developmentwhoseconcretefacetsmust 
be based on specific local circumstances, background and resources. This 
approach emphasizes employment generation, provision of urban service to
i./ With the important exception of improvements in health stan­
dards through eradication or control of endemic diseases.
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the rural population, and mutually beneficial economic integration of 
towns with the countryside.
Agricultural Development and Employment
Because Mexico's poverty problem begins in its rural areas, "develop­
ment with equity" is particularly crucial in agriculture. In the Papaloa- 
pan Basin the ^ marginalized" groups studied which did experience notable 
increases in incomes and living standards included!
1) ejidos specializing in sugar cane, situated near mills, who 
benefitted from price increases;
2) ejidos and colonies working with special credit programs for 
pineapple, rubber, coffee and tobacco, where underemployment 
of resident labor has dimini shed;
3) ejidatarios working with the Banco de Credito Rural on high- 
priced products such as rice and chile;
4) permanent wage labor on the more productive farm ranches,
who are receiving higher salaries, and whose numbers have 
increased;
5) landless labor from the mountains working in the lowlands 
agriculture and intensified ranching (particularly in clear­
ing and fencing) who, while still not earning minimum wage, 
find much more continous work than previously
6) loggers in Ixtlan whose incomes rose substantially from in­
creasing pay rates
These results were due to a series of factors which affected price 
levels and product composition, land area expansion, intensification of 
production and migration patterns.
Prices, Products and Intensification
^The first major factor in agricultural dynamism was production of 
profit able crops, which spurred both farmer incomes and intensification of 
production. Farmers in the Papaloapan Basin have proven quite responsive 
to real price incentives._ It appears that while high (profitable) prices 
do not guarantee intensification and modernization of production, they are 
a very necessary condition. A rural revival will be possible only while 
agriculture is as profitable as other endeavours. High prices are an 
excellent vehicle for transferring income to poorer farmers, if credit and 
marketing facilities are such that the extra value is indeed channelled to 
them. We have already mentioned that agrorelated industry promotes 
increased production and farmer living standards only if the price offered 
is profitable.
Rubber, pineapple, sugar cane, many fruit trees and cattle can all be 
very profitable.
Diversification is to be encouraged. Products should be chosen in 
accordance with soil maintenance requirements, Much tropical land is 
simply best left in cattle: the key is to intensify operations.
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On ejidos, mixed cropping/livestock systems provide income increases 
from livestock without affecting agricultural employment, because of the 
closed system..^/ Land on ranches can be fanned intensively, with 
livestock operations integrated to reduce costs for both.
A major problem is excessive emphasis on maize. Because of the phys­
ical conditions of most tropical agricultural lands, maize is among the 
least productive and most expensive crops to produce and store m  relation 
to its price. Even in the dynamic zones studied here, maize farmers were 
the one major group which was always "left behind." The major difference 
between them and their neighbors who produced rubber, cattle, or 
pineapple, was government assistance in establishing the more profitable 
but investment-intensive crop.
Traditionally, the number of hectares per man-equivalent^employed has 
been excessively large on ranches and excessively small on ejidos and 
minifundia. Through intensification of production, however, this is 
changing. Size of holding is becoming less important. Small holdings are 
likely to be more labor-intensive than large ones, but this is mainly a 
functionofinternalmanagement. Fromthecasestudies,theonlyconclu­
sion that could be drawn was that less than four hectares per man-equiv­
alent provided insufficient income unless it was of unusually high 
quality, or produced a very high-priced crop, or large inputs of capital 
were used. This is partly due to capital limitations, poor marketing con­
ditions and emphasis on maize. The maximum cutoff was around 200 hectares 
total, after which labor intensity dropped off significantly due to the 
problems of managing so many laborers. This may also apply to collective 
s it uations.
Land Expansion
The second aspect of agricultural dynamism in the^Basin was land ex­
pansion. This took place in response to the introduction of sugar cane, 
clearing for cattle, road-building which inspired immigration to unused 
lands, and active promotion of colonization to unused areas.
Recently, now that most land in the Basin has been claimed, land ex­
pansion has involved the use of lands previously held in fallow or not 
cultivated because of lack of funds and time. In part, this expansion was 
a result of private attempts at intensification in response to price in­
centives . In great part, it was due to public and private credit expan­
sion and government subsidies for land clearing. Even at a low level of 
labor intensity, these combined to multiply that Basin's demand for 
agricultural labor.
Butpolicy-makers must resistthetemptation for quick returns from 
new lands development. Soil fertility decline is common, and other 
ecological problems are inadequately understood. Sustainable systems of
27 Excessive emphasis on livestock however may result in concen 
tration of ownership with consequent decline in labor demand.
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intensifying tropical land use on already opened land 
uncleared) should be the immediate goal. (usually better than
Capitalization of Agriculture
in the Papaloapan, intensification of production did not necessarily 
mean technology. When the incentives to increase production came 
underutilized capacity of pastures, labor and care were employed.’
The level of technology in the sense of using "modern" inputs did not 
seem to correlate with incomes or employment,
But at the present general level of productivity, technology should 
justify a marked increase in employment levels. Specific management 
principles need to be developed to assure that use of advanced technology 
systems are both profitable and labor-intensive.
Most capitalization of agriculture in the Papaloapan that has taken 
place was due to resource transfers of one kind or another. Cattle expan­
sion by large landholders has traditionally been financed through profits 
m  nonagricultural businesses. In Isla, capital lending and transfers 
were accomplished by wealthier members of the community, under special 
conditions of community cooperation and cohesion. Capitalization on 
minifundias and ejidos had been negligible.
Recently, this has changed, with the major sources being private 
banking credit (which is a response both to price increases and government 
pressure), government credit and direct transfers.
The effect of credit on cattle production, use of improved pastures, 
and fertilization and mechanization of field crops has been extremely im­
portant, This is despite the numerous problems of timing input deliv- 
eries, poor coordination of personal, irrational production requirements 
and lack of management experience by farmers. Of all those in the case 
studies who reported that their incomes had improved "significantly" in 
the last years, all but one had used credit. Under the traditional 
money-lending system there is far more flexibility for the farmer as to 
how he used the money— a negative aspect of official credit which still 
prevents wider and more effective use of credit. But lower rates of 
interest and the act of breaking loose from traditionally exploitative 
ties are real advantages.
Credit repayment in some of the agricultural programs (livestock 
credit is still not being repaid in many private and public programs) is 
fairly good. ^The main problems have been in recuperation of maize credit 
for reasons discussed earlier. Along with subsidized land clearing 
programs, credit availability has led to exploitation of thousands of 
unused hectares, usually at a somewhat higher technology level than before 
credit was used, and was an important element in increasing general demand 
for labor. One particularly interesting example was the effect of the 
upsurge m  government ejidal livestock programs on private ranching: so
many calves were in demand that the local price surged, cattlemen 
intensified production and markedly increased private ranching demand for 
full- and part-time labor.
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Machinery use has been promoted privately and publicly by credit 
institutions. Tractor use seems to be justified for use in seedbed prep­
aration throughout the Basin, because this task occurs at a peak period in 
labor demand. Extreme weather fluctuations in tropical environments make 
timeliness of some operations very important. The main precaution that 
must be taken is to mechanize on only certain soil types. Many tropical 
soils have severe structural problems when heavy machinery is utilized.
In Vertisols and Fluvisols, for example, mechanization of such crops as 
rice or chile is reasonable; in Acrisols, perennial plants are preferred, 
which need minimal tillage.
Before using harvest or cultivation machinery (on a permanent basis), 
however, a careful examination of labor patterns must be made, because of 
the relatively greater importance of these activities to part-time labor 
incomes. Such machinery as grain driers for postharvest use, etc. are 
certainly indicated, as is truck ownership, for its advantages in mark­
eting and timeliness of input deliveries.
The other aspect of capitalization of Fapaloapan agriculture has been 
the large infrastructure projects. Roads have been vital to integrating 
the rural and urban economies, and are probably the single most important 
investment there. The big dam and irrigation projects, however, seem to 
have been premature and are still far from properly exploited.
Undoubtedly, flooded areas need protection, and the constraints of 
seasonal rainfall fluctuations must eventually be mediated by supplemental 
drainage and irrigation works that are highly productive. But these are 
very costly investments which, in view of the immediate gains they have 
registered, do not appear to be the best use of scarce capital. Programs 
(including price support) to help farmers intensify production are prelim­
inary conditions to insure that gains from large infrastructure projects 
will be exploited by farmers whose yields will justify the investment.
New Migration Patterns
These conditions have created very new patterns of labor demand in 
the Papaloapan. The expansion of land cultivated, intensification, di­
versification of production and improved rural communications have com­
bined to encourage a very mobile work force. Off-farm income in the sur­
vey ranged from 15 to 50 percent of total income for landowners.
Products adapted to ecologically or temporally diverse areas 
has proven to be one of the keys to Papaloapan development. Multiple 
product development in the region resulted in a broad seasonal distribu­
tion of labor demand. Use of the full-time labor force was expanded, as 
was the potential ofthe areasfor absorbing part-time labor from other 
ecological zones at various times of the year.
Those primarily affected have been landless workers— and those ejida- 
tarios and minifundistas near the main production zones. But Mexicans who 
own land have a remarkable attachment to it, and the latter groups most 
often leave to work part-time during their slow seasons only, even when 
salaries off-farm are considerably higher.
-234-
Migration for the cane harvest is still very important, but on the 
decline, being substituted in some places (particularly those newly in 
production) by the ejidatarios themselves. Labor in the pineapple fields 
is almost all local, comprised of the landless and seasonally unoccupied 
maize farmers. Rice transplanting and harvesting in the Rio Blanco 
irrigation zone attracts similar groups of workers from within and outside 
the Basin.
These patterns have important indications for agricultural develop­
ment planning. The choice for any zone— for example, between development 
of dairy or fattening operations in cattle; or use of harvest machinery or 
nearby migrant labor— should partially be determined by evaluating the 
characteristics of the labor force which feeds or could feed the area.
Moreover, employer attitude is a very important determinant of the 
absorption of labor. Mexico needs new institution and traditions for 
rural employer-employee relations and an orientation to increase land and 
capital efficiency, as opposed to labor efficiency. Certainly, those 
farms managed by agronomists, agricultural technicians and veterinarians 
are now the most efficiently run in the Basin and often the most 
labor-intensive. The schools for agricultural technology are likely to 
have a great impact in the near future; labor management should be 
incorporated into their curriculi. Meanwhile, projects such as the annual 
agricultural expositions can be exploited much more fully to assist small 
fanners and ranchers, and provide management, and technical information.
Industrial Development and Employment
For too long, the Mexican tropics have been examined through blinders 
which see only banana plantations and sugar cane. In reality, the future 
tropics will be urbanized and industrialized. This was so even before the 
oil boom but the petroleum industry development ensures it.
Oil has already brought a great deal of wealth to parts of the South­
east, and promises to bring more. So far the distributional effects of 
development based on oil appear to be very limited. Agricultural develop­
ment , as discussed above, and other types of industry will be necessary to 
counter the marginalization process there.
Industry and towns are more likely to attract workers from other 
regions (partly for climatic reasons) than is agriculture. There is 
adequate water in the Southeast for industry as well as a relatively 
advanced support system for beginning a diversified industrialization 
drive there. Special programs to incorporate the Highlands can be devised 
as in Ixtlan.
Industrialization can be one of the most effective means of modern­
izing the countryside. It introduces a middle-income class of workers 
with different patterns of consumer demand and greater politicization than 
traditional local groups. The educated management and technical strata 
may form a more "progressive" upper class than the more conservative local 
largeholders.
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The numbers of workers directly employed in industry, however, tends 
to be very small in relation to the population, especially considering the 
capital invested. An industry that uses no inputs from the region will 
have minimal employment effects, even in services, because of this. The 
tendency is for heightened differences between the urban and rural areas, 
and reduced economic and social integration. As much as possible, this 
type of industry should encourage substitution of manpower for capital, to 
maximize employment and hence the distributive effects.
On the other hand, industrial investment oriented to the use of 
agricultural products has enormous potential for both urban/rural 
integration, improved distribution of benefits and creation of a dynamic 
service sector. It is essential that this type of industry be managed 
internally as efficiently as possible to permit maximum payments to the 
agricultural input producers. Agro-industry is effective in raising 
farmer incomes only while the price it offers is profitable. This was 
well-illustrated by the history of the sugar cane mills, the Tuxtepec 
paper mill's logging operation, the Tuxtepec rubber processor and rice 
mill, and Isla's pineapple plants. A good transportation system uniting 
the producers with the processors then serves to connect outlying areas 
with a commercial center which can benefit from rising farmer 
consumption.
Large construction projects can also encourage the growth of a serv­
ice sector because the wage workers are paid from outside funds. If this 
is merely floating labor which leaves after a short time, the stimulus is 
short-lived, unless the benefits of the investments (in roads, flood 
control, etc.) are quickly forthcoming.
Much construction work meanwhile, can be performed by local 1abor 
which is either unemployed or seasonally employed. For both municipal- 
sponsored construction and industrial projects, new methods of financing 
must be found— such as was used with the Isla slaughterhouse and 
roadbuilding. Programs to facilitate local control and expand 
opportunities for local government initiative must be designed. Combining 
local funds and initiative with federal government supervision or 
assistance is one strategy that should be examined fully. It may be 
preferable in cost terms, and encourages economic decentralization. On 
the other hand, decentralization of government offices into these places 
is a step toward better integration and official planning.
The experience of the Papaloapan suggests that towns of 15,000 to
50,000 inhabitants provide a relatively comfortable rural/urban transition 
for the populace, and closer integration with the rural areas. This is 
not to suggest that government and other resources be directed to create a 
large number of economically stagnant towns. Rather, a few medium—sized 
centers should be encouraged in every region, through concentration of in­
vestments and communications, to integrate surrounding rural areas com­
mercially, politically and economically. These can exploit local advant­
ages in resources, geographic position or political antecedents.
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Urbanization of the Countryside
The fundamental element which promotes wide distribution of develop­
mental benefits is employment creation for uneducated workers. Although 
there is still a marked potential for agriculture to employ many more 
workers than are presently occupied, the combination of extremely rapid 
population increase and limited land resources requires development of al­
ternative occupations as well. Industry's high capital requirements 
create a similar problem. Thus while creation of greater surpluses in 
these producing sectors is fundamental to growth, the service sector 
dependent on them has an enormous potential for job creation.
Improved living standards depend in large part on one's ability to 
exchange one's own product for a variety of others'. Provided there are 
good communications routes for prospective consumers, the concentration of 
services in towns provides important economies of scale. There are some 
services which are prohibitively expensive to provide to disperse agricul­
tural communities. A certain level of concentration of population in turn 
tends to promote a more dynamic economy.
Furthermore, the chronic lack of services and generally the "ameni­
ties of life" in rural areas is a major factor in the massive rural-urban 
migrations. Certainly, reverse migration will not take place until such 
amenities are more widely available. In the Fapaloapan, one of the main 
sources of attraction to places such as Tuxtepec, and Isla (once their 
economic base was established) was their "civilization"— paved streets, 
raoviehouses, cultural events, good schools. There is no reason why many 
such towns cannot become centers for productive immigration: certainly the 
extraordinary urban growth in the Lower Papaloapan testifies to this.
On the other hand, if agriculture— which must continue to be a major 
source of employment— is to be strengthened, the rural communities must 
enjoy some of these amenities as well, or as soon as incomes and 
educational levels rise, emigration will accelerate. Rural inhabitants 
must be able to live as well as urban ones to prevent this.
Initially, government subsidies may provide many of the services, as 
well as communications networks and.other investments for urban and rural 
areas. But in the long run, the growth of a service and commercial sector 
presupposes net income generation from other sectors, and consequently, 
local initiative and financing for community improvements— both rural and 
urban— should be possible,
The Future of the Tropical Development Commission
The main purposes of the Papaloapan Commission as originally 
planned— integration of the Basin with the rest of the country, and 
stimulation of its economy— have to a large extent been achieved. It is 
time for reevaluation of its role— and of the role of the Southeast 
development agencies.
If the regional planning institutions are to continue to exist, they 
must first relegate the large hydraulic projects to their proper perspect­
ive as only one of many instruments that can be used for the region's
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development. From now on, development in the tropical river basins will 
depend on the growth of towns, and the successful incorporation of rural 
citizens into their economies, more than any series of engineering 
projects. That development must take into consideration the economic 
effects of southeastern petroleum development.
The Commissions' role should be to encourage and assist local munici­
pal government planning for infrastructure works and industrial and com­
mercial investments, through technical aid and organization of financing. 
They should play a leading role in record-keeping and evaluation of pro­
jects both government and private. This would enable the Commissions to 
responsibly guide investment with care to distribution of benefits and 
spatial distribution among towns.
In the Echeverria sexenio, considerable experience in more sophisti­
cated rural development planning accumulated. The PLANPA and PLAMEPA pro­
grams and the Alianza para la Producion, at least in spirit, reflect a new 
approach. The initiative in agricultural experimentation, while still 
grossly inadequate, is a major step forward, as is the preoccupation with 
basic agronomic advances in fertilization, population densities and such. 
There is still a marked lack of programs for mini fundistas and for market­
ing control in general, which is one area with which the Commissions 
should be able to deal effectively. The Fruit and Forest Complexes 
provide good models for integrated agricultural planning.
Efficiency improvements in program coordination (there are far too 
many government and private groups providing the same services, at cross 
purposes) and in program implementation (such as timing of input provi­
sions) should have priority.
Administrative and political provision for more local participation 
in decision-making must be made. With the coming Rainfed Agriculture 
Districts and stronger Irrigation and Drainage District programs, exces­
sive control from the top is likely to become a real problem. Responsible 
local administration takes time to cultivate.
Certainly the day has come for a serious effort to develop Mexico's 
humid tropics. Prospects appear quite good that the above policies could 
duplicate the cases of Papaloapan dynamism elsewhere in the Southeast. 
These guidelines, while developed from experiences in the tropics, should 
also be considered for application to other parts of the country. Strong 
support for the agricultural sector, integration of rural areas with new 
urban centers, and emphasis on employment generation are basic to Mexico's 
future development.
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